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SUMMARY 
This thesis is concerned with the way multi-national issues are 
dealt with by media. I illustrate this by the example of the media 
treatment of Mideast relations, concentrating on three newspapers: 
The Washington Post and The New York Times from the US, and Al 
Ahram from Egypt. The events central to the study lay within the 
Camp David Period of September 1977 to March 1979, with the signing 
of the Camp David Accords in September, 1978, and the Treaty in 
March, 1979 ("Camp David"). 
Because of the media coverage this is an ideal series of events to 
study methods of filtering information within newspapers. Since 
Camp David created as much interest in the Mideast as in the West, 
a comparison of different reports is fruitful. Within Chapter 5I 
utilise a content analytical method to discover what biases may 
have been present in the reporting of Camp David, widening this to 
deal with issues of journalism and the North/ South divide, and 
show that media is less an investigative tool and more an anchor 
for established views. 
A tentative conclusion is an identification of the lack of what are 
considered journalists' most valued qualities: objectivity and 
professionalism. I identify a misunderstanding in the lay-person's 
view of the media profession: as The Washington Post and The New 
York Times show, although articles may have attempted a balanced 
format, these media may not have been investigative internationally 
(though they were domestically). We have to be wary when 
extrapolating from only three newspapers to the wider world (though 
I studied other newspapers and media) but since these titles were 
chosen for their standing and influence, some wider conclusions may 
be drawn. The thesis indicates no single viewpoint of developed 
media; no "conspiracy" somehow politically to defraud or act 
directly for domestic interests. 
I seek a perspective on developed media in a simultaneous analysis 
of the Egyptian media and its milieu. What I contend is of interest 
is that forces acted on Al Ahram, The Washington Post and The New 
York Times which, though different in kind, were more similar in 
effect than heretofore argued. Western journalism I assess as 
operating within a narrower set of models than is frequently 
believed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is principally concerned with how, in one area of 
international relations, multi-national issues are dealt with by 
media. I illustrate this by the example of the media's perception 
of Mideast relations, focusing on three particular newspapers 
(though with other references): The Washington Post and The New 
York Times from the US, and Al-Ahram from Egypt. 
The event central to the study is the negotiation for and signing 
of the Camp David Accords in September, 1978, but the thesis covers 
the entire "Camp David Period" from September, 1977 (when the 
possibility of the Geneva Conference was'firmly put on the agenda 
by the Carter administration) until March, 1979 (when, on the 26 
March, the Treaty was signed in Washington). For the purposes of 
this thesis "Camp David" shall be considered to mean the entire 
period and/or the actual treaties and accords as the context shall 
indicate. 
The usual view of the period (the 1978 Accords and the 1979 Treaty 
are Appendices A and B) has been one of a successful international 
rapprochement, the prime foreign relations achievement of the 
Carter presidency, and an example of realpolitik. Palestinian 
issues raised were submerged by political and military gains for 
Egypt and Israel (Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, demilitarization 
of the north Sinai corridor, stationing of a UN force, access for 
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Israeli ships to the Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal) and by 
increasing Egyptian domestic instability (see Chapter 3). Promises 
about the autonomy of the Occupied Territories (after a five year 
moratorium) were marked only by Palestinian protests. in 1984 (the 
year of promised elections). 
This thesis illustrates how the media can be subject to bias in 
failing to report issues relevant to a Mideast agreement (for 
example how Sadat was out of touch with the needs and aspirations 
of Egyptians or how Palestinians were unserved by negotiations for 
peace, and how US perceptions and domestic considerations permeated 
their interpretation). 
Because of the heavy media coverage of Camp David and its 
relatively short duration, it was an ideal period for studying 
methods of filtering information within those newspapers. Also, 
since the event created as much interest in the Mideast as in the 
West, though for different reasons, there were recurring points of 
reference in reports on the same events, while those events were 
ranked as important by both sets of media. 
Before examining the reporting of camp David (and specifically a 
content analysis of its first part - September 1977) I deal with 
wider issues of developmental journalism (directly relevant because 
illustrative both of Western treatment of Third World events, and 
developing countries' journalistic attitudes), and clarify wider 
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issues of media standards by appeal to behaviour codes involved in 
written and broadcast journalism within the West and the Third 
World. 
Chapter 1 is primarily concerned with a study of the New 
International Information and Communication Order (NIICO) to 
specify the nature of supposed media biases and where they may be 
operative. This gives a formal philosophical context for the 
information and conclusions contained in Chapter 5 (showing clearly 
what exactly critics of the Western press may mean by "bias" or 
"subjectivity", and allowing a consideration of whether these terms 
have any relevance to the way Camp David was treated in both the US 
and Egyptian press). The effect media may have on determining 
foreign policy, domestic political policy, or, indeed, public 
debate is not at issue. 
One of the purposes of this thesis is to investigate what are 
considered to be journalists' most valued qualities: objectivity 
and professionalism. Sometimes the editorial or owners' line, or 
the established views of that particular readership can have a 
marked influence, and the media may be less investigative 
internationally than domestically. Though one should be wary when 
using only three newspapers to illustrate these characteristics of 
the media in general, the importance of all three newspapers in 
their societies suggests wider conclusions may be inferred. 
Historical research and discussion is therefore included: the 
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Mideast from 1947 to the present; the relationship of developed to 
developing nations; post-colonial media, all help set the framework 
in which Camp David was reported. 
But this thesis is not concerned with the rights and wrongs of the 
journalistic debate or with the relative effectiveness of different 
types of journalism for the developed and developing world, though 
the debate itself (including the heated controversy of the 1970s 
regarding developmentalism, and culminating in the Brandt Report) 
is discussed. The centre of the thesis remains the relative 
inflexibility of media identified as an imbalance between the 
developed countries' view of themselves and the view they have of 
the rest of the world (specifically the Mideast) . The thesis allows 
that there is no single viewpoint within the plethora of developed 
media; that there is no "conspiracy" to somehow politically defraud 
underprivileged nations, or act directly for domestic interests. 
The way developed media act may show a paucity of historical 
awareness; occasional resistance to unorthodox views, and a desire 
not to upset whatever consensus the editors perceived to be acting 
most directly upon their papers but this, I contend, could be 
inherent in all media to a greater or lesser extent: notions of 
objectivity and professionalism, praiseworthy targets in 
themselves, may be corrupting if it is believed they can be 
attained in fact. 
I believe the only way a correct perspective on developed media 
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during this time period could be effectively maintained is to offer 
(as I have) an analysis of the Egyptian and US media within their 
respective milieu. What I contend is of interest is that forces 
act on Al Ahram, The Washington Post and the New York Times which, 
though different in kind and intention, are similar in effect and 
substance. 
Chapter 1, in dealing with the communications debate from the 
perspective of developed and developing media shows the structural 
potential for imbalance which following chapters articulate more 
precisely. Chapter 2 outlines the politics of the specific 
historical area the thesis covers, while Chapters 3 and 4 deal 
respectively with the Egyptian and US journalists' responses to 
Camp David. 
It is in chapter 5 that I deal with the specifics of comparison 
between Al Ahram, The New York Times and The Washington Post using 
a limited content analytical approach. 
My conclusion is that once agendas have been set within estab- 
lishments it is virtually impossible for establishment organs such 
as these to disappoint them. With this in mind, I opine that Camp 
David may have been granted its designation of successfully 
completed peace accord by virtue of the way it fitted certain 
agendas rather than by any reference to solid post-1979 achievement 
of its aims. 
V 
CHAPTER 1: 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS ORDER 
NIICO 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter concerns NIICO and its relevance to coverage of Camp 
David both in the US and the Mideast, but specifically in the 
three papers at the centre of the content analytical section of 
Chapter 5: The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Al Ahram. 
The NIICO debate reached its peak in the mid-1970s, when there 
was a general realisation of the importance of Third World access 
to the benefits of advancing communications technologies linked 
to the media. Many Third World countries were left behind their 
needs ranging from information technologies for education through 
to their direct use in and by national industries. Externally the 
problem of technological imbalance manifested itself specifically 
in an inability to articulate adequately Third World demands 
within international and developed fora. The problem surfaced 
both as an image-distortion by the West of Third World issues (in 
this case the variety of Arab demands associated with Camp David 
and Palestinian concerns specifically) as well as the 
aforementioned lack of articulacy in all matters vital to Third 
World interests. 
Al Ahram furnishes an example of the ineffectiveness of a Third 
World newspaper (albeit a newspaper with a longer history than 
most in the Third World): restricted by internal Egyptian 
regulations, lack of resources, poor journalistic training, and 
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few of the many supporting structures enjoyed by Western 
newspapers (use of agencies for general news, reports from a 
worldwide set of correspondents and stringers, and exchange and 
debate on issues within a set or sub-set of similar 
organisations). The thesis provides contexts for the analysis of 
the handicapping of Third World media as well as for the 
empowerment of structures supportive of Developed media (Chapters 
3 and 4) and offers a socio-historical frame for Camp David 
itself (Chapter 2). 
NIICO highlights and measures the imbalance of media from the 
decolonizations of the 1950s and 1960s to the difficulties in 
remedying those biases today. Imbalance in the coverage of Camp 
David acts as an example of precisely those demands articulated 
by NIICO. The furnishing of the Third World since colonization 
with a media established and run for and by the colonizing 
nations remains the core problem even today, characterized by 
dependence on Western expertise and products. Basically 
developing media were too weak to offer sufficiently powerful 
counter-balances to Western media. Accordingly Western news 
distribution services with their own agendas and cultural 
contexts dominated the reporting of Camp David displacing access 
to the media debate of different interests. Decolonization has 
not seen an end to the dual ranking of nations: Northern states 
(the old colonial powers plus the US, USSR until 1991, and China 
-a reborn colonial power) still monopolize world resources and 
production. One of the burgeoning production areas is 
information: news, geological information processed by satellite, 
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satellite time and computer-based interactive technology. The 
benefits'of change in the processing of information are enjoyed 
in the North, while developing countries often languish with old 
equipment, poor training and little access to new technology. ' 
The gap in the'getting and processing of information had become 
so wide by the late 1960s (combined with a belief among some 
developing countries that information held the key for further 
development) that there were calls for NIICO in the developing 
world. For the North such calls ran contrary to a dominant view 
of the natural "free market" for communications, what in the US 
was seen as a constitutional support for the unfettered gathering 
and distribution of information. 2 UNESCO (the United Nations body 
most concerned with containing developed states' desires not to 
inhibit communications technologies) was itself inhibited by 
financial and political measures which effectively killed NIICO 
as an issue during the 1980s. 
Third world interest groups considered media a positive force for 
amelioration despite fears that communication techniques and the 
media itself might increase developing countries' inability to 
free themselves from underdevelopment. 3 Western responses varied 
from country to country, and from media to media (and indeed 
within the media there is very little uniformity in approach to 
any question). This could be characterized overall as "laissez- 
faire" (with the media perceived ideally as sacrosanct). "In the 
economy-at-large, economists ... welcomed a continuously 
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expanding pool of goods and services. ... If everyone received 
more information it was believed, the course was a correct one. 114 
Western media goals, frequently aggressive and often vaguely 
formulated as the "free flow" of global media information, may 
benefit Western media producers (those having resources). Yet 
entrepreneurial goals are signified as impartial "standards". 
Standards for ethical communication rooted in an American 
value system ... are not widely shared throughout the 
world. Criteria of linear logic, empirical observation, 
and objective truth are not used to assess communication 
ethically in various other cultures, religions, and 
political systems. 5 
Even where a Western -journalist is aware of developmental 
problems, there is a chance that they will be encouraged by the 
media heirarchy to tune their work to domestic levels of interest 
and awareness. 
The most persistent problem is that Western news agencies may 
employ people well-trained in every domestic journalistic task 
but-not necessarily qualified to report extra-nationally. 6 The 
media may frequently see things subjectively, despite attempts 
to balance away biases using unorthodox or foreign journalists 
(Robert Fisk writing about the Mideast for The Independent, or 
Yusef Ibrahim writing for The New York Times). For Third World 
media systems the persistent problem is that technical 
achievement cannot easily be shared at the point of research, 
development or (increasingly) production. 'Third World nations may 
find themselves in a system suited to advanced countries which 
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already have good access to information and know-how in vital 
areas. 
The origins and implications of international information are 
bound together in their colonial beginnings. One reason why 
"free" or "developed" international media can so easily appear 
to the developing world as propaganda is that it inherited so 
much from colonial mind-sets.? The world media system as it 
exists today is a direct inheritance from colonial media 
practices, bringing with its past a significant amount of 
ethnocentrism regarding the needs of the developing world. 8 
Somehow the gaps between the knowledge which experts share 
and the widespread ignorance of ordinary citizens has to be 
bridged and there is really no other way to achieve this 
than through the mass media. ... The balance in the flow 
of information asked for by UNESCO is an integral aspect of 
its quality. ... The disadvantaged and the oppressed ought 
to be represented and to have some voice. Mass media, and 
especially news, are still for many people the only way in 
which they can reach some understanding of the conditions 
of the world ... . The more interdependent the world 
becomes, the more important it is that the interdependence 
be sustained by information and understanding. 9 
This chapter will look at four different stages of development 
within the field of information and communication, and relate the 
current arguments and situations to the Third World and the 
Mideast in particular. It could be considered that the Mideast 
is an almost perfect example of the tensions in present media 
practice. 
The central theme is essentially a challenge to the simplistic 
concept that a free flow of information is universally viable. 
Emerging from this is an analysis in section 1.2 ("International 
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Communication and the Developing World") of the dependency 
generated by the free flow of information. I will focus attention 
on the way in which Third World media systems were shaped by 
First World forces, infrastructure laid down by colonizers at the 
height of their administrative power. What the Third World 
inherited was a media system directly derived from a European 
model. The chapter then concentrates on the way developed 
countries' media infrastructures have maintained links with the 
Third world after independence. Western assistance, and the 
nature of this assistance constituted the focus for UNESCO 
criticism, at least until the withdrawal of American and British 
finance in the mid-1980s. Section 1.3, "The Information and 
Communication Order in the Post-Colonial Era: the International 
Political and Economic Context", looks at the considerable 
imbalance in the flow of news from the West to the Third World, 
and specifically at Western superiority in the field of 
news-gathering and dissemination (the direct result of centuries 
of experience which had built up the existence of strong Western 
news agencies) . The output of these agencies dominates the news 
market of the Third World. This section argues that much Third 
World news is only published or broadcast by these agencies. The 
imbalance in this area of news-gathering encouraged the 
non-aligned countries to form their own Non-Aligned News Agency 
Pool (NANAP) in 1975. I will discuss the importance of this pool 
and the problems besetting its effectiveness as an alternative 
news-gathering organization, which, almost before it started, was 
the object of Western criticism. " Section 1.4, "Conflict Between 
Media: Image, Lifestyles and Values" looks at the overall effect 
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of free flow and discusses its implications. My conclusion rests 
on the supposition that the present information imbalance is 
unlikely to be corrected because it is neither institutionalised 
nor planned. 
1.2: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: 
COLONIALISM AND THE MEDIA IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
Understanding the media imbalance between developed and develop- 
ing countries has to be in the context of the relationship 
between the West and its dependent states prior to de-coloni- 
zation. The colonial expansion of Europe into Africa and Asia was 
in large part a desire for new markets outside Europe (while 
simultaneously bringing the South into the European cultural and 
military sphere). Western interests focussed on communicating 
news to and from the metropolitan centres of Europe, especially 
trading information. Such news was important to colonial 
industries, banking and financial organizations. Another, equally 
important task of the colonial media systems, was the molding of 
some kind of homogenous ideology among settlers. " 
A notable factor in most colonial media was the use of European 
languages even if the broadcast was directed into rather than out 
of the colonies. 12 Newspapers were often printed only in English, 
French or Portuguese. This creeping linguistic homogenisation 
continues today within the media systems of Third World 
countries. The use of European languages in some Third world 
media systems was an easy way out of the problems faced in 
broadcasting within a multi-linguistic and multi-cultural milieu 
(such as the Ivory Coast). Because the information infrastructure 
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was created by Europeans any growth of an indigenous media was 
likely to be minimal. Broadcasting reflected the order and values 
of a foreign ruling class, and was dependent on the European 
system for survival. 
A listener could easily imagine he was tuned to a Parisian 
station. Music was mostly French or French versions of 
American popular music. There was little indigenous music 
... Announcers were both French and Ivorian and spoke in 
excellent French. In fact all but six of the hundred and 
seventy-five hours a week of broadcasting were in French. 
There was very limited news broadcast in nine of the 
vernacular tongues. 13 
Whereas the use of French in the Ivory Coast could be seen as an 
advantage, offering as it does the chance of a media and 
educational lingua franca simplifying the problems of numerous 
indigenous languages, the content of broadcasts created a 
specific cultural deficit by their Euro-centrism. Granting 
independence had hardly any effect: the systems tended to be kept 
going in the same way as before, change being too expensive, too 
complicated or threatening to cut off Western help. '4 15 If first 
steps were taken to turn a European model into indigenous media, 
they consisted in restricting organizations from doing what they 
had done for years. This might mean crude censorship of "Western" 
viewpoints. Such draconian measures-reflected the bewilderment 
(or simple authoritarianism) of new governments faced with 
legislating in the complex system of media. 16 
As most Third World countries inherited media developed during 
colonial rule there was a discrepancy of technology for maintain- 
ing that media. Equipment had to be purchased from the West and 
the experience of ex-colonies' media showed a powerful monopoly 
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of Western media concerns, '? and often with that an extension of 
Western structures. 18 
Dependency can divide media personnel of developing nations from 
their native material. One media-linked revolution occurring 
worldwide is loss of adhesion between classes in societies and 
the creation of an international information elite which, coupled 
with the growing technico-economic dependency of their countries 
on western expertise, isolates the entrepreneurial classes within 
their own societies. This in turn strengthens dependency since 
elites see no reason to invest in domestic projects (which would 
be risky) while their money is invested safely elsewhere. The gap 
between classes in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
grew through the 1970s and 1980s in proportion to the increase 
in information technology (whose infrastructures existed mainly 
at some central location) and was reflected by the flight of 
capital from those societies. Western aid often accelerated this 
process. 19 
Dependency theory gives us a clue as to the evolving structures 
of international media. The lack of meaningful independence in 
the poorest countries has been exacerbated since the debt crisis 
of the mid-1980s with a net outflow of capital'from the develop- 
ing world. The consequent influence of Western banking over 
parts of the Third World might be described as "neocolonialism". 
In contemporary dependency theory there is a greater 
element of doubt as to whether the circle of dependency ... is or is not absolutely vicious, and as to whether 
significant change is possible within the existing 
international order. ... There is substantial evidence to 
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show that many weaknesses in the economies of poorer 
nations are partly caused by and sometimes reinforced by 
the political and commercial interests of the stronger 
economies. 20 
It is possible to see the debate as loaded, employing exaggerated 
claims that are difficult to substantiate, and owing much to 
political and sociological rhetoric. 
The contours of debate have perhaps been too much 
influenced by the Latin American experience, where North 
American penetration of technology, advertising, low-brow 
canned US media fodder, has been especially acute in 
conditions of relatively low national government regulat- 
ions. There is a general tendency towards exaggerated 
claims for media impact. When the particular dangers 
predicted in relation to one innovation fail to materialize 
... attention moves on to the next 
incipient weapon of 
imperialism. 21 
Neo-Marxist dependency theory, as outlined by Gurevich, Bennett 
et al, explains aspects of prima facie dependence without being 
able to provide a convincing analysis of what such dependence 
might create within the society. 22 Gearing up the Third World to 
consume what the First produces is one way of interpreting what 
motivates organizations such as USIS (United States Information 
Service). Such assistance serves many publicly-unacknowledged 
goals for the donor country, but need not necessarily be suspect. 
it may be described as neo-colonialism, corruption or effective 
business practice, or simply as a means of offering objective 
news and information on a wide as possible basis. 
1.3 THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER IN THE POST-COLONIAL 
ERA: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Whatever conditions. surrounded the various types of changes 
labelled "political independence", and however much we may need 
to qualify that term with other terms such as "neo-colonialism" 
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(see 1.2 above) independence from European rule did mark a new 
beginning for many Third World countries. It allowed their 
entry into the international community, which, prior to their 
independence, had been composed mainly of Western European 
states. This new development in international relations brought 
with it a need for re-adjustment on the part of both the Third 
World and Europe. For the former it meant their political 
destiny was for the first time in their own hands (at least 
primarily) and that their activities were governed by an 
international code of conduct, while the West had to adjust to 
the shock of accommodation to new members of the international 
community who previously had made up their Empires. 23 
For the first time international relations had to be conducted 
not between ruler and ruled, but as a relationship of political 
equals. This required a new set of rules in international 
conduct, especially on the economic and diplomatic front: the 
Third world, given its young and fragile economies, needed 
protection in its commercial activities with the West. It is 
possible that such protection could be achieved for some 
countries through a period of isolation, though this solution was 
contestable. As part of an assertion of much needed national 
independence, and in recognition of the fact that such independ- 
ence may need an amount of isolation, the Third World had at some 
point to be given similar opportunities for economic planning. 
However, international aid might lead countries away from 
internal development and towards the reconstruction of First 
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World structures; the relationship between the Third World and 
the West remaining the same, more or less. 
Foreign economic aid is frequently advocated ... as a road to development. In the post-War period public ... funds for promoting development became a regular part of Northern 
foreign policies. Economic aid was used because it fitted 
well the desire of the developed market states to maintain 
the existing structure of international economic relations 
and at the same time to garner political influence in the 
developing world by responding to Southern desires for 
development. Aid, however, was a second-best solution for 
the South, for it involved neither a change in the manage- 
ment of North-South relations, nor a meaningful redistrib- 
ution of economic benefits. 24 
Economic institutions devised to rescue states at times of 
economic difficulties operate along conservative fiscal lines. 
Many problems faced by the Third World and Europe today derive 
from a background of Western political reluctance or inability 
to make the developing nations trading concessions. The first 
major reaction to the needs of international trading commitments 
exemplified by Bretton Woods was the Havana Charter of 1947.25 
But as the various GATT rounds illustrate developed states need 
pay very little attention to areas where their concerns are not 
directly affected. The consensus among Western politicians is 
that the international market should not be tampered with until 
it automatically re-adjusts itself in the face of economic and 
commercial problems. It is perhaps the last phase of Western 
political reaction to the failed optimism of Bretton Woods. 
In December 1974 a group of Third World countries pressed through 
the General Assembly of the UN the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States. This included an article on the right of the 
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South to form producer associations and the duty of the North to 
respect the right by refraining from applying economic and 
political measures that would limit it. Yet by the late 1970's 
the prospects for these new producer cartels seemed dim indeed. 
Virtually none had succeeded in maintaining higher commodity 
prices in the face of depressed market conditions: most were 
fraught with internal dissension; and a few never really got off 
the ground . 
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The increasing frustration led to developing states during the 
early Seventies calling for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) together with a complete change in the structure of 
information communication. 27 This began the impetus leading to 
the deliberations of the Brandt Commission reports which 
received scant interest (perhaps because of fears of inflationary 
tendencies underlying the structures proposed). 28 NIICO had 
similar beginnings and constraints, UNESCO formally pledging 
itself to work towards it in 1978. The argument inside UNESCO was 
that domination of all structures and resources of communication 
by the agencies (private and public) of the developed world was 
detrimental, distorting a nation's image of itself by marginaliz- 
ing Third World news. Further, even training for communicators 
(both technical and creative personnel) was conducted by 
Westerners, usually in Western countries. This training could be 
said to instill' alien priorities at variance with a nation's 
social needs and economic development priorities. In other words 
Western media may be accused of setting a cultural agenda and 
thereby eclipsing alternative values. In their place an interna- 
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tional culture held up Western ideals to which people must aspire 
to become modern. Finally, the ownership of communications 
technologies by Western powers was said to mean that any reform 
which did not put power over these technologies in the hands of 
the people of the Third World would only complicate the pro- 
blem. 29 Calls for change and re-adjustment in favour of 
developing countries were already being outpaced by technological 
and economic changes in the West from the mid-1970s. 30 
The economic role of the information and media industries and the 
services they provide are primary factors in the maintenance of 
the system. Whatever complaints come from UNESCO, and however 
justified the attacks may be, little change can be effected 
without developed countries making their own specific economic 
decisions. Notions of "social responsibility" within the media 
are very limited in the face of a technology which has fewer 
political constraints the further one moves from domestic 
political interests. 31 The UN and its agencies have been used for 
pushing Third World demands for economic change, but there have 
been few concrete results (an example of such failure would be 
the Brandt Report's inability to resurrect the NWEO). Success 
in controlling and changing the world's financial organizations 
has been enjoyed only by and within. the West, whose governments 
have been able to overcome the difficulties involved in getting 
together on equal terms and with some amount of consensus to meet 
their own trading and economic needs, and to tackle their own 
environmental and political problems. 
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The continued underdevelopment of the Third World means that they 
furnish the West with a market which can be used advantageously 
by Western corporate capitalism. It is this economic and tech- 
nological imbalance which places the developed nations in a 
monopolistic position in areas of information and communication. 
1.3.1 PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF "FREE-FLOW" 
Presently most Third World countries have- an indigenous news 
agency of some sort, although the capacity of their operations 
is frequently limited due to shortage of funds and trained 
personnel, and the ability to satisfy even their own and neigh- 
bouring countries' thirst for news is limited. Press Trust of 
India is typical, despite the resources of so large a nation. 32 
Such constraints leave a vacuum in the area of newsgathering and 
dissemination which Western news agencies are keen to fill. 
The first serious call for a change in the field of communication 
came at the meeting of Non-Aligned Countries in March 1976 in 
Tunisia, where the acronym NIICO (New International Information 
and communication order) was coined. The call came as a result 
of mounting concern on the part of Third World states over the 
growing imbalance between themselves and Western Europe. German 
Carnero Rogue, a Peruvian media specialist, articulates this 
concern. 
Since information in the World showed a disequilibrium 
favouring some and ignoring others, it is the duty of the 
non-aligned countries and other developing countries to 
change this situation and obtain the decolonization of 
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information by initiating a new international order in 
information. 33 
The founding of UNESCO had been encouraged by the West as a 
result of a re-think of its attitudes after the conclusion of the 
Second World War (a re-think sought directly by the US). 
The triumph of the "value-free" American ideology of the 
media was nowhere more remarkable than in UNESCO, the 
United Nations agency whose areas of activity include the 
media. UNESCO has propagated such American notions as the 
"free flow of information", which inevitably favour the 
major media exporting nation. The most active architects 
and proponents of UNESCO media doctrines have been 
Americans; they have openly based these doctrines upon 
American research - despite the commercial advertising and 
Washington foreign policy strains in the financing of this 
research. 34 
Tunstall clearly indicates the strains that later lead to 
UNESCO's rejection of American influence, beginning at the 
Twentieth UNESCO Conference where newly-independent Third World 
governments, supported by the USSR (taking a belated interest in 
UNESCO affairs) voiced their dissatisfaction at the style of 
Western reporting of Third World issues, and calling for some 
form of international control. 
The case for control was defined in terms of "strengthening 
peace, and combatting war, propaganda and racism", terms 
which it is hard to oppose. But the draft declaration 
added that all such reporting should be done "with due 
respect for the sovereignty and legislation of the country 
in which these media are located", and that "the mass media 
should make known the versions of facts presented by 
states, institutions and individuals who consider that the 
information published about them has done serious harm to 
their efforts" to strengthen peace, ' fight war, racism and 
colonialism. " 
The US took the issue of the promotion of knowledge, peace and 
security through international media very seriously, introducing 
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this concept into the constitution of UNESCO, but with a market 
idea of media, using fixed points of reference regarding media 
and how competition should work according to the Western and 
specifically American model. The one-sidedness of the idea of 
free-flow simply did not register, nor did the implications of 
the founding phrases of UNESCO in the world of a growing number 
of newly-independent nations. 
The purpose of the organization is to contribute to peace 
and security by promoting collaboration among the nations 
through education, science and culture in order to further 
universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for 
human rights, a fundamental freedom which is affirmed for 
the people of the world, without distinction of race, sex, 
language or religion, by charter of the United Nations. 36 
The UNESCO charter also could be used to promote developmental ism 
and even discrimination against primary media producers in the 
West. With such wording it was inevitable that media would soon 
be on the UNESCO agenda. At the first session of the general 
conference (1947) the US suggested that UNESCO should establish 
a worldwide communication system using funds of $250 million. 
But this proposal was rejected by the UK which believed such a 
system would be used by the US as a propaganda platform. 
Although the suggestion was never realised, US influence remained 
strong in UNESCO (though by the sixties this had begun to decline 
as membership of -newly-independent Third World states 
increased). 37 V 
There are many aspects to the problem of information-imbalance 
between the West and the Third World, the most-prominent being 
the flow of news. 38 The main reason for this is the existence of 
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powerful Western news-gathering agencies. Typical of these 
agencies are Reuters of Great Britain, UPI (United Press 
International) of the US (finally eclipsed as a force in the late 
1980s and sold in 1992), AFP (Agence France Presse), AP 
(Associated Press), IPI (International Press Institute), IPS 
(International Press Services) and CNN (Cable News Network). 
These agencies, together with TASS (or TASS/ITAR as it became 
known in 1991), control about ninety per cent of all the world's 
information. 39 40 IPI/IPS (the International Press Institute and 
the International Press Services, see below) is tiny by 
comparison: understaffed, underqualified and underfunded. 
Imbalance of this kind may allow one-sided pictures of different 
cultures to be constructed, and expectations of Third World 
states and cultures to be developed which (whether positive or 
negative or merely simplistic) it may be difficult for a 
journalist to disappoint, and equally difficult for that 
professional to notice events which may conflict with those 
expectations. Crisis-dominated news coverage of Africa in the 
1980s would be a perfect example of this phenomenon, or coverage 
of the Mideast where a popular perception of Israel (a nation 
under siege) was maintained despite contrary evidence from 
reporters. One of the characteristics of news gathering agencies 
as well as the media itself is of a subjective conservatism which 
does not like to disappoint the expectations it may have built 
up with readers over time, and has little time or space to 
qualify. This is partially demonstrated in the reporting of Camp 
David by Western agencies during the 1970s and 1980s (see Chapter 
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5 below). During the November 1991 abortive Madrid Summit, The 
Sunday Times in its major coverage included two articles on 
Palestinian "terrorism", one as a front page story about Abu 
Nidal. Within this frame it would be difficult to condemn 
Shamir's tactics of "finger wagging" or approve the "insult 
trading" of Palestinian delegates (Abdel Shafi and Saeb 
Barekat) . 
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Hardening Western attitudes to calls for a new international 
economic structure (see above) also prevented favorable consider- 
ation of the need for NIICO. However, the West softened a little 
in the mid-Seventies in the face of concerted Third World 
opposition, fearing that they might drive Third World countries 
increasingly into the Soviet sphere of influence. 42 Western 
Europe and the US began actively to discuss international media 
problems once more, starting with the US Senate Committee for 
Foreign Relations in 1976-1977.43 
This effort on the part of the US to mobilize financial support 
for a Third World media structure, was termed by some a Marshall 
Plan for telecommunications. This effectively acted as a 
bargaining chip for the West in their negotiations with the Third 
World over information and communication issues at the 20th 
UNESCO Conference of 1978, but was countered by Third World 
states themselves. In US terms NIICO would be a channel for 
technology from the West to the Third World (within the context 
of a free flow of information), however the final resolution 
which was adopted put forward certain requests. 
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Requests the Director-General to intensify the 
encouragement of communications development and to hold 
consultations designed to lead to the provision to 
developing countries of technological and other means for 
promoting a free flow and wider and better balanced 
exchanges of information of all kinds; 
Invites the Director-General for this purpose, to convene 
as early as possible after the conclusion of this twentieth 
session of the General Conference a planning meeting of 
representatives of governments, to develop a proposal for 
institutional arrangements to systematize collaborative 
consultation on communications development activities needs 
and plans... . 
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Consequently, the International Programme for the Development of 
Communications (IPDC) was established at the 20th session of the 
UNESCO General Conference in Belgrade (1980). 45 This programme 
failed to satisfy the US and therefore at the 21st Session 
another US/Third World resolution was considered. The Internat- 
ional Commission for the Study of Communications Problems (the 
MacBride Commission, having its origins in the dissatisfaction 
which grew from the 1960's onward, see above) had as far back as 
1977 begun an attempt to solve the problems of communication and 
information. 
There is an obvious link between communications on the 
national and international levels. To isolate one from the 
other ... would not only be a mistake, but is really impossible. So many complaints and criticisms in the 
international sphere, justified or exaggerated, about 
monopolies and imbalances in communication, or about the 
role of transnational companies or the neglect of cultural 
identity and heredity, are certainly connected with what is 
often taking place inside various countries. 46 
Most of the participants, having been strong advocates of the 
free flow concept of information, found the Commission comforting 
and encouraging since it did not suggest a fixed programme based 
on militant principles hostile to their free flow position. This 
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was because the Commission stressed a need for reform of the 
existing system, keeping the basic Western information and 
communications philosophy intact, the belief being that any 
measure considered too radical by financing countries such as the 
US would simply be dropped. What McBride broadly-argued was a 
"development theory" of media which recognized a commonality and 
uniqueness in the problems of mass media in the Third World, 
putting philosophies of free flow into new context. McBride noted 
the factors which might make a separate theory and practice 
necessary. 
One circumstance is the absence of some of the conditions 
necessary for a developed mass communications system: the 
communication infrastructure; the available audience. 
Another, related, factor is the dependence on the developed 
world for what is missing in the way of technology, skills 
and cultural products. Thirdly, there is invariable 
devotion of these societies to economic, political and 
social development as a primary national task ... . 
Out of these conditions have come a set of expectations and 
normative principles about mass media which deviate from 
those which seem to apply [elsewherej. 47 
Expressing constant mistrust of each others' aims and require- 
ments, the Third World and the West continued to push their 
demands through the 1970s and 1980s. UNESCO still, despite all 
the difficulties, tried to reconcile viewpoints while in favour 
of NIICO. What remained undefined was the concept of such an 
order itself (apart, that is, from its partial incarnation in the 
form of the IPI and IPS). The West continues to support the 
principal of free flow (notably in the GATT round of 1993) , while 
the Third world knows it is its understanding of the problems of 
information flow, and the political implications, that gives 
their demands credibility. 48 
21 
0 
1.3.2 THE NON-ALIGNED NEWS AGENCY POOL - SOLUTION OR ANOTHER 
PROBLEM? 
From 1960 to 1990 very little change occurred in world news flow 
because very few politicians in developed countries regarded 
alternatives to free flow as anything short of crude censorship 
(though the advent of satellite technology is causing change49). 
Developing countries have moved to free themselves from dependen- 
cy, and one of the most significant efforts has been the 
establishment of NANAP, see above. 50 It has no headquarters and 
no specific funds allocated to it but operates so that each 
member country dispatches news which it wishes other members to 
receive. The sender of the news provides the payment for its 
dispatch, at the same time the receiving country or countries 
would be under no obligation to publish anything. Although NANAP 
has not enjoyed anything like the commercial success of the 
older, Western agencies, the ideas behind it continue to inform 
developmental debate. 
Because this type of news agency is government-run, criticism may 
suggest lack of objectivity or journalistic freedom. It was hoped 
that the pool would one day be capable of satisfying the Third 
World need for mutual news-exchange, since it aimed at reflecting 
Third world events in a more positive light. ' NANAP was conceived 
as very much a materialization of more abstract notions of some 
form of developmental journalism, encouraged by Asian journalists 
such as those of the Philippines. " 
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In much the same way as NANAP, indeed with the same fundamental 
philosophy and needs, the concept of developmental journalism was 
born out of what some Third World journalists and broadcasters 
saw as a need for a socially and politically responsible system 
of reporting with events in Third World societies: a system that 
would take into account the special needs of developing cultures. 
Concepts of objectivity and responsibility, it was observed, are 
ideally approached within the framework of local needs. Western 
attitudes were not rejected but neither were they seen as 
candidates for wholehearted adoption in the radically different 
environment of developing societies. Developmental journalism, 
according to the definition offered by the Non-Aligned 
journalists, ought to take into consideration all the unique 
components of events which make news in Third World societies. 
Although to Western eyes a free and democratic media should act 
objectively and responsibly as a watchdog over government 
conduct, when related to the media in the Third World these 
qualities should be determined by local exigencies. The problem 
of slanting media towards local needs in the Third World was only 
one of many, the biggest problem remained putting the Third World 
on the Western agenda at all without having it summarized in 
terms of calamity, war or underdevelopment. The common denomina- 
tor remained the need for some kind of independence and self-res- 
pect. 
Although the principle of NANAP was founded on a real need to 
balance the flow of information between the West and The Third 
World, as well as within the Third World itself, its operation 
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was never smooth. The reasons were inadequately qualified 
journalists, problems of ideological differences between members, 
and insufficient funding. Since the languages employed by the 
Agency were limited to English, French, Spanish and Arabic this 
caused difficulties in translating pieces of news into other 
languages: linguistic barriers do not simplify problems of 
information exchange through the medium of a news agency. 
Problems of translation and funding remain considerable hindranc- 
es to any effective use of a pool by contributor states, let 
alone the problems already mentioned originating in (Western) 
opposition or general technological change. 
Naturally, the majority of the criticism faced by the organizers 
of a non-Western news pool came omes from the excluded Western 
media owners, experts and journalists. The president of UPI, 
Roderick Beaton, articulated this criticism as part of an attack 
on UNESCO. 52 
I can't see ... how the kind of thing they are proposing 
could have any credibility. The information that would be 
sent out would be sent into a pool by the government and 
then distributed. - It would essentially be propaganda. But 
the thing that disturbs us most is UNESCO sponsorship, they 
are going against the United Nations Charter. 53 
Despite all the criticisms of NANAP, in a limited way it met the 
expectations of member states and articulated a fundamental 
frustration. It increased its circulation - producing up to 
forty thousand words a day by the end of the 1970s and having 
within it up to eighty governmental news agencies. 
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1.4 CONFLICT BETWEEN MEDIA: IMAGE. LIFESTYLES AND VALUES 
The conflict between indigenous and imported media is clear in 
most Third World societies. Besides the tendency of imported 
media to upset government economic planning it may also stifle 
indigenous media. The capacity of Western media, especially 
television, to damage that of developing countries, is powerful 
in those states bordering a nation with a high media profile and 
output. The superiority of Western media in production and 
programme contents is more often than not the reason a 
neighbouring audience is lured away from its own broadcasts. 
Western programmes may be persuasive sources of information and 
attractive entertainment: their effect on the weaker media of 
neighbours can be to attract and sustain large young, 
impressionable audiences. 
The level at which indigenous media may retaliate is low. In many 
Third World cases the role of the media is not primarily to 
entertain but to act as an instrument of government. Compared to 
imports this overtly propagandist role for media is likely to be 
regarded by a population as unattractive; consequently Western 
media becomes widely accepted. Canada, ranking with the highly 
industrially-developed, ironically has long been faced with a 
situation similar to that of the Third World, complaining about 
powerful US media penetration of its society and the consequent 
corruption of its culture. Issues of deculturalisation are a 
constant worry to Canadian government and media specialists. 54 
Nowhere has this re-culturalisation been strongest than in the 
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Third World, media penetration going hand in hand with some form 
of dependency. This link is consolidated through the openness 
of international systems of trade in commercial media products, 
such as film. 55 Even in relatively wealthy African countries 
domestic economics can lead to dependence on foreign media. 56 
Tanzania's relative independence is a rare example of a directed 
effort to rid domestic media of colonial traces through 
investment in the training of journalists and broadcasters within 
the country itself. (The -foreign training of journalists 
producing an orientation of those individuals towards foreign 
cultural values, is an alienation already pervasive in Africa. 57) 
Turning this tide of cultural swamping by the West would require 
an independent media policy, and the implementation of media 
systems modelled on national requirements and not on any foreign 
notions of what the developing society may need. No matter how 
attractive an imported broadcasting network might be, foreign- 
built systems can rarely be adequate. to the hugely different 
needs and aspirations of the societies on which the networks are 
imposed. Since direction of movement of cultural activity is 
virtually all in one direction (from the West to the Third World) 
there will obviously be limited possibilities for any real kind 
of cultural exchange and interaction. 
It is tempting to enter the world media market only as a buyer, 
and avoid the headaches, financial restraints and other problems 
of home production. On an individual level the temptations are 
harder to resist, and the reasons to resist them more abstract. 
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1.4.1: THIRD WORLD MEDIA PROFESSIONALISM. 
In many cases what is striking in the Third World is the lack of 
qualified (and many underqualified) personnel employed in the 
media. Perhaps this is because governments do not wish to employ 
the well-educated and well-trained in this sector, and potential 
personnel are required instead to fill posts in government 
ministries and other political positions. This lack of 
professionalism is partly the result of the media operated as an 
extension of government. Journalists and broadcasters- are not 
always seen as professionals using their own creative initiative. 
The blame must partly fall on governments who make it their duty 
to instill fear in journalists. There is nothing left for profes- 
sionals under such conditions except to publish material 
underground or move abroad. 
National training centres for journalists and broadcasters in the 
Third World can be replaced by foreign forms of training only 
with difficulty, though there is still a lack of proper training. 
However, those countries which do have such facilities are 
tempted to have their journalists and broadcasters receive their 
final training in the West. The effect is to consolidate a link 
between the West and the Third World. 58 A significant problem 
from any Western training for Third World journalists and 
broadcasters must be the frustration when they return home to 
systems far removed from the technologies they have been trained 
to use. The problems their societies face can be different to 
remedies they have learnt abroad. 59 Dependency is plainly a 
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factor in the free-flow of media technology to economically 
vulnerable states. 60 
Like the concept of media itself (and any export from the West 
which has with it a philosophical link to the ideology of 
advancement and is therefore perceived by the exporter as a 
neutral export, of great advantage to the importing country) 
media technology cannot easily be promoted with the interests of 
development in mind. Western entrepreneurs are liable to see 
under-development as a boon, areas where they can escape the 
rising cost of labour and the restrictive practices in the West. 
The US has encouraged South American countries to accept multina- 
tional activities (a drive explicit in the founding sentiments 
of the IMF - see above), while these same countries could not 
easily afford the full costs (economic, environmental, social) 
of these giants. 
There would be a special centre set up in Colombia, funded 
by the Ford Foundation amongst others. This agency would 
help make the programmes and combine the educational needs 
of the various Latin American nations. Each government 
would have the dubious privilege of awarding the contracts 
for ground equipment to the foreign corporations. Most of 
the money to pay off the corporations would be loaned from 
Western nations or international agencies. " 
If the legislatures of the West are uninterested in the 
imbalances of trade generally (and this may-after all only be the 
outcome of their own trading problems) then the problems of 
developing media are likely to rank low on any international 
agenda. 
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1.5 CONCLUSION: THE GENERAL ARGUMENT OF MEDIA IMBALANCE IN THE 
THIRD WORLD AND THE MIDEAST IN PARTICULAR 
No study of the treatment by media of any world event can be made 
without considering the wider issues of possible international 
bias, its causes, and how such distortions are effected. Camp 
David came as one media event in a continuum of misinformation 
as well as within an unequal relationship between developed and 
developing countries. To understand the processes behind the 
reporting of Camp David, together with the range of initiatives 
during and after, one must look not only at the imbalances of 
media information but also at attempts to redress the balance, 
in this case in the context of the NIICO debate (see above). If 
there are lessons to be learnt from Camp David they could include 
ideas about the professionalism of journalists, economic 
relationships of nations and the way this changes the flow of 
information, how the changes in information technology have 
altered the arenas of debate, as well as how far those arenas 
remain much the same with broadcast media (especially television) 
as with newspapers. 
A study of the reporting of camp David can be seen as a paradigm 
of how public perceptions are created and sustained, and whether 
public perceptions can be an important element in the domestic 
political processes which mould foreign policy. A perception of 
Israel (or any country) in the US is constructed out of an 
unqualified historicism (not unusual in popular culture of all 
periods and places) and ideas of maintaining an international 
status quo. However inadequate developmental journalism may be, 
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however naive and unworkable in the face of the financing of 
media multinationals in the age of satellite television, the 
criticisms of its proponents can be levelled at Camp David. Too 
often "new" ties between countries with older, colonial relation- 
ships have (almost ipso facto) been old ties. 
It might be perceived by developmentalist critics that if Western 
multinationals realised the potential of change for boosting 
profits there could be an alteration of the present state of 
affairs. But for such recognition to take place, Western 
capitalism would have to be a more cohesive entity than it is, 
and media (a set of interrelated but independent ventures and 
concerns) less unaffected by debates on dependency or imbal- 
ance. 62 Both scenarios are unlikely to change because there is 
neither the climate for such change to take place, nor the 
incentive (financial or legistlative). Developmentalist econom- 
ists enjoying the first blush of decolonialization in the 1960s 
overestimated both the amount of inter-dependency between poor 
and rich nations, and the naturally selfish nature of Western 
economic development. With the advent of a more global economy 
by the late 1980s the- ideals of inter-dependency were replaced 
by the reality of old-style dependency of the very poorest 
nations (mostly in Africa) and new agendas in the economically 
unstable West. Old ideas of strong and stable Western economic 
development trickling down towards poorer nations continued, but 
not unchallenged. Gradually ignorance of Third World problems 
turned towards fear that underdeveloped countries might threaten 
their Northern neighbours (either through demographic shifts or 
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economic and political instabilities). During these changes 
independent media (despite financial problems because of economic 
change and depression) grew in power. By the 1990s much of the 
larger developed media were more independent of national 
restrictions, and rather than reflecting the politics of host 
nations reflected the needs of an international market. Yet while 
CNN or ITN produced a politically more homogenous package (due 
in part to the vanishing of old political polarities) never 
before had Third World problems been so instantaneously and 
thoroughly consumed by developed nations. 
The media system in the Mideast suffers from problems similar to 
most Third World countries. Arabic remains one of the strengths 
of indigenous culture, there being a high level of interaction 
between the media systems of Arab countries. For example both Al 
Ahram and Al Gumhuryah have a circulation outside Egypt63 and 
broadcast media reach Arabic countries in the age of satellite 
almost as a single nation. Relative cultural isolation in 
developmental terms means there is the danger of an overem-phasis 
on the ideologies of each country preventing the easy flow of 
information between countries (this is one of the problems faced 
in the reporting of Camp David) . 
64 The other notable factor is 
the existence of regional media powers such as Egypt; (prior to 
the troubles of the 1970s and 1980s, the Lebanon also made an 
impact on the media systems of neighbouring countries) but it may 
be worth noting a dramatic increase in education from the 1960s 
has meant that Arabic culture is no longer as self-contained as 
it once was. 
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The major media centres in the Mideast unfortunately are located 
in countries where financial and other restrictions hinder their 
playing a greater role. Similar difficulties to those faced in 
other Third World countries (including the traditional lack of 
adequately trained individuals to run an advanced media system, 
coupled with an inadequate technology) hinder efforts. Even those 
possessing advanced equipment often do not have the necessary 
personnel for its fullest use-This is especially so in the case 
of the Gulf States. 
Outflow of Mideastern news through Western media is according to 
its relative value for Western audiences. 65 "Value" in this sense 
may mean (i) cultural (linguistic, political or religious) 
similarity (ii) similar history (iii) radical divergence - the 
fascination of the different (iv) topicality (v) specialist 
interest (ie financial or health issues). Coverage of Camp David 
may have had elements of all five "value" measures, but 
especially (i) and (ii) which relate directly to the Western 
connection to Israel. While Arabic media used Western news 
agencies to bolster sparse reports, public opinion within the 
Mideast66 could not easily be accounted for by Western commentat- 
ors who quite often saw consequences apart from any relevance 
they had for the region., This news movement was very much on the 
terms of the primary consumers, and the inability of the arabs 
to. promote their own points of view stemmed directly from the 
inadequate media resources at their disposal as well as cultural 
habits not used to self-promotion in the Western tradition. 
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Coverage of Camp David in the US press critical of the form and 
content of the agreement (collectively called the "rejectionist 
front") played a relatively minor, low-key role in the reporting 
of the event, and has had little impact on the image of the 
Mideast in the US establishment from Kissinger onwards. The 
"rejectionist front", negatively labelled and given little media 
space has been damned through national and political disinterest. 
The importance of Camp David (and the diplomatic communications 
surrounding it) to the West obviously comes from the extraordin- 
ary recognition by an Arab State of the existence of Israel, and 
Western knowledge that anything which made another Arab-Israeli 
war less likely could only be a boon politically and commercial- 
ly. (The great fear haunting regimes since the Ford Administrat- 
ion was of another Arab oil embargo. ) 
The imbalances in reportage of the processes of Camp David was 
a reflection of general world media biases, with the addition of 
cultural differences hindering mutual comprehension. The lack of 
resources and access to information combined with a lack of 
Western political expertise simply did not permit the Arab 
community of nations to put their case effectively. This example 
makes sense of developing nations' call for a new communication 
order, at the same time highlighting what continues to be a 
resistance to change within the media industry itself. This 
research will focus primarily on such media imbalances and will 
attempt to uncover the disadvantages facing Third World countries 
33 
as long as this imbalance remains, with conclusions in terms of 
the reporting of Camp David specifically. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
PEACE INITIATIVES LEADING UP TO CAMP DAVID 
2.1 Introduction - the Historical Context 
The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict is complex and 
heterogenous, for the purposes of this thesis beginning in the 
post Sykes-Picot' period from 1918. A mingling of radically 
differing interest groups without a stable commonality of history 
or interests created a complex of antagonistic politics. 2 
Although at the heart of this antagonism there are two main 
contenders, the Israelis and the Palestinians, it would be wrong 
to assume that they were the only parties in the conflict or that 
the violence was somehow hermetically sealed in a Mideastern 
scenario. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians 
encompasses a number of other parties: principally the US, the 
wider Arab nations and the USSR/CIS. But the issues involved, and 
the lack of clarity in the political structure set up in 1948 has 
inevitably allowed contention to spill into the international 
community (which created Israel under the auspices of the UN). 
Finally, issues of race and territorial dispossession are the 
most powerful and problematic, especially in the Twentieth 
Century. Consequently the problem of Israel and Palestine 
continues to have a considerable effect on Western political 
thought after fifty years. 
Europeans have (for the most part) seen themselves as hosts to 
the Jewish people, a group which rarely achieved satisfactory 
integration in most European societies. The main historical 
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problem stemmed from the persecution of Jews by their European 
hosts, and this lead the Western powers towards a solution: the 
accommodation of Jews in a land of their own. The appropriate 
location was-felt to be Palestine, the land from which many of 
their progenitors had been evicted, and for which Zionists felt 
a profound longing. 
One justification for the establishment of "a National Home for 
the Jews"3 on Arab land was the belief the two communities might 
coexist. The legitimacy of one state (Israel) and the non-exist- 
ence of an Arab nation (or in US diplomatic parlance "entity") 
called Palestine within and around it, has made it difficult for 
Palestinians to effect a change in the course of post-1948 
events, any reform having to occur within the legislative 
boundaries of Israel, or within its aegis. Over the years the 
international community as a whole has lacked the political will 
to face the problems involved. The existence of a large domestic 
group of Israeli sympathisers and deep suspicious of the USSR 
encouraged the US to back the Israelis with military and economic 
aid, backing Israel with Western (specifically US) economic and 
military investment in a region troubled by instability. With 
Western influence in Lebanon in the period 1970-1990 reduced by 
anarchy and Syrian intervention, Israel was a possible lever for 
us policy in the region (Egypt was perceived as too unstable and 
factious) .4 
It did not take long to discover advantages Israel could confer 
on the US: even as a block to the progressive development of the 
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military power of other states in the region. Israeli bombing of 
the Iraqi nuclear installation in 1978 is one example. Israel has 
given the US a military presence by proxy in a region perceived 
as threatened first by Soviet expansion and then by a regional 
Islamic resurgence. 
The major proposals for a settlement in the Mideast and the 
explanation of the political background to the media treatment 
of Camp David will be dealt with in this Chapter. Here the aim 
is to frame the processes of Camp David with a chronological 
analysis of the changes in the Mideast since 1948. 
The Balfour Declaration by this time had petrified one strand of 
British policy in Arabia. Although this letter was personal and 
not (at the time) a matter of wider policy, it later acted as a 
foundation for the development of a Jewish State in Palestine. 5 
The "declaration" failed to comprehend how one people6 could be 
planted on another without a loss of rights and political status 
for the latter. Balfour was, like many Westerners, ignorant of 
(and perhaps even prejudiced against) Arab culture; his views 
demonstrated in a memorandum written in 1919. 
... In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the 
form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of 
the country, though the American Commission has been going 
through the form of asking what they are. The four great 
powers are committed to Zionism, and Zionism ... is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, 
of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of 
the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.? 
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The "Europeanism" of the Jewish settlers was seen by some as 
worthier than the civilization of the Palestinian peoples, 
despite Balfour's asseverations in his famous letter to Roths- 
child that "nothing may be done which may prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palest- 
ine". Either Balfour was ill-informed about the intentions of the 
Zionist movement to create a State of Israel on lands occupied 
by Palestinians, or could not see the consequences of that 
settlement; it was in hindsight an unrealistic act to expect a 
national group to suffer loss of land and at the same time not 
consider their. rights prejudiced. Asseverations that the 
Declaration was not a call for a State but only for a "home" do 
not release Balfour from the charge of lack of political wisdom 
in making his statement vague enough to be agreeable to many and 
yet believe it unnecessary to provide any realistic political 
guidance for the settlement of Palestine. 
2.1.2 THE PERIOD 1920-1948 
The period from 1920 (the Allied peace treaty with Turkey and the 
League of Nations entrustment of Palestine to a British mandate) 
to 1948 is essentially twenty eight years of movement towards a 
Jewish state which would exclude the native Palestinian populat- 
ion even from the partial independence allowed other Arab states 
following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1919.8 
The idea of statehood is stronger, and simpler to understand, 
than the concept of some kind of "home", an amorphously designat- 
38 
ed place of refuge for the world's Jews, and the 1920s and 1930s 
saw the idea of a state replace generalizations. What clinched 
the issue in international terms was the disastrous conclusion 
to European anti-semitism between 1941 and 1945 following the 
Wansee Conference. 9 The moral force behind righting the wrong 
was too great for there to be an equally righteous voice raised 
in defence of the Palestinians who were marginalised in a series 
of moves culminating in the UN Declaration of Israeli Statehood 
in 1948. 
On 29th November 1947, the General Assembly, by a majority 
of only one vote, recommended the partition of Palestine. 
... The 
immediate result ... was to deprive the 
Palestinians of their homeland [and] ... the effect of the 
General Assembly Resolution on partition ... provided for 
the establishment of: 
(a) A Jewish State on 56.47% of the total land area of 
Palestine, although Jewish land ownership in this territory 
did not exceed 9.38%; the population of this state would 
have been 498,000 Jews and 497,000 Arabs with the Jews 
established as the ruling class contrary to Western 
democratic principles; 
(b) An Arab state on 42.88% in which Jewish land holdings 
were a mere 0.84%, and the Jewish population would have 
been only about 10,000 souls; 
(c) An international zone of Jerusalem on about 0.65% of 
territory. 10 
The larger portion of the land went to Jews, and in the period 
which followed, more and more leached out of Arab ownership. The 
original unfairness of land division was therefore exacerbated 
by a further shift of power away from the indigenous peoples. The 
situation in 1948 was not helped when the natural arbiter, the 
UN, was seen to do nothing during the partition, despite the 
growing conflict between arabs and jews, which inevitably lead 
to the flight of a large number of Palestinian Arabs to neighbor- 
ing Arab states-" Despite efforts at finding a settlement for 
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the Mideast conflict but each party has its interests when 
setting out suggestions for peace: no two groups could be further 
apart than the Israelis and Palestinians: the claims of one are 
almost totally at variance with the rights of the other. 
There were, up to 1977-79, some fourteen important peace 
initiatives taken by various parties (not counting the 1947 
Partition Plan). The initiatives start with mediation and 
conciliation as the UN attempted to effect an initial settlement. 
On 14th May 1948 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 186,12 
asking for a mediator chosen by the five permanent members of the 
security council. The man given this task was the Swedish 
ambassador to the USSR, count Folke Bernadotte. After looking at 
the problem Bernadotte concluded his task with firm proposals: 
too firm as it turned out for the founders of Israel. 13 
This was the first real initiative taken by the UN. However the 
assassination of Bernadotte together with UN observer Colonel 
Serot by the Stern Gang in Jerusalem on September 17th 1948, 
brought this effort to a halt. The assassinations reflected the 
antagonism of many Jewish settlers to moves to promote peace 
between them and Palestinians. Ever since Israeli governments 
resisted initiatives recognizing the rights of the Palestinian 
people to nationhood (including thereby the exercise of sovereign 
rights over land, property and freedom of movement). Israeli 
governments' continuing objection to any reconciliation centered 
around its rejection of various points, mainly concerning the 
positioning of the border formulated at the Lausanne Protocol 
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signed on 12th May 1949 and based on the November 1947 UN 
partition resolution. While signing the Protocol Israel 
nevertheless felt the partition resolution to be void, taking 
instead the borders of the British Mandate and the armistice 
lines of 1948 and 1949 as the basis for borders. "In effect 
Israel's territorial proposals at the Lausanne discussion in 1949 
meant that the Palestinian Arabs would be left with about 20% of 
the area of their own country. "14 
Israel had always been unhappy about the cross-border position 
of Jerusalem which the General Assembly announced to be placed 
under an international regime (decided in a resolution in 1947). 
The Arab states accepted but Israel rejected this, only allowing 
an international regime for the religious places in the Old City 
which were under the control of Jordan. The UN effort to bring 
some form of agreed settlement failed, and its commission was 
left to deal with refugee problems. 15 
2 1.3 THE PALESTINIAN PEACE PLAN. 1947/1948 
The Palestinian Peace Plan was announced at the UN in 1947 and 
adopted into the Palestinian National Charter in 1964. It 
contains the premises for the setting up of a Palestinian state: 
(1) the state should be a single democratic entity occupying all 
the lands of Palestine and (2) have equal non-racial rights for 
all its citizens. " 
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The original peace plan was rendered a historical anachronism by 
the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949: Israel established itself on 
its own, rather than UN terms. 
2.1.4 RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 
Resolution 242 is that most adroit of UN creations, a statement 
which in some parts can please most people, and whose meaning can 
be differently construed. '? 
Resolution 242 was deliberately ambiguous. It recognized 
... that the superpowers, the regional contestants and the local ones, had differing interpretations of what it meant. 
Did it mean a return to the 1949 Armistice Line? Did "a 
just settlement of the refugee problem" imply implementat- 
ion of Resolution 194 of 1948 (confirming the right of 
return), as an innocent might assume? The fact is that 
Israel, the Arab States, including the new State of Palest- 
ine, the United States and the Soviet Union have different 
interpretations. " 
The background of Resolution 242 starts with the unsuccessful 
attempt by the General Assembly and the Security Council to get 
Israel to withdraw from the land occupied in June 1967. The USSR 
and US disagreed over the methods which should be used to hasten 
the withdrawal. The USSR wanted Israel condemned as an aggressor 
as well as demanding its withdrawal from the territory. The US 
wanted to avoid any outright censorship of Israel, seeking 
instead to use the issue to engineer a form of settlement between 
Israel and pro-Western Arab states. 
Amalgamation of Soviet and US needs meant that (despite later PLO 
acceptance) Resolution 242 is vague and fails to address directly 
Palestinian problems, or indeed confrontation in the Mideast. 242 
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was adopted "unanimously" precisely for this lack of specificity: 
different parties took different meanings from the resolution as 
it suited them, Israel seeing that although their act of 
territorial aggression was denounced in the second paragraph of 
the resolution' (and in l. i and l. ii - see Appendix E), the fact 
of Israeli claims (fundamental to Israeli foreign policy) was not 
challenged. Without direct confrontation with UN policy or the 
policies of those on the Security Council Israel was able to 
unilaterally interpret 242, and continue doing as it wished, 
avoiding prolonged censure from the US or Europe. 
The two most important aspects of 242 are in the words "just and 
lasting peace" or "just settlement" repeated three times, and the 
notion of "secure and recognized boundaries" also alluded to 
three times. " Since Palestine is not a state (and the 
Palestinian people referred to only as a refugee problem, a 
denial of national rights which initially caused the PLO to 
reject 242), the only countries to which 242 could be referring 
(so the Israeli argument went) were Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Syria 
and Lebanon. As Kimche put the problem so succinctly "everyone 
subscribed to it and no one believed in it, since (no one] could 
agree on what the Resolution meant. "20 
The PLO saw 242 as relegating Palestine to a refugee problem, 
keeping it out of any Mideastern peace settlement. The PLO's 
initial rejection of 242 was what kept the Palestinians out of 
any peace contacts. When Israel accepted 242 (under US pressure) 
in 1970 it did so on its own terms, refusing to demilitarize the 
43 
Occupied Territories, and maintaining heavy armaments on the 
Golan (which it used in 1970 to shell Jordanian targets). 
Israel's strategic position (and, in the US, political considera- 
tions) led to a greater latitude where Israeli breaking of 242 
(and the 1949 Geneva Convention) was concerned. Despite Israel's 
adoption of 242 both its value and the value of 338 were reduced 
to that of a plan to get antagonists round a table. 21 338 was 
adopted in the wake of the war of 1973, and has about it a 
desperation to implement 242. 
2.1.5 THE ROGERS PEACE PLAN 1970 
The Rogers Peace Plan was constructed along the lines laid out 
in Resolution 242, and was accepted in 1970 by the Israeli 
government (though with internal dissention). This new US 
interest in the Mideast occurred at a time of logistical demands 
in Vietnam, and since there was a threat of engagement on 
Egyptian-territory, possibly with Soviet troops, some kind of 
agreement using the broad structure of 242 became necessary not 
just to prevent a face-off with the USSR (which had promised 
Nasser anti-aircraft batteries to protect the Suez Canal) but 
also to protect US influence in the Arab world. 
Rogers' position in 1970 was strengthened since Nasser was 
increasingly willing to use US influence to end a dispute which 
had become both wasteful and dangerous. At the centre of Rogers' 
peace proposals was an American interpretation of 242, essential- 
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ly an exchange of land for peace, and a full and comprehensive 
agreement which would be final. It came to nothing. 
2.1.6 THE JARRING MISSION 1969/1971 
The mission led by the Swedish Ambassador to the USSR, Dr Gunnar 
Jarring, had two parts separated by the 1969-1970 Israeli-Egypt- 
ian war. This broke off Jarring's first efforts but Rogers 
suggested that Jarring try again to organize some kind of accept- 
ance of Resolution 242. 
Under military and diplomatic pressure Egypt and Jordan decided 
to accept the Resolution while Syria rejected Jarring's attempts 
on the assumption that Israel had no intention of withdrawing to 
pre-1967 boundaries, a fact confirmed officially in 1971 in an 
Israeli letter to Jarring. Effectively 242 had been used by 
Israel to create a moral buffer for its annexation of territory 
for the purpose (stated as legitimate in 242) of security. For 
a time Jarring was seen as a threat by Israel as the UN acknow- 
ledged Palestinian rights (in a very limited refugee-status) to 
be part of an Arab-Israeli peace process. 'Jarring had no mandate 
to secure international talks, and no support from the US (the 
most important external force in Israeli international relat- 
ions). Oddly it is Jarring and his plans for a peace settlement 
which were first picked up by Kissinger (once he had begun to 
appreciate the complexities and importance of the problem) and 
then by Jimmy Carter. 
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... For all its ambiguities and ultimate shortcomings, Resolution 242 was to be the starting-point for every 
attempt to resolve the Middle East conflict over the next 
two decades. 
... Ambassador Gunner Jarring ... was condemned to follow 
a lonely and ultimately barren road. ... If anything, his 
mission confirmed the impotence of the United Nations in 
this kind of negotiation. ... In February 1971 he pres- 
ented a final plan to the Egyptian and Israeli governments 
which, though unsuccessful at the time, contained man of 
the key elements of the subsequent Camp David Accords. 2 
In March 1972 Jarring gave up the attempt to make anything of 
242, a Resolution which denied Israel the ability to find a way 
to claim permanently areas captured during 1967, and from the 
Palestinian perspective failed to recognize them as a legitimate 
nation. The central issue of the Arab/Israeli antagonism, namely 
Palestinian rights, failed to be reported as a significant part 
of the dispute, as was the insufficiency of 242 to answer 
questions or tackle problems (from any perspective). 
2 1.7 GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE (IN PURSUANCE OF 338) 1973 
The multilateral Geneva Conference had two brief spans of life. 
The first in 1973 was an unmitigated failure; the second in 1977 
acted as a prelude to Camp David but was never convened. There 
remained throughout this period a basic incoherence in US Mideast 
doctrine (which surfaced most obviously -in the Reagan Plan of 
1982). 23 
The Geneva Conference summarizes many of the deepest problems 
faced by all peace initiatives since 1948: that the Israelis felt 
and wanted no common ground with Palestinians; that the US 
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complied with this, partly due to internal political pressure and 
partly because the State Department wanted as far as possible to 
keep the USSR out of any major Peace programmes in the Mideast; 
and finally that Israel felt no imperative to adhere to or comply 
with the terms of UN peace proposals. 
The maverick element added to the problems surrounding Geneva in 
1973 was Henry Kissinger. Chomsky is unstinting in his criticism 
of Kissinger's tactics, saying that he was the person with prime 
responsibility for all the difficulties of 1973, mainly because 
he had instructed the State Department to cease efforts towards 
a peaceful solution. ' Basically Kissinger was a man who came 
late to the belief that for a country committed to Israel then 
the rest of the Mideast had to have strategic significance. Part 
at least of Kissinger's judgement about the region may have been 
based on a dismissal of Arabs as a force to be reckoned with or 
a culture to be considered seriously. 25 Until 1967 they were 
only the accidental peoples surrounding a Western enclave. (Many 
us media reports continued to see them in this way. ) 
The Genevan Peace Conference of December 1973 was the direct 
result of the October ("Yom Kippur") War. The war was initially 
one of attempted recapture by Egypt and Syria of territory 
captured by Israel in 1967. The US supported Israel with enough 
supplies to allow her to mount an offensive despite sustaining 
heavy losses. Although a cease-fire was accepted by all sides, 
the Israeli army maintained its forward momentum. Following the 
war, the demand for a Mideast conference was persuasive (coming 
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mainly from the US and its European allies). But there was not 
enough common ground on which to build concrete proposals. The 
US and the USSR sponsored the conference in the knowledge that 
the October War had very nearly escalated into superpower 
conflict. The US was looking for a way of maintaining and 
extending influence and of lessening the likelihood of any use 
of the Arab oil weapon. 
In this amorphous diplomatic situation (six weeks after the 
cease-fire went into effect) a general peace conference between 
Israel, Egypt and Syria was convened at Geneva under the auspices 
of the UN and co-hosted by the US and the USSR. The lack of 
mutually-agreed aims meant that it met once and was one of the 
chilliest international gatherings of all time. The two sides 
refused to acknowledge one another's presence, would not shake 
hands or even look one another in the eye. The Israelis refused 
to permit the seating of any representative of the PLO, offending 
their Arab opposite numbers. Syria and Egypt insisted that the 
principal issue to be discussed was the withdrawal of Israel's 
armed forces from the occupied Territories and the restoration 
of the rights of the Palestinians. The Syrians, unlike the 
Egyptians, maintained the long-standing Arab position that Israel 
was an illegitimate state. The Egyptians, on the other hand, 
implied that should Israel withdraw and make an overture to the 
Palestinians, Cairo could offer recognition. The Soviets backed 
the Arab position but were troubled by the apparent divergence 
between the two allies. Moscow had no influence with Israel. " 
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That left the US. Kissinger saw a grand opportunity to assert 
US views in the region. The squabbling between Egypt and Syria, 
and Egypt and Libya, suggested that properly applied pressure 
could separate the major Arab combatants. Since Egypt maintained 
the most powerful Arab armed forces its attitude was crucial to 
the success of the negotiations. The first frosty meeting between 
the belligerents was never repeated. Instead Kissinger embarked 
on an eighteen-month-long mediation effort. It represented 
probably his greatest temporary success in office. V The only way 
forward appeared to be negotiations which were not face-to-face, 
through what became known as Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy". 
2.2 CAMP DAVID 
The outlines of the various peace plans drawn up attempting 
settlement in the Mideast show the dilemmas which follow 
initiatives of this nature; any peace plan is merely the latest 
attempt to iron out deeply-rooted problems going back into both 
the period of direct and indirect European colonialism and each 
was drawn up giving Palestinians and Jewish Israelis unequal 
weight. None treated the Palestinian problem seriously. 
Carter's Camp David initiative came as a surprise which, as it 
progressed, was received in the West (and the US) as a major step 
towards a lasting settlement. It was seen as a major peace effort 
because of support given by an Arab leader. Egyptian status and 
Sadat's Westernized and conciliatory tone, seemed to legitimize 
Carter's efforts, and finally Camp David. The process took on 
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a depth of meaning since it aimed at bringing in Arab parties to 
the agreement. (No one thought that since the peace was accepted 
by one Arab leader it further de-legitimized it in Palestinian 
and other Arab eyes. ) Sadat's actions meant that an Arab leader 
had acknowledged Palestinians as no longer playing any crucial 
role in the determination of the region's peace (despite constant 
asseverations in his domestic press - see Chapter 5). Thus it 
could be argued that Camp David had a negative (postponing) 
effect on the cause of Palestinian national self-determination. 
Camp David had different effects: Egyptians felt changes in their 
economic and social life, while for Israelis it was one block in 
a general process of security and maintenance of US commitment 
to the Mideastern status quo. In effect, Camp David was about 
military security for Israel and economic security for Egypt. The 
Israelis saw their security in fixed external terms, while the 
Egyptians (faced as they were with economic stagflation, 
diplomatic stalemate inside and outside the Arab League, social 
discontent over the price of food and basic resources) saw 
security in internal, political terms. For the Carter admini- 
stration the process towards Camp David resolved a longstanding 
feeling of inadequacy within Mideastern diplomacy, bridged the 
gap which previous administrations had created at the State 
Department between the Arab world and the US, and mended bridges 
with European powers critical of US support for Israeli expans- 
ionism. Finally, Camp David offered a firm US initiative to 
compete with both Soviet and Islamic interests in the area. 
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The peace moves between Egypt and Israel allowed the West to gain 
confidence in the policies of the previously suspect new Israeli 
leadership. This confidence for the US took the form of inflows 
of capital into Israel and Egypt as a sign of encouragement for 
both countries. American investment in Egypt's banking and 
financial sector was made possible after the acceptance by Sadat 
of Israel's right to exist. Such investment had been requested 
by Nasser, but a call for economic assistance was linked to his 
strongly independent desire to promote an indigenous economic 
base. "... Nasser's Egypt had tried, in 1953, to interest foreign 
and national capital and to direct it towards productive 
enterprises, but without subjecting it to political conditions. 
There was no result. Hence the "Egyptianization" measures 
followed by nationalizations. 1128 
Seeing this as unfairly uncompetitive the West shunned any offer 
Nasser made, preferring to wait for more of a free hand in the 
Egyptian economy. With his economic initiative (known as "the 
open door policy") Sadat paid a heavy price in the trade measures 
linked to Camp David. His eagerness for a stable relationship 
with his powerful neighbour may have obscured the damage being 
caused by the unilateral trade policy. Whatever the reason, 
economic problems became the preliminary to extremes of social 
unrest. 29 
Camp David generated two main camps: the US and its allies, and 
the Arabs and so-called "rejectionists". There was, in the first 
group, a simplistic (and, considering the internal state of 
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Egypt, uninformed) optimism regarding the, outcome of Camp David. 
Given the sophistication of US media it is curious that the 
initiative became simply portrayed as positive: the realization 
of a long-held dream of stability in an area that was important 
(not least for military and strategic reasons, though also for 
religious and social ones). After the long haul of Vietnam, 
peace, of whatever kind, would be warmly embraced. Camp David was 
an honourable peace for the US by proxy: "for most Americans, 
Camp David stands out as a proud moment in their recent history. 
Politicians regularly embrace Camp David as the centerpiece of 
American policy towards the Mideast". 30 
This political and diplomatic coup dazzled many western 
politicians and media specialists. That there was finally a 
treaty signed by two long-term enemies was welcomed at a time of 
political and economic gloom. Those who felt tired of war and 
wished to rehabilitate the general perception of their nations 
lead the public to believe in the value of Camp David and 
barriers were erected to any criticisms. Those who raised 
objections were dismissed as pessimists because they rejected a 
situation where friendship was seen as a political reality 
between Sadat and Begin, the implication being that peace was an 
end in itself, no matter what the ramifications. Few asked why 
the Arabs had steadfastly refused to recognize Israel. Arab 
issues, if they were heard, were dealt with by Western news 
agencies in Western languages. 
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The imbalance of information (see Chapters 1 and 3) together with 
extensive support for Camp David in the West, hindered objective 
discussion. Feelings of abandonment by regional peoples, 
especially Palestinians, were given a particularly low profile 
(see chapter 5). 
2.3 EGYPT AND CAMP DAVID 
The Egyptian press failed to reflect the discomfort present in 
the domestic population regarding the detente between their 
country and Israel simply because Sadat was adamant that his 
policies should be supported. Journalists who dared express 
doubts, and some who objected outright, were simply removed or 
jailed. 31 
The October War helped legitimize Sadat's presidency, freed him 
from the perceived stagnancy of the Nasser legacy and gave him 
the freedom to move faster towards the political and diplomatic 
change he felt was needed. A peace pact with Israel and simultan- 
eous movement towards the West were logically linked in Sadat's 
strategy. 32 This realignment created a great deal of debate 
within Egypt. In an economy starved of cash, investments and new 
technology, an injection of this sort was bound to have an 
effect. Egypt embarked on a programme of economic management 
geared to an enterprise culture. There were efforts to create the 
infrastructure for tourism seen as a vital conduit of Western 
money to Egypt. It also managed to. create a new set of groups and 
initiatives dormant since the 1950s. Given the fact that the 
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country for over seventeen years was pushed towards self-reliance 
this kind of programme came as a great shock to many Egyptians. 
As the economy became further involved with that of the West and 
(to a certain extent) less reliant on other Arab countries, old 
habits of state investment and handouts to* particular industries, 
together with the reliance of a large civil service on government 
patronage, were progressively shut down after 1973. Subsidies of 
the kinds enjoyed by Eastern European citizens under communism 
(such as for basic foodstuffs) were effectively ended: prices 
rose, inflation mounted and discontent peaked during 1977. 
(Though to read Al Ahram one might imagine these were years of 
plenty for the average Egyptian, with Sadat as a beneficent 
monarch - see Chapter 5. ) 
Legitimizing these changes by a form of political double-think, 
Sadat termed his new programme "Inftaha" (Egyptian-style 
glasnostch or openness). It is easy to understand US and 
European willingness to aid a country abandoning pretensions to 
a socialist economic structure (there had never been any real 
political socialism within Egypt; what Nasser handed on was old 
fashioned nationalism). Huge changes took place following 1973 
without any major upheaval (the Egyptian military maintained a 
permeating presence within society). Inftaha essentially meant 
closing down organizations of the left tolerated under Nasser 
(though Nasser was no friend of the left, and jailed a number of 
communists during his administration) and altering the economic 
structure of government. To begin with people did not feel any 
changes, though within three years it became apparent that 
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economic and political involvement with the West was not having 
any obvious benefit to Egypt. Simultaneously the Inftaha's social 
effect was the opposite of calm and political tranquility. 
The difficulties which surfaced resulted from the emergence of 
three separate classes: those who had economic power, those who 
had had greater access to economic power but felt they were 
losing it, and those without it. While under Nasser such 
differences were consciously repressed, they re-emerged and 
became difficult to control. 
The political shift entailed first of all a swift decrease in 
Soviet involvement (a move belatedly welcomed by the US). The 
impact of this changing relationship was not just the sacking of 
at least two thousand Soviet military advisors but the generat- 
ion, especially among the middle classes and Egyptian "nomencla- 
tura", of a new level of expectation which failed to be matched 
by the economic environment and the chances offered in the early 
1980s. What the new alliance did was create a new reliance on the 
US for political and military guidance. Egypt had never been as 
reliant on the USSR as it became on the US. Political, diplomatic 
and economic pressures from the US may have speeded the rapproch- 
ement with Israel. 
There was more to Sadat's peace activities than domestic 
economics and foreign pressure. Part of Nasser's legacy was a 
nationalism (not easily assuaged without the return of land 
occupied by Israel - territories such as Sinai and Ta'aba) 
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naturally at odds with the humiliation of another military 
failure. The 1973 October War had had a devastating impact on 
Egypt militarily and socially (many Egyptians died in the 
conflict). If peace meant the elimination of war and the ready 
supply of US aid the effort was likely to be supported. 
From Nasser onwards Egypt had attempted the role of leader of the 
Arab world. The possibility that Egypt's security pact with 
Israel and reacquisition of Sinai could be a preliminary to 
winning back some of the lost Palestinian territories was never 
a serious military option but provided powerful rhetoric. 33 
2.4 ISRAEL AND CAMP DAVID 
Political and social changes must be accounted for when looking 
at the Israeli attitude to Camp David: internal shifts in the 
political structure within Israel at that time are useful in an 
understanding of the Israeli reaction to the peace initiative. 
During the Camp David Period Likud were in power, the first time 
Labor had been in opposition. Likud had won ground within the 
Knesset on two fronts: consolidating popular nationalism of the 
centre with people like Dayan (who had been Labor supporters, and 
still had a popular following) while ensuring legislative power 
by wooing the religious parties of the far right (who represented 
a small percentage of Israelis but appealed to a wider constit- 
uency than their vote). The dilemma faced by Likud was one of 
balancing the country's need for US aid (only in 1991 was there 
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wide discussion of Israel's ability to abandon such bilateralism) 
with a profound belief in Israel's territorial role in the 
Mideast. Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) could be coupled with 
the Golan and Gaza to serve the imperative of protecting Israel. 
This was fine so long as the US perception of the Mideast was 
uncertain, and so long as the Jewish Lobby in Washington 
maintained its efforts on Israel's behalf. 
In 1977 Likud was bouyed by increasing Ashkenazim immigration 
from the USSR and popular support for the settling of the 
occupied Territories (at that time including Sinai). But 
embattled attitudes can give way to constructive diplomacy with 
neighbours. "Eretz Israel" (Greater Israel) had to play a wider 
diplomatic game, and some annexed territories might be used to 
secure US approval (the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan were not 
negotiable at that time). Peace could entail giving up something 
despite the awkward consequences for a right wing party such as 
Likud. However this offered a period of stability between Israel 
and at least one militarily important Arab neighbour; domestic 
Israeli stability through a renewed sense of security (perhaps. 
not felt since 1948) ; and finally a move towards peace would 
release Israel from its border security commitment on the 
Egyptian front, leading to the reorganization to other more 
pressing areas such as the Syrian and Lebanese borders. Israel 
made certain the US would guarantee Israel's southern borders. 
A limited peace could be important in terms of US aid, internal 
politics, military deployment, and an effective wedge in the 
traditionally shaky Arab opposition. Peace could allow Israel a 
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more relaxed political climate, and -change some Western 
perceptions of Israel as a militarized monolith. Within Europe 
the stigma of Israel as pariah state could be significantly 
lessened, and was (in the short term). 
Israel on the" eve of President Sadat's initiative was at a 
political crossroads as the old power structures in place since 
1948 began to alter. In 1977 the country marked the tenth 
anniversary of the Six Day War and the occupation of the Golan 
Heights, the West Bank, Sinai, Gaza and (most importantly) East 
Jerusalem. No consensus existed on the implications of the 
occupation of these areas for the shape, demographic composition 
and political fabric of the state. Israeli near-defeat of 1973 
had a demoralizing effect on many citizens: military commanders 
and government ministers had been exposed as human, the myth of 
military invincibility shattered and a measure of fatigue set in. 
As economic conditions worsened and domestic strife grew, the 
integrity and efficiency of the existing leadership was challeng- 
ed. Finally, in May 1977 elections had ended the hegemony of the 
Labor Party. Negotiations with Egypt began in this atmosphere of 
fluid uncertainty, and their outcome could not but touch upon key 
facets of the domestic political debate. ' 
peace with Egypt meant the opening of a new market and a new 
image for Israel in the Mideast, perhaps even a positive one, 
something it had never enjoyed. This is not to say that anyone 
believed Israel would have better relationships with other Arab 
states but partial respectability and partial security is better 
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than none. If a new initiative could achieve this it would 
balance the doubtful military position of the 1970s. From May 
1977 international relations became insecure, despite (or indeed 
because of) Camp David. Begin's Likud coalition was never seen 
as a reliable Mideast partner by either the Carter or following 
administrations. (This combined with a significant shift in 
National Security policy towards a more holistic Mideastern 
outlook. ) 
The Egyptian-Israeli peace process palpably relieved much 
of the anxiety felt by most Israelis. As the fear of war 
lessened, the public's attention and energy turned towards 
domestic issues ... . Menahem Begin's skillful linkage of 
peace and social welfare in his argument for the ratificat- 
ion of the Camp David Accords reinforced this ... . Thus 
the treaty indirectly sanctioned an extractive view of 
politics ... raising popular expectations of government and influencing the tempo, nature, and content of social 
exchanges. 
Sadat also used peace to strengthen his position at home, however 
he gained less than Begin and, consequently, his domestic 
political gains were more easily corrupted. For Sadat, Camp 
David merely postponed problems of internal strife which later 
reappeared as violently as before. 
2.5 THE US AND CAMP DAVID 
Although Camp David was signed by Israel and Egypt, the US was 
the broker, and, like Israel and Egypt, had various domestic and 
international circumstances which shaped its relationship to the 
treaty. There was pressure to maintain strong military and 
logistical support for Israel but also pressure towards a wider 
consensus within the Mideast, at least some of which came from 
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US allies in Europe. The ideal solution was to fill the void left 
by the USSR and adopt another client state (though with fewer 
heavy commitments to Israel). 
Carter was of course a major element in the process towards 
adopting Egypt, and guiding Israel towards a treaty. The 
Washington Post and The New York Times hinted (see Chapter 5) 
that Carter needed some kind of fillip to his flagging presiden- 
cy. Newsweek commented after Camp David in an article about the 
Carter presidency entitled "Can the Magic Last", "... it was, 
quite simply, Jimmy Carter's finest momentn36 but as the euphoria 
surrounding the signing died away so did Carter's presidency. His 
role (like any president's) was to demarcate a special area of 
responsibility which would be his alone, not a hangover from 
previous administrations. This special area, despite being a key 
area of foreign policy, was not domestically important enough to 
reinvest his administration with public confidence. 
Prior to the manoeuvreing over camp David the US had had few 
diplomatic successes. Three years earlier it had managed to pull 
itself out of Vietnam, so it was not surprising that the new 
Democratic administration had a desire for a peace-creation 
programme. Historically the US had had relatively little to do 
with the Mideast; however the paradox of having a client state 
in the area created a dilemma. To the US the aim in the Mideast 
was to ensure stability with political parity (see above). During 
the 1960s and 1970s this meant keeping Israel powerful and the 
USSR out. 
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Global US strategy could be summarized on three counts: extending 
US influence, both political and economic; facing out Communism 
as the natural antagonist to these US interests; and finally, 
strengthening US military security. On these terms it was easy 
to protect and use Israel, since opposition could be identified 
with Communist subversion. Israel was only one client state among 
many, vital for the US global strategic balance. In this sense 
Camp David would have been perceived as a step in a process of 
stabilization, where Israel would relocate her resources once 
Egypt was secured within the US ambit. The Palestinian problem 
was indefinitely postponed: the complaints of the Arab League, 
the PLO, or of non-aligned factions in the UN mattered little. 
What transpired was a media success for the main figures which 
would paper over a lack of adequate US diplomatic philosophy. 
Yet Camp David was a far more ambitious peace plan than any other 
in the history of initiatives in the Mideast. It also was one of 
the most controversial and least understood. Although it received 
support from public, political and academic circles in the West 
and especially in the US, it failed to gain significant support 
in the Mideast. To understand the contending views an analysis 
of the Treaty and Accords is vital. 
2.6 THE CAMP DAVID RESULT 
Because of its subject-matter and context (see above) Camp David 
tended to attract (some might say even generate) subjective media 
coverage. Not only was Israel the central topic (emotively as 
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is seen from coverage in both The New York Times and The 
Washington Post - see Chapter 5) but peace between an Arab 
country and its antagonist was revolutionary. Interest thus 
focussed on the nature of an exciting change not on its critics. 
Although the Camp David Accords, signed on September 17, in both 
the preamble and the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace 
Treaty Between Egypt and Israel" (see Appendix A) talk 
specifically about wider issues than merely the Israeli/ Egyptian 
axis, the result of Camp David both within the media and in terms 
of Mideast changes, was merely to sanctify the new relationship. 
Palestine was not on the agenda. 
The least powerful of the groups, the Palestinians, receiving 
almost nothing from the Treaty, were amongst its most vociferous 
critics. Egyptians remained ambiguous, depending on which part 
of the political and religious consensus was consulted, while 
Israel's other neighbours (the Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians) 
saw the Treaty as a further division in the traditionally shaky 
Arab solidarity. 
The first part of the Treaty (see Appendix B) contained matters 
not only relating to Egypt and Israel but also to the situation 
of the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinians from those 
territories. But the Palestinians were officially excluded from 
attending any of the negotiations on their own if not represented 
by an acceptable party, meaning a sovereign state. 
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Sadat was faced with the political contradictions of the Treaty, 
contradictions stemming in part from roles which he himself 
assumed. On the one hand he had officially declared himself as 
a spokesperson for the Palestinian people as well as negotiator 
for the return of occupied portions of his own country. Yet when 
the matter was complicated by accusations of other Arab States 
(in terms of Egypt breaking ranks with the stance of the Arab 
World as a whole) Sadat claimed that his chief aim was to 
negotiate on behalf of his country alone. 
At Camp David ... Sadat made it clear in writing that Egypt 
would assume [Jordan and Palestine's) role in negotiations 
for an interim regime if they did not come forward to speak 
for themselves. This. was a controversial decision even 
within the Egyptian delegation ... . Egypt, as the 
strongest Arab state, could afford to ignore the criticism 
of other Arabs. It was not shackled by the requirement of 
consensus. At the same time, it was never clear whom, if 
anyone, Sadat could really speak for among the 
Palestinians. 
By the time the Camp David negotiations had been completed, 
Egypt and Israel were committed to two tracks of negotia- 
tions: one dealing with their bilateral problems, which 
would lead to an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; and the 
other involving negotiation to establish a self-governing 
authority for the West Bank and Gaza for an interim period 
of five years. 37 
The peace plans predating and postdating Camp David highlight the 
difficulties of establishing workable formulae. Camp David, far 
from learning from previous mistakes was neither less complicated 
nor more far-reaching. Backed by no direct sanctions for change 
it caused as many problems as it solved, and as a result Israel 
was able to invade Lebanon without worrying about her southern 
borders, because of the guaranteed neutrality of Egypt. 
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Sadat's initial plan entailed Israel withdrawing from the 
territories occupied in 1967. This would-be non-negotiable. The 
second point was that Israel should recognize the Palestinian 
right to self-determination through the establishment of a state. 
The Israeli reaction to this was negative: Camp David was to 
remain an initiative with Egypt, nothing to do with questions of 
Palestine. Camp David was an answer to one, medium-term problem; 
not the business of any states except the US, Egypt and Israel. 
A withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza was inconceivable for 
the Begin administration. As a result Begin submitted an autonomy 
plan to the Knesset on September 28,1977. He used the names 
"Samaria and Judea", for which territories he stated the 
Palestinians could have autonomy: elected administrative councils 
for education, finance, commerce, agriculture, justice and the 
police. There would also be a commission of representatives. 
Representatives of Israel, Jordan and the administrative 
council would lay down rules for the return of Arab 
refugees in reasonable numbers, provided that its decisions 
were adopted anonymously. Security and maintenance of 
public order would remain in Israel's hands. The Israelis 
would have power to buy land and to settle in the occupied 
territories. As to the future the plan stated that Israel 
maintained its rights and claims to sovereignty over Judea, 
Samaria and the Gaza strip, but in view of the existence of 
other claims it proposed that the question of sovereignty 
remains open. 39 
But priorities dictated Sadat stress the Israeli withdrawal from 
Sinai rather than the return of Palestinian territories. He 
concentrated on the dismantling of Jewish settlements in Sinai, 
but Begin could not countenance this without a substantial 
benefit in military and political terms. Potential deadlock 
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encouraged the achievement of Sadat's priorities at Camp David: 
the return of Sinai but little else. 
(Israel] ... agreed to dismantle all seventeen settlements it had established and to withdraw all its armed forces and 
"civilians" from Sinai. The price paid in return was 
Egypt's recognition of Israel, its abandonment of its 
original position on Palestinian rights (self-determination 
and the Palestinian State) and its acceptance of Begin's 
"autonomy" plan for the West Bank and Gaza. 39 
Camp David was no more innovative regarding the Palestinians than 
Begin had himself been at the Knesset in 1977. The plan was that 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Palestinian "representatives" should 
take part in its implementation. Neither the Palestinians nor the 
Jordanians wanted to participate and were not asked. This 
autonomy plan was broken down into three stages, first that there 
would be a transitional period of no more than five years, during 
which those occupying the territories (the Palestinians) would 
have full autonomy, being able to elect their own selfgoverning 
authority. Later, Israeli military government and its civilian 
administration would be withdrawn to certain pre-ordained 
security points. The second stage would entail Israel, Jordan and 
Egypt defining the structure of the operation of the self- 
governing authority and its responsibility. The third would be 
a three year period with self-government not later than the third 
year from the establishment of the authority. From then on decis- 
ions about the position of the West Bank and Gaza would be 
clarified. 
Egypt insisted this would be a first step toward the establish- 
ment of a Palestinian state. To Israel on the other hand this 
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marked the beginning of a circumscribed autonomy which was soon 
disposed of. Israel insisted on retaining sovereignty and as a 
result of this Egypt and the US distanced themselves from the 
Israeli plan. The autonomy talks were suspended by Egypt 
altogether in 1982 after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Israel 
withdrew from Sinai in accordance with the. Treaty (withdrawal was 
completed by the 25th April). Both countries agreed to limit the 
number of troops on their mutual borders, and called for the UN 
to send a force to be stationed there as observers. 40 Camp David, 
as a result of this confusion of unresolved differences, was a 
significant achievement for Israel. 
In this first test of strength between the Camp David 
participants, Begin won. It was a strong signal to the 
Palestinians and Jordanians who were watching to see what 
in reality the Camp David Accords meant to them. In short 
the one tangible gain Carter thought he had achieved at 
Camp David for the Palestinians was immediately lost, and 
with it much of the credibility of the agreement in the 
eyes of the Jordanians and Palestinians. 41 
In terms of original aims, Sadat paid highly for territorial 
integrity: Israel remained adamant about control of the most 
vital territories and coming to terms with the existence of the 
Palestinian problem. The notion of the establishment of a 
Palestinian state is something Israel never conceded as a 
possibility under either Likud or Labor. Camp David, despite its 
frequent invocation of UN SC Resolutions 242 and 338 (see 
Appendix E) failed to answer Palestinian demands. Camp David's 
broad appeals to justice and security made it possible for 
Palestinians to continue to make the Mideast a battleground from 
whence to vent their political frustrations and propagandize 
their demands. Despite the rhetoric, the treaty failed to dampen 
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enthusiasm for a military solution to the problem: in fact 
military activity (both open and covert) vastly increased. 
Lebanon was the major battleground, though elements in Syria, 
Iraq, Iran and Libya were sucked progressively into escalating 
confrontation. 
During this Egypt was, by default, one of Israel's advocates and 
the whole face of the Arab-Israeli conflict was changed. If 
peace, in the words of the preamble to Camp David, could be 
regarded as "liv[ing] in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force" and "achiev[ing] 
peace and good neighborly relations"42, then the Treaty left the 
hostility and suspicion between Egypt and Israel essentially 
unchanged; there were few concrete propositions, which negated 
gains from the neutralization of actual hostility between the two 
countries. Diplomatic and cultural ties were used to measure the 
success of the Treaty but neither thawed the cold front between 
the antagonists nor enhanced social contact between people in 
either society. Israel remained a strategic winner and the Treaty 
gave little to Egypt (except avoidance of a repetition of 1973). 
The treaty effectively demilitarized Egypt, and Camp David 
ensured its new defensive role. Israel managed to move in the. 
opposite direction: armed forces were enlarged (not only in the 
nuclear arena), rapidly building one of the strongest forces in 
the region. 43 Egypt was left almost bankrupt of defense capabil- 
ity: it had not managed to renew any of its weapons systems nor 
asked any of its allies (Arab or US) to help rearm it. « 
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Other Arab states, recognizing change in the region, strengthened 
their military capacity knowing that Israel was doing so. In 
their minds Egypt had backed down in the face of Israeli aggress- 
ion (such as that against Lebanon in 1982) and had accepted US 
aid as a salve to their political conscience. 45 These develop- 
ments hurt Egypt politically and financially and rich Arab states 
found themselves unable to back Egypt because they could not 
understand nor approve Sadat's policies. 46 This was followed by 
the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League (in 1979) and the 
removal of the Arab League headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. The 
humiliation of this development caused two of Sadat's ministers 
to resign in protest: Ismael Fahmy (Foreign Minister) and 
Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel. 
Sadat was under pressure to remove himself from Nasser's shadow 
(who had been a titular head of the Arab world and thereby 
automatically the most difficult act Sadat could follow), and 
possibly because of this pressure he became more of an actor than 
a politician. 
The leadwriters outdid one another in the superlatives they 
heaped upon him. Sadat was truly a great man. His pilgrim- 
age was a sublime gesture ... a watershed in history. ... 
A famous columnist remarked how petty Sadat had made Nasser 
seem by comparison. There was an extraordinary euphoria, 
an unreasoning belief that peace between Arab and Jew - so 
desirable in itself, and so vital to Western interests - 
was finally at hand-47 
Sadat's method of peacemaking (establishing a concordat with 
Israel before gaining any of his demands) gave Israel the dignity 
and approval it desired without any quid pro quo. Egypt entered 
Camp David the weaker partner, fearful of domestic opinion should 
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there be further conflict, and uncertain' of the outcome of the 
peace process as domestic insecurity grew. 
... Anwar Sadat came with his pockets empty. His armed forces were weakened and ... demoralized. His popularity 
was at a low ebb, as the food riots in Cairo in January 
1977 had demonstrated. His relationships with other Arab 
governments, so important to the Egyptian economy, had 
deteriorated steadily through the successive forced 
disengagement agreements, and the trip to Jerusalem. 
One person who was fully aware of Sadat's position was 
Menahem Begin. 48 
Sadat, unlike Begin, knew how to play Western media: by giving 
plenty of interviews to US media, he managed to improve his 
difficult designation as an Arab leader. As an US television 
producer was reported in the Daily Telegraph as saying, "you sure 
have a great president here. He knows the deadline of every news 
show in the States", 49 but it is possible that approval was as 
much for being a Westernized non-communist Arab (along with King 
Hussein) as for flying to Jerusalem to embrace Menahem Begin. 
Approval can be triggered strongly in one group by a member of 
another adopting their standards or rules; this movement 
(performed by Sadat) was guaranteed in a press previously hostile 
to Arab grievances, and was a sentimental magnanimity typically 
associated post military victory. 
The US and Israel had been campaigning for a formula which would 
lift the military dimension of this conflict from the Mideast; 
isolate the Palestinian question from the main stream of Arab 
politics while not diminishing the strength of Israel. It was a 
single campaign geopolitically without much thought to the long- 
term consequences of the Egyptian position and the failure to 
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address resentment in other Arab states which saw Camp David as 
a peace between Egypt and Israel, brokered by an unsympathetic 
power. The Jordanians rejected it and the Palestinians would not 
acknowledge it (despite the fact it was signed with their 
interests very much at the centre of the framework)"50 
Camp David gave Israel short-term respite from US pressure, long- 
term military advantage to Israel, and offered the possibility 
of later ignoring awkward terms. The wording of the Treaty 
regarding Palestine was based on a draft declaration for the 
Palestinian problems brought by Begin before the Knesset to 
establish an Israeli version of Palestinian autonomy. What 
Palestinian autonomy meant in real terms was a continuation of 
conditions within the Occupied Territories.. Although Palestinians 
might conduct some economic activities and basic educational and 
other administrative matters, politically the occupied Territor- 
ies were neutered. 
Camp David created a radically new atmosphere in the Arab world 
(and Egypt). There was a sense of fragmentation and insecurity: 
one of the major powers in the region was eliminated from the 
equation, and eliminated voluntarily. The Treaty brought about 
a unity in imbalance within the Arab world. Egypt had to adjust 
to its new role of being part of a no-man's land between East and 
West (although Sadat had a vision of joining NATO at a later 
stage), while its stand on Palestine changed completely. 
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Hope that trade arrangements with the West would engineer an 
economic revival were not fulfilled. Fragmentation of Egyptian 
society increased to the point where for the first time in modern 
Egyptian history ethnic and religious differences became a source 
of strife. This potential for trouble was made worse by Sadat's 
paranoia (his need for political orthodoxy led him, for example, 
to depose the Coptic Pope) and the increasingly fragmented mood 
of society, both of which had a common denominator in a percept- 
ion of themselves as no longer part of the Arab world. There was 
widespread political encouragement for this idea, and for a new 
pan-African identity, suggesting the Egyptian people had little 
in common with Arabia except religion and language. Sadat rode 
a wave of popular nationalism within Egypt following new Western 
investment which temporarily allowed him to manage social 
divisions and unrest, contain internal fragmentation and prolong 
his control of the divergent elements of Egyptian society. 
But when Sadat closed the PLO office in Cairo he underestimated 
the depth of feeling within the PLO who for the first time gained 
almost unequivocal support from the rest of the Arab world. The 
depth of the injury given the Palestinians effectively united the 
resentment of the Arab states towards Egypt, and gave it a 
temporary focus (at least until the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon). Within Egypt as well, Sadat's adoption of the Israeli- 
/US position created a temporary sense of common horror. 
There was ... good reason for the gravest misgivings. At a 
stroke (Sadat's visit to Jerusalem) shattered the most 
sacred of Arab taboos. The "psychological barrier" which 
Sadat claimed to have breached was indeed formidable. Even 
the earliest days, when the "Zionist menace", as the 
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Palestinians called it, was embryonic, they had refused to 
confer upon it the legitimacy of direct negotiations. 51 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Camp David could not hope to tackle structural Mideastern 
problems, and was never intended to do so. The return of Sinai 
and the incoming US aid packages were its only gain to Egypt 
(though even these advantages could be disputed). It became 
clear quickly, as Israeli West Bank and Gaza settlementation 
accelerated, and the Israeli military clamped down within those 
areas, that the Palestinian question would not be resolved. 
Israel, until the withholding of the 1991 aid budget by George 
Bush, had no need to observe either the UN strictures or the 
details of Camp David. The overwhelming desire on the part of the 
US was to accommodate Israel and to keep the USSR from 
reasserting its presence in the area (which was the threat 
perceived in any action which might be critical of Israel) . These 
factors masked every other relevant issue. The problem of the 
Palestinians was not ignored, it was denied: politically and 
often in the media; the settlement of the refugees in a homeland 
of their own has come consistently last on the list of 
priorities. (Little direct mention was made in either The 
Washington Post or The New York Times during this period of a 
Palestinian state rather than "entity", see Chapter 5. ) Any 
perceived abuse of human rights by Israelis rarely received 
condemnation in The New York Times which was not somehow linked 
to suggested (or overtly proposed) Palestinian/Arab socio- 
political or religious/racial inadequacies. The Washington Post's 
criticisms of Israeli actions were more frequent, but so were 
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criticisms of other involved parties (see Table 5.3 B). It was 
only when the Palestinian population resorted to the Intifada 
that Western public opinion took interest in what was happening. 
Camp David may be one example by which to measure the credibility 
of Western media. 
That [the West] could have reached conclusions about Sadat 
so sharply at variance with the Arabs' and Egyptians' own, 
that a formidable scholar-statesman such as Henry Kissinger 
could call him "the greatest since Bismarck" ... raises far-reaching questions about international relations ... 
about the qualifications of the Western media which, for 
all their massive coverage of the man, ended up with such 
an unreal portrait of him. ... There is but one reason why 
Sadat won such honour in the West: he made peace with 
Israel. It is essentially that ... which caused the West to ignore, minimize or excuse flaws of character and conduct 
which it would find repugnant in its own leaders. " 
Camp David should be considered an initiative from which neither 
Carter nor Sadat gained much in the medium term, and almost 
nothing in the long term. For Carter (as for any major politician 
- George Bush's Gulf War being a good example) foreign policy 
initiatives failed to convince even the most sympathetic media 
that his administration had ideas. Within days of the ending of 
Camp David both The Washington Post and The New York Times were 
profoundly critical of him. What this Treaty cost Egypt was 
isolation, with no political or diplomatic certainty or direct- 
ion. Economically Egypt took a downturn after 1980, where failing 
infrastructure and a small middle class could not be buoyed up 
by US aid. Israel did not withdraw from territories other than 
Sinai, and the sections the agreement dealing with Palestinian 
sovereignty were shelved. Carter was in no position to insist on 
anything. By 1981 Sadat was using more repressive measures 
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against his opponents, camp David his -most costly political 
gamble. He recognized later that he had conceded too much to 
Israel. "Begin has offered nothing. It is I who have given him 
everything. I offered him security and legitimacy and got nothing 
in return. "53 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE OBJECTIVITY OF JOURNALISM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE 
OF 
3.1 Introduction: Professionalism and Objectivity 
In developing societies such as Egypt, what distinguishes 
journalism? Are objectivity and professionalism keys to its 
functioning? How far are the criteria of professionalism, often 
important to First World journalists, altered by relationships 
to a political order such as Egypt's? What insights can this 
throw on the reporting of Camp David? 
Andrew Neil, editor of The Sunday Times (considered by some as 
a maverick right-winger outside the UK press establishment) 
viewed the idea of journalistic professionalism as a red-herring. 
"journalists are tradesmen and women, not professionals. ", If 
journalists and editors are tradespeople, then the burden of 
choice or blame for good or bad reporting may be considered to 
fall equally on the consumer as the publisher. People, the 
argument goes, get the press they deserve. But this in turn begs 
questions of education, availability of news, resources to 
purchase news, and pressure to withhold news. Opposing Neil, an 
argument in favour of greater professionalism would need to hold 
to two crucial points: firstly that society is self-educative on 
a strictly rational basis; and that, secondly, news is important 
enough to the political system to be considered a pillar of that 
system (as it is, constitutionally at least, in the US). 
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There are problems associated with categorising journalism within 
a society. (1) If journalism is concerned with the transmission 
of information considered vital (perhaps socially, politically 
or economically) reliability of service becomes important. Both 
professionalism and objectivity would be important measures of 
that service, and these twin notions might help clarify whether 
journalism could or should have standards, possessing regular 
codes and boundaries to performance: in other words journalistic 
"duties". (A duty as such could only be said to exist if that 
service were important rather than merely like, say, the trade 
of a mechanic governed by simpler standards of professionalism. 
Whereas mechanics should be constrained by legislation aiming to 
make their work safe and any contractual relationship with their 
"public" within limits designed to avoid fraud, journalists like 
doctors or politicians may be perceived to offer a service of 
greater magnitude. Their contract with the public is (i) more 
difficult to define in terms of service offered; (ii) more 
various; (iii) difficult to constrain by "safety" rules, or rules 
to limit fraud because the product (perhaps criticism of a 
political act) is not the same as the skill needed to mend a 
faulty brake. (2) Discomfort may arise since little educationally 
leads them towards their profession. (This has been less so in 
the US where universities offer journalism courses. ) often 
professionalism has been created for journalists from within 
their own ranks. 2 Finally (3) journalists, broadcasters, editors 
and media proprietors may wish to avoid being labelled as part 
of an entertainments industry, if only because there are many 
cases where journalism (especially the broadcast variety) errs 
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towards showbusiness, and some newspaper professionals could fear 
an alignment with the "tabloid" (sensationalist, non-analytical, 
politically extreme) press. But such a wish by itself does not 
help create a categorization. 
Those opposing the US system of feeding media direct from 
university courses might consider it would remove the variety of 
the profession and impose uniformity. But journalists could see 
change as useful, encouraging a higher quality product, and the 
adoption of beneficial "contractual" rules governing media. 
For journalists in the United States, objectivity is the 
most important professional norm, and from it flows more 
specific aspects of news professionalism such as news 
judgement, the selection of sources and the structure of 
newsbeats. Objectivity does not reside in news stories 
themselves; rather it resides in the behaviour of journal- 
ists ... . Journalists must act 
in ways that allow them to 
report the news objectively. ... Objectivity does not mean 
that they are impartial observers of events ... but that 
they seek out the facts and report them as fairly and in as 
balanced a way as possible. ... By having journalists 
define objectivity as being the balanced reporting of the 
facts, the question of whether or not objectivity is 
possible in its scientific sense is neatly side-stepped. 3 
The status of professionalism might make it easier to define the 
role of journalists (especially as societies become more 
regulated, and comparisons can be made with other professionals) . 
Objectivity, though, is not professionalism: objectivity is a 
term surrounded by undefined areas lending it to an infinite 
number of reinterpretations. The two terms cannot be considered 
interchangeable and journalists can never claim freedom from 
bias. Objectivity in media is an ideal to which journalists and 
producers aspire, while being aware that it is functionally 
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unattainable. Semantically value-neutral words could only exist 
outside a sociological context. 
(I have) questioned the possibility of objective value-free 
reporting. ... [T]hat representation in a semiotic medium 
such as language is inevitably a structuring process; that 
values and implicit propositions are continuously 
articulated as discourse on a subject proceeds, so that 
discourse is always representation from a certain point of 
view. ... I am not saying that newspapers are particularly 
"biased" (even though they have a political axe to grind), 
all texts ... are discursive constructions of some world. 
4 
The preceeding may indicate how difficult it is to resolve 
contradictory ideas present in defining "professionalism" in 
terms of journalism. 5 There are clear arguments concerning the 
usage and abusage of language both in developing journalism and 
in the West's own media. Language can easily be used to modify 
perspectives, one party transferring the argument onto its own 
linguistic territory. Propaganda is an obvious, crude case; but 
every media has its own perspective and this may transform itself 
into bias. Subtle differences such as an appeal to Western 
kinship can be used: Israelis were (during camp David) rarely 
portrayed as non-Europeans, and only when unavoidable were they 
portrayed as gratuitously violent (see Chapter 5); Palestinians 
and Arabs in general were shown as either neutral or antithetical 
to Western traditions (veiled women and men dressed in Keffiyeh 
were images often chosen to represent the Arab) .6 There may be 
a belief that journalists' objectivity is a natural extension of 
their function; whether an ideal or no, this perception expressed 
as the wishes of media experts is not rare. 
I assert the strongest possible mission for the news 
profession: does it promote justice? Does it aid in 
fulfilling the stirring vision in which justice flows down 
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like a mighty stream? In a day when the powerless have few 
alternatives left ... should the press not serve as a voice 
... for those who cry out to be heard? 
7 
If subjectivity is taken as a norm, objectivity, especially in 
the context of developing media, has to be something brought to 
the media rather than hoped for as an intrinsic part of that 
media. Can one expect the Financial Times to be more independent 
of the financial institutions it reports (without, at the same 
time, asking it to stop being the Financial Times)? 8 The prime 
motive of much media may not be objectivity or professionalism 
but profit-9 Objectivity, like any quality, may only be seen as 
of value inasfar as it enhances a paper's reputation, and 
increases (or sustains) market share. 1° In world media terms 
profit need not always be a prime consideration; it may be 
replaced by service to a political elite. 
Thus is would be difficult (perhaps inappropriate) to assess 
professionalism in a Third World context, employing concepts used 
in similar assessments of Europe and the West generally; the most 
influential factors (relationships between media and government, 
history of media, development of methods of criticism, relative 
social affluence) are vastly different. It is also inappropriate 
either to judge one in terms of the other, or using the same 
parameters. Journalists in a Third World country can have a 
different relationship to society and might be seen as profess- 
ional by dint of their government-employed status. " 
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3.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EGYPTIAN JOURNALISTS AND SADAT'S 
REGIME 
Few states regard media as inviolable; most see it as a luxury 
of stable society (it is often added that media are vital for 
such stability). With this in mind, it is not surprising that 
journalism within Third World states is often run, as in Egypt, 
as some form of government near-monopoly. Such political 
involvement in the media creates a different definition of 
journalism. With government controls investigative journalism is 
difficult to conduct: journalists cannot be independently 
critical and there may be problems with objectivity. There is 
also the question of the suitability of journalism as a 
value-neutral profession. It is considered easier for a conscien- 
tious journalist to cover a foreign than a domestic story, since 
fewer preconceptions are brought to the former. Moreover, 
allegiance varies from a journalist deeply committed to a 
political viewpoint (crusading columnists such as Bernard Levin 
of The Times, Ben Bradlee of The Washington Post) to those who 
would admit to merely being hardworking hacks intent on making 
a living. However it is unlikely that even the least ideological 
hack is neutral, or that neutrality is valuable in writing which 
relies more on rhetoric than rigour. There are other obstacles 
to journalistic professionalism. Every Western newspaper carries 
publicist-generated material in obvious form (page adverts) or 
more subtle penetration via commercial involvement in the paper 
itself. Once a newspaper runs advertising for, say, British 
Aerospace, can it be relied upon to offer entirely objective 
criticism of the arms industry? A final barrier to professional- 
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ism may be ownership of media. Although proprietors such as 
Rupert Murdoch do not admit to their papers disseminating their 
own ideologies, 12 the political slant of News International shows 
this to be largely misleading. Few professions lend themselves 
as fully to expressing the owners, mind-sets as the media. 
Egyptian journalism remains a government near-monopoly: even with 
resources from advertising media remains attached to government 
infrastructure. As has been noted the editor of Al Ahram may be 
considered a civil servant: journalists and editors are most of 
the time appointed by government organizations. Although 
organizations such as the BBC are also government-owned, a 
balance has been struck to give the Corporation if not full., at 
least limited autonomy. In the case of Egypt thq relationship 
between government and journalists is not that only of 
nomenclatura to central official; the government makes use of the 
law to challenge work seen as unfit for publication and has at 
its disposal security and religious litigation, both of which can 
be used to challenge anything seen as seditious. This. has 
resulted in journalists emigrating to escape restrictions. (Zaher 
Mikhaeel offers a notable objection to demands for journalistic 
freedom in the Third World; freedom,, he says, has to be 
accompanied by responsibility. 13) Under such conditions it is 
difficult for journalists to acquire professional status: 14 for 
example, Egypt has journalists' syndicates but lack of freedom 
renders attempts to strengthen professionalism futile, and this 
leads to a dearth of journalists with "professional" attributes. 
Many skilled individuals tempted to work in media may be deterred 
81 
by restrictions and lack of professionalism. Egypt could meet 
such professional requirements as it has the layer in society 
from which journalists of quality might be furnished. (The 
Egyptian middle classes, boasting some form of higher education, 
are an unusually large group for an Arab country. ) 
3.3 EGYPTIAN JOURNALISTS AND DEVELOPMENTALISM 
For a development theory to have general validity there must be 
common conditions within developing countries which limit the 
application of other theories or that reduce their potential 
benefits. One circumstance is the absence of the conditions 
necessary for a developed mass communication system: the 
communication infrastructure; professional skills; the production 
and cultural resources; the available audience. Another factor 
is dependence on the developed world for technology, skills and 
cultural products. Thirdly, there is the devotion of these 
societies to economic, political and social development as a 
primary task, towhich other institutions should submit, though 
some are aware of coincident interests in international politics. 
out of these conditions have come a set of normative principles 
about mass media which deviate from those that seem to apply in 
any systems of the First World. 
15 
Journalism in developing countries is often a balance between 
dependence and identity. It differs most from Western notions of 
media in its idea of function: media has a "use", an important 
view for developing countries but one which, in the West, is 
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associated with totalitarian attitudes. This appreciation helps 
widen the gap between developing and developed points of view. 
The normative elements of emerging development theory are 
shaped by ... circumstances ... (which) have both negative 
and positive aspects. They are, especially, opposed to 
dependency and foreign domination ... . for positive uses 
of the media in national development, for the autonomy and 
cultural identity of the particular national society. To a 
certain extent they favour democratic, grass roots involve- 
ment, thus participative communication models. ... [C]ertain freedoms of the media and of journalists are 
subordinated ... . At the same time, collective ends rather 
than individual freedoms are emphasized. One relatively 
novel element in development media theory has been the 
emphasis on a "right to communicate", based on Article 19 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 16 
Developmental journalism implies that fragmented societies call 
for a specially coherent operation among political groups. It is 
hoped there could be some kind of coexistence between media and 
government. 17 However the arguments for and against developmental 
journalism are that either journalism is a resource like any 
other and may therefore be used in very much the same way, say, 
as a bank, or that tied as it is to the functioning of democratic 
rights, media cannot be restricted without denying those rights; 
and that such denials have nowhere proved beneficial to 
development of Third World societies (in fact most often quite 
the reverse). The very size, undeveloped and dependent nature of 
the press in many Third World countries has propelled it into 
supporting the government, hence one of the synonyms for 
developmental journalism is "development support communication". 
But this could never be a clear concept. 
It is not easy to give a precise and neat definition [of 
developmental journalism]. However ... one can isolate the 
following elements: the media should carry out positive 
development tasks as defined by national policy-makers; the 
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state has the right to restrict media operations and 
exercise direct control; the operational model should not 
be from the centre to the periphery; special efforts should 
be made in the promotion of national culture and integration; greater emphasis should be put on collective 
ends rather than on individual rights and freedom. 18 
Communication values such as these *cover a variety of 
relationships between government and media. Both UK media and the 
media in China would say it had a social conscience; there is no 
limit to the way journalism is interpreted. Although the concept 
may be neutral one can understand the antipathetic reactions it 
has caused. In many developing countries, particularly those in 
Africa, the need for national development has facilitated the 
establishment of authoritarian political institutions, in which 
basic human rights and freedoms are suppressed. 
Developmental journalism puts the press in an abjectly 
subservient position to the government and reduces it to a 
mere mouthpiece ... . There is, however, another interpretation of the concept, which assigns to the media 
a watchdog role, consisting of scrutinizing the activities 
of the government in the area of development by measuring 
performance against promise. This second school of thought 
sees the relation between the developmental journalist and 
the government as one of a critical observer rather than an 
obsequious and uncritical advocate. 19 
A problem faced by those Third World governments interested in 
harnessing media to local problems, is that, by their nature, 
media have a momentum of their own, related partially to their 
goals, and partially to their means. 
Another tangle in which media in developing countries find 
themselves is how to harmonize the compulsions of the media 
and the governments' constant efforts to regulate them. ... To be effective, they have to be necessarily decentralized 
and enjoy a fair degree of autonomy,. However in India and 
other Asian countries, they have been converted into 
over-centralized, top-heavy bureaucratic monoliths. What 
happens to them under such circumstances? Their growth 
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comes to be determined not by plans and professionals, but 
by events and accidents. 20 
Egyptian media under Sadat has been faced with exactly this 
problem. Unable to come to terms with its highly developed 
capabilities (such as the relatively high standard of its 
journalists) and the demands of the government in terms of 
Israeli-Egyptian and Arabic-Egyptian detente, a gap opened up at 
the level of political participation and consensus, and it is 
given a louder and more coherent voice than in many other Third 
World countries by the large and articulate class of media 
intellectuals. This has proved problematic since Egypt has, for 
reasons of class and education discussed above, a natural 
interest even reliance on written media among a broader than 
usual social group for a Third World state. But the subordination 
of Egyptian culture to the influx from the West created doubt, 
uncertainty and reaction (in the form of resurgent Islam). This 
reaction to cultural imports was less of a problem in Egypt than 
other Arab countries because of the isolationism imposed during 
Nasser's presidency, and the strongly-developed nature of the 
indigenous press even during the colonial period, but still the 
problem existed. Indeed it was exacerbated under Sadat when 
external barriers broke down. The resulting problems varied'from 
the more complex issues of language integrity to the less 
abstruse but inevitable attraction among younger Egyptians to 
Western styles of dress and codes of behaviour, and the resulting 
friction caused with conservative elements in society. 
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One problem specific to Egyptian and Arab media is written 
Arabic. This is difficult for the average person who is less 
well-educated to understand, catering for the educated who know 
its classical base. Classical Arabic can be seen as an exclusive 
code, much like specialist English usages (by academics for 
example) but taken to a greater extreme. A problem of language 
may be different for each Third World country, but in some form 
it is present in each. The eroding of a sense of Egyptian 
autonomy before and during Camp David created an atmosphere of 
ambivalence in the national media; while any independence was 
cancelled by fear and the position of journalists as civil 
servants. In Egypt there was from Nasser until Mubarak no clear 
distinction between the role of media and of government. 21 Even 
with a media so old and well-established there was dogmatic 
subservience to authority symbolised (especially in the Nasser 
and Sadat administrations) by a concentration on the portrait of 
the president, which took a regular central place in every 
paper. 22 
One of developmental journalism's central concepts is that media 
will assist development by furnishing the groundwork for 
discussion of policies. With illiterate populations (the highest 
illiteracy rates are in groups most basically effected by 
economic changes) this may be fanciful. Sadat's "open-door" 
economic policies were never comprehensively explained, nor could 
they be to the urban poor largely effected by his raising the 
price of bread. Had they been explained would those who rioted 
in 1976 and 1977 have listened? The ordinary Egyptian remained 
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out of touch with government actions. 23 Egypt had become, by the 
late 1970s, an example of the failure of conventionally-applied, 
state-orientated journalism within a developing society. Nasser, 
realizing the power of radio, monopolized it. "After the revolut- 
ion, and particularly once colonel Nasser emerged as the 
undoubted leader of Egypt, broadcasting suddenly became a vital 
means of welding the new country together into a coherent nation 
and making its influence felt as a vital force throughout the 
Mideast. j24 Governmental control was clearly in Nasser's mind 
when he drew up the policies of the broadcasting organizations. 
1. To enhance the standard of all kind of art. 
2. To strengthen the national consensus as well as the 
social, co-operative feelings, to promote the essence of 
co-operation between individuals and groups; to encourage 
favourable habits and customs and to discourage improper 
ones. 
3. To participate in educational. campaigns among the 
people, and to follow up intellectual and artistic 
activities among the cultivated circles. 
4. To deal with social problems and to exert adherence to 
moral and ethical values. 
5. To revive the literary, scientific and artistic Arab 
heritage. 
6. To acquaint the people with the best products of human 
civilization. 
7. To enlighten public opinion about internal and external 
news and to inform of the various worlds trends. 
8. To bring the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Arab world 
to the notice of foreign countries. 
9. To promote talents in every field of intellect and 
inventiveness. 
10. To promote relations between residing compatriots and 
those who left the country. 
11. To entertain the compatriots. " 
What appeared as enlightened (even "developmental") aims actually 
lead to central control. The difference between Sadat and Nasser 
was that Nasser intended to use broadcasting and the media in 
more restricted ideological terms, Sadat's probable aim was to 
direct a heterogenous public to support an unpopular programme 
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of detente. 26 The media system under both leaders was a vehicle 
continuously carrying favourable comments on the man his regime 
and his policies. Media was considered too vital and potent to 
be left in the hands of "mere" journalists. In Egypt half the 
leading journalists, broadcasters and press editors were and are 
politically prominent individuals in society. Even Nasser and 
Sadat retained strong connections with the press and were 
associated with it before they rose to power, (the former was 
famous for his revolutionary writing prior to his leadership, and 
the latter was editor of a prominent Egyptian newspaper - the 
daily Al Gumhuryah). Conflict arose partly because of- this 
personal political contact, putting journalists in an invidious 
position. To further complicate matters, the extent of a 
government's fear of such individuals was expressed in Sadat's 
paranoia. Journalists' reaction to suppression was abstinence 
from political criticism; an exercise in self-censorship. Some 
general anxieties were channelled elsewhere: the novels of-Naguib 
Mahfouz were a radically different commentary from that favoured 
in the anodyne columns of the official dailies. 27 Although Sadat 
issued a decree to end press censorship in -1974, control remained 
since he had appointed editors and press union leaders 
sympathetic to his own policies and political ideology (as had 
Nasser). In essence, Sadat's methods differed very little from 
Nasser's. 
On 28 August (1974) Sadat asked a special committee to 
draft a working paper for the reorganization' of the press. 
Speaking to editors in Alexandria, he criticized newspapers 
for sarcasm about the country's economic position, 
reinforcing the impression that editors who did not keep 
control would be dismissed (as 'Hiekel had been) or 
transferred to other newspapers. A switching of editors 
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duly took place affecting al Ahram, al Gumhuryah and the 
Egyptian Gazette. [In 1976] Sadat ordered yet another 
. major reorganization of 
the senior management and editors 
of the main newspapers and publishing houses. " 
The Bread Riots were a test of press loyalty to Sadat. Most 
passed but the left-wing al Tali'a (from al Ahram's media stable) 
and Rose el-Yousuf suggested that the riots had been an 
expression of popular dissatisfaction. 29 By April . 1977 both 
publications had new editors. Despite attempts at controlling 
debate that Spring saw a lively discussion of domestic and 
foreign policy issues conducted in the Majlis and universities. 
The government fought back by imposing printing and financial 
restrictions and then use the Socialist Prosecutor, who began 
seizing issues of al Ahali on the grounds of being anti-democrat- 
ic. 30 Whether or, not specific censorship laws had been abandoned, 
there remained a consensus imposed top-down. 
Under such conditions of limited freedom the press changes. One 
of Sadat's chief opponents was Mohammed Heikal, appointed editor 
of Al Ahram. Heikel pointed out in Autumn of Furv31 that, in the 
entire history of the paper, there had been five editors; after 
Sadat dismissed him the newspaper changed editors eight times in 
eight years, demonstrating the political conflict in which Sadat 
later found himself enmeshed. The Egyptian literate middle 
classes were on the whole politically aware, their interests 
usually well catered for (there are nine daily newspapers in 
Cairo alone), but Nasser and Sadat set a tone of propagandism 
which encouraged people towards external media (the Voice of 
America, the Arabic service of the BBC, or the media of neighbor- 
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ing Arab states) . The government had a unique way of disciplining 
journalists when it saw publication of material as undesirable: 
material was suppressed while the state continued paying the 
journalists responsible their salaries. It was a highly 
paternalistic discipline of frustration. Combined with vaguely- 
applied laws at the government's disposal censorship in Egypt 
had, as elsewhere, a pseudo-legal basis, appealed to sometimes 
in the name of religion and sometimes of security. 
3.4 CAMP DAVID 
Any moves towards peace in an area beset with conflicts are 
difficult to gainsay. When favourable analysis made the headlines 
during Camp David it was difficult for any Egyptian group to 
challenge without seeming to be retrogressive and bellicose. 
Those who opposed the peace (on whatever grounds) were dismissed 
as pessimists (see Chapter 5). When looking at the reporting of 
Camp David issues were often simplified by turning the West's 
strongest regional supporter, Sadat, into a hero. In the face of 
simple optimism, complexities which might have lead to 
reservations could be branded negative and pessimistic. Yet 
despite favourable media attention public opinion remained just 
as rejectionist, possibly as a direct reaction to the pressure 
put on the media by Sadat's administration. Despite the higher 
level of professionalism among Egyptian journalists, to talk of 
objectivity under such conditions would be invalid. 
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There were similarities between the Egyptian and US press 
treatment of Camp David. The case of al Ahram was typical: the 
difficulties faced by the editors and journalists were enormous. 
This being a newspaper of importance internally and externally, 
it could not but toe the official line. For most journalists and 
some editors this may have been anathema, but still little of 
their vilification could be articulated (though continuous 
references to the "progress" Sadat made domestically and 
internationally in Al Ahram might be a negative indicator of the 
pressure joursnalists were under). Most articles treating Camp 
David had their sources in official announcements (see Chapter 
5.6). If the government condemned Israel, editorial comment took 
the same line. There was little independent commentary or 
condemnation of government action; no substantive critique of 
Camp David, and after the Treaty in 1979 both Al Ahram and Al 
Gumhuryah stated what, in essence, ýwas the official line. 
There is no dispute except that Israel is not ready to 
respond to , the call for" peace with a spirit of 
understanding and law acceptable by international society, 
that is the assurance of sovereignty and no further 
annexation of land by force. Menahem Begin ... is not 
ready to give up his style of trickiness and dishonour, the 
biggest indication of which is [his] ... intention to 
[follow] the American suggestion which Egypt has not as yet 
agreed to. 
What Israel has to understand clearly is that Egypt will 
stand by its position of not giving up even one square 
centimeter of occupied Arab land .... . It is up to Israel 
to understand that the spirit of peace is one of the most 
important steps towards a peaceful agreement, if Egypt does 
say yes to a friendly relationship and good-neighborliness, 
then the other side must also have the intention of 
agreeing with the Egyptian spirit of peace. 32 
Al Ahram during the 1970s and 1980s became illustrative of a 
clash between media and government, the latter yielding little; 
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the agenda (if there was a single agenda apart from political and 
diplomatic needs) was one of using media to help justify 
government actions rather than explain them. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
According to theories of developmental journalism media machinery 
should be in the hands of journalists who in cooperation with the 
state offer positive aspects of indigenous culture and politics 
to the nation, relating these things to the experiences of 
ordinary people. However this suggests far greater unity of 
purpose in a population than is usually the case, and remains an 
ideal. The paradox might be that developmentalism exists between 
. two states of government practice: 
total control (or a state of 
heavy censorship and government interference as in Egypt) and a 
minimum of legislation (Europe and North America). The more media 
moves towards the latter state, the less the influence of local 
legislation. As the media become 'increasingly supra-national 
determining forces shift: perhaps towards the consumer, perhaps 
towards the producer. The local or regional isolation suggested 
by some developmental journalistic theories may no longer be 
possible. On the other hand the role Al Ahram played in Egypt 
during the 1970s may also be outpaced- or challenged to act 
differently by broadcast media which have their origins and 
legislative restrictions in the West. 
The situation under Sadat showed that most media in Third World 
countries were still subject to controls, and were not able to 
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enjoy a great deal of professional integrity. Egyptian media, 
subject to government interference, was in this respect not 
dissimilar to other old-established media of the Third World. In 
Chapter 5I hope to show how (1) Al Ahram may have been "cued" 
by Western media, and (2) how thoroughly certain government 
viewpoints were maintained. 
The information systems in any developing countries breed 
discontent. The reasons for this are many, and vary, but can 
basically be summed up as (a) journalists caught in the gap 
between First and Third World political practice, aspiring to 
report the former but having to deal with the latter: few 
journalists from developing countries can avoid comparing 
themselves on a story-by-story basis with journalists . from 
developed countries, a situation especially true in broadcast 
media which uses so much professionally-produced First World 
product (CNN, ITN, BBC, ABC and RTF and others sell worldwide); 
(b) having to cope with domestic structures to which the 
questioning "objective" nature of journalism may be antithetical; 
(c) journalism, attracting expressive talent, may in the end 
become a block to that talent (see above for details of Egyptian 
writers in this position); (d) the histories of many developing 
countries since independence (Egypt is typical) show a decline 
in press freedom. Discontent, instead of being expressed by 
media, may develop into social trauma; disillusionment with the 
system thus increases, encouraging public and journalists to look 
elsewhere for information. There was, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
no attempt to alter established practices within Egypt. Despite 
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Al Ahram's attempts to be objective under al Jamal (see Chapter 
5) and subsequently the paper's role as a part of the 
establishment increased. No ideas comparable to developmental 
journalism were evolved (in fact, the only Arabic-speaking states 
to come close were in North Africa, and there hardly for 
developmental reasons). Western notions of objectivity and the 
political problems of developing states might not be adequately 
balanced in developmental journalism. 
The Egyptian press at the end of the Sadat era entered a period 
where no philosophy of media obtained: instead the insecurity 
which grew through the 1970s and into the 1980s within 
government, society and media lead to the latter's fearful 
subservience. 
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CHAPTER 4: US JOURNALISTS' FAVOURABLE RESPONSE TO THE PEACE 
INITIATIVE 
4.1 Introduction: Domestic and Foreign News Gathering 
Attitudes to domestic news and attitudes to foreign news may 
change when people (including journalists) move out of their 
domestic culture, and interest may concentrate on issues which 
relate back to that culture. This may be because of lack of 
knowledge about distant places which means they are difficult to 
slot into a "cultural" world map, while proximity equals greater 
familiarity and therefore interest; there may be market 
resistance to foreign news; and media resources mean that the 
further from home base a reporter operates the more expensive it 
becomes. All this combines to create the effect that, should a 
foreign news story not be linked to domestic consumers, its 
coverage may change: either-diminish or, perhaps, be specified 
according to the interest groups comprising the paper's 
readership. Northern Irish issues covered by The New York Times, 
film issues covered by The Los Angeles Times, shipbuilding 
stories in The Glasgow Herald or the coverage of winemaking by 
Le Sud-Ouestl all differ because of their constituencies. A good 
illustration of this would be the coverage of specific minority 
issues, where (for example) a newspaper serving a city with 
predominantly Hispanic or African communities would be likely to 
offer more news regarding those racial groups (in the widest 
sense) than a newspaper in a city with a smaller percentage of 
non-European readers. Consitituencies such as gender or religion 
would remain relatively stable, though coverage may then differ 
according to more political criteria. 
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This skewing of interest could also be the case in US reporting 
of the background and proceedings of Camp David. (Specific 
treatment of The New York Times and The Washington Post will be 
dealt with in the analysis of those newspapers in Chapter 5. ) An 
element in this constituency-sensitivity during the 1970s, and 
a major factor affecting reporting of any event in the Mideast 
by US newspapers, was the sizeable and well-organized Jewish 
lobby ("the Lobby") which energetically worked as Israel's 
unofficial unpaid embassy to the US; a second factor was the 
polarization of news between good and bad outcomes, a factor in 
most media. A case could be made by editors and proprietors that 
positive reporting of Camp David (combing away confusing 
difficulties such as Palestinian rejection of the dialogue) made 
for a more receptive and (in times of economic difficulties and 
low national prestige) more interested audience, and thereby 
perhaps increasing sales. The "Good News" factor (news linked 
positively to issues of local/national identity) is often in 
direct contention with the "Hard News" factor (objective, non- 
constituency-sensitive news). The former can mean anything which 
will comfortably fit scheduling and audience expectations, the 
latter (unusually) discounts the "natural" (domestic/local) 
constituency of the news-gatherer (see 4.3 below). 2 
4.2 SETTING THE AGENDA 
An analysis of the US media response to the Camp David period 
under study (1977-1979) has to offer some kind of definition of 
news agenda. The painting of a picture entails the creation of, 
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or recognition of borders (ie, where it ends) . Not only does this 
affect what is omitted, it must also change what is included. The 
agenda of the Camp David summit was largely set as the structure 
of the Geneva Peace Conference (envisaged by Carter and Vance in 
1977, but abandoned in November that year). It was an agenda 
which centered around Israel (minus its Arab inhabitants) and 
included Egypt (minus its anti-Sadatist faction); it did not 
include the Palestinians as central players, not other front-line 
Arab states. (As Chapter 5.6 below indicates, while the two US 
papers gave extensive coverage to Israel, Egypt and their 
leaders, the Palestinians were quantified as secondary players, 
while other Arab states hardly figured at all (unless in a 
negative context - see table 5.4). This was an agenda for 
rational peace between peoples, unclouded by Mideast complexity. 
As has been stated (see 4.1) the media acts generally, if 
non-purposefully, to support values dominant in a community 
through a mixture of personal and institutional choice, external 
pressure and anticipation of what a large heterogenous audience 
expects and wants. One view might be that it is essentially 
conservative because of a combination of market forces, opera- 
tional requirements and established work practices. Another may 
suggest the media is actively engaged on behalf of a ruling (and 
media-owning) elite in constraining political and social 
deviance. 3 Whichever may be more plausible in this context (and 
there are elements of both in the structure of most newspapers) 
agenda-setting when media act in concert within a consensus, or 
under pressure from external interest groups, acts as a block to 
97 
I 
new ideas, and supports stereotypical perspectives. 4 It could be 
that the more internally fragmented a society is (the US like all 
large nation-states is a series of societies which sometimes find 
the need to assert a common goal) the more its media set an 
agenda to cohere the surrounding world, especially in those areas 
where national philosophy might be most seriously tested (the 
Mideast for example). Such is the effect of the Camp David 
period. 
When the media publicize dissent ... the effect ... is to 
minimize its sources and objects, to magnify its fragment- 
ation and incoherence. That effect comes about far less by 
positive act of will on the part of media producers, or in 
response to active establishment pressure upon them, than 
by the sheer inertia of understanding of the world of aff- 
airs circumscribed by the horizons of those who run 
affairs. s 
There are unlikely to be concerted internal efforts to solve 
structural maladjustment of a news system (resulting, say, in 
bias and/or ommission of news) and external efforts would be 
deeply resented as independent- Western media asserts its 
professionalism and resists enforced change. Add to this that, 
with few exceptions (one being the much-criticized MacBride 
report), Western journalism's freedom from criticism of its 
international coverage since 1945 and the possibility of change 
becomes negligible. If, on occasion, cases of agenda-setting are 
discussed these tend to be overt censorship on developing media 
rather than pressures. on domestic media. The way the conflict in 
Northern Ireland has been reported in Britain illustrates this. 
Another inflection of the official discourse on Northern 
Ireland is to emphasize the continuing human consequences 
of terrorism on the innocent civilian population of the 
province. This approach is to be found in all types of 
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actuality coverage ... . The "who, what, where? " format has 
become standard for reporting incidents in which someone is 
killed, as have the follow-up filmed reports which concen- 
trate on the bravery and good character of the victim and 
the sorrow and endurance of their families and kin. 6 
This has also been the form taken by reports of PLO Fatah and 
Hamas attacks on Israeli settlers on the West Bank, or other 
Israeli civilians. ' Censorship is only the visible tip of agenda- 
setting. The coverage of Camp David said little about the 
environment of the Mideast, and Western journalists, by not 
dealing with Arab issues adequately, allowed topics not 
considered important in the West to leave the agenda. By not 
presenting the matter in greater detail US journalists weakened 
the case of Arab grievances. If the media do not tell people how 
to think they can (as sole transmitters of news) form the 
boundaries of what people think about, or build on what is 
familiar. The importance an event such as the breaching of the 
Berlin Wall found wide coverage in Western media. During the week 
from November 13 1989, an average of 54% of international news 
in The Times, Le Monde, and The Irish Independent covered the 
Eastern European thaw: the Wall was of political and military 
significance to the West. Third World issues are unlikely to 
summon such enthusiasm. Events receive attention for the horror 
value (earthquakes and famine), comforting relationship value 
(visits of Western figures to developing states) or linking the 
interests of the West to a political event elsewhere (Panama, 
Nicaragua, the Pergau Dam project in Malaysia) . Where they cannot 
so easily be linked (Sudan, Ethiopia) there is less news until 
something extreme occurs (the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Miriam 
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in Ethiopia, the actions of President Habre of Sudan and the 
following UN handling of the crisis). $ 
4.3 "GOOD NEWS" AND "HARD NEWS" 
Sympathetic attitudes are not the norm in the business of world 
news; for most Western journalists (and, indeed, Third World 
journalists not in the "Developmental" camp) the skewing of news 
towards the consumer, and the fickleness of the consumer are as 
much problems as difficulties of objectivity and independence. 
However the modern Western consumer, glutted with information and 
relative wealth, contrasts with the media consumer of the pre- 
television period. The old polarities have gradually vanished in 
favour of a plethora of domestic identities (groups, minorities, 
religions, allegiances of various types), while the 
t'consumerization" of news may well be reflected in the coverage 
of Camp David (especially in broadcast media) with "Good News" 
craved as part of the international picture, or, where such news 
is absent, then at least a feeling of national superiority or 
security. The closer to home the more complexity reporting can 
bear. But the issue of reporting adequately has more at stake 
than the temporary mind-set of a reader. 
The favourable response by the Western press9 and, in particular, 
the US towards Camp David was a single set of responses, limited 
by the usual constraints of time and political contingency, to 
a complex and far-reaching situation. In part the "Good News" 
/"Hard News" contention also changed the complexion of the 
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reporting: translated to the Israeli-Egyptian summit what the US 
public were fed were positive images supported by a White House 
seeking breaks ofý that sort, in a media- which naturally 
simplified. Finally if consumers were not dictating the agenda 
they were clients to be pleased rather than people to be 
informed. At the start of the peace process other attendant 
problems (the Palestinians, Jordan, the status in Egypt of Sadat 
himself) were aired. By the end everything had been simplified 
into "the conclusion of an enmity. and the beginning of a 
friendship" with the US as broker. 10 Although hailed as a triumph 
the Accords really did little except satisfy a Western yearning 
for peace on a superficial level (see Chapter 2). (The Camp David 
Accord was Carter's only major foreign policy initiative given 
major domestic press coverage, one of the few major foreign 
policy manoeuvres since Nixon's visit to China in 1973). It is 
possible the US press merely satisfied a perceived need for good 
news, fearing there had been too much hard news: criticism over 
Mideastern policy and Far Eastern policy, very little movement 
in the SALT talks, an administration which actively sought to 
distance itself from the policy of Kissinger without offering 
anything as press-friendly lead to a media demand for positive 
achievement. Whatever national feeling of inadequacy the Summit 
addressed, it could be said that within the US Camp David was a 
treaty for US consumption; its reporting a victory of "Good News" 
over "Hard News". 
In the build up to the Accord certain US newspapers (The 
Washington Post notably but even The New York Times occasionally, 
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see Chapter 5) perceived Palestinians as more than a footnote, 
editorials recognizing an agreement between Egypt and Israel must 
be linked to the background of the conflict (again see Chapter 
5). These observations were later overwhelmed (or rendered 
irrelevant in terms of "grander" issues of peace) by events at 
Camp David: the history of the Palestinian conflict was perhaps 
too far from, and too subtle for the satisfying of public concern 
to be reportable in detail. The fact that, since 1978, no 
significant improvement in the Arab/Israeli relationship occurred 
until 1993 starkly indicates how far a Western perception of good 
news created a climate of superficial diplomacy. The atmosphere 
of uncritical Egypt/Israeli bipolarity could be said to have 
lasted ten years after Camp David period (up to the Intifada of 
1988). 11 Historical support for Israel and fear of Soviet 
influence allowed Western media to reflect anxiety over an area 
traditionally prone to superpower patronage. Although "hard news" 
(especially in US terms) might not deliver the Mideastern 
viewpoint in detail, "good news" (in the sense of reporting 
supportive of administration viewpoints) was inadequate to the 
political reality and changes of the area. 
4.4 INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYISTS - AN UNBALANCED MEDIA 
camp David is almost unique amongst US news issues over the 
period 1969-1989 in that there was a larger constituency for a 
positive outcome at home than internationally. US journalists 
were involved in issues which concerned not just the inhabitants 
of the Mideast but their own domestic consumers. Here was the US 
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energetically moving for peace rather than using its power to 
destroy (if Vietnam was a blow to US prestige, Camp David could 
conceivably be a better indication of the nation's vision), and 
while Palestinians (and other Arab nations) summed up all that 
was negative and antagonistic to Western interests, an image of 
a "Western" Arab such as Sadat was more palatable. This media- 
presentation may have enhanced a preference for a limited 
settlement. - 
In the course of working for the Egyptian-Israeli peace, 
the negotiators lost the objective of a broader Middle-East 
settlement. Many observers ... argued that the war in 
Lebanon would never have happened on the scale it did if 
Egypt and Israel had not been at peace ... . 
Lebanon, however, was never the central concern of the Camp 
David negotiations. The Palestinian question was. And on 
that score the record shows that Camp David did little to 
bring about a settlement. " 
How far the media at home informed Carter's view of the Mideast 
is not quantifiable, but pressures from the Jewish Lobby Quandt 
notes were only overcome when Carter was no longer president and 
could visit those areas of the Mideast for himself. 13 
Besides understanding the Palestinian issue less well than 
the Egyptian Israeli dispute, Carter also found that the 
constraints of the American political system came into play 
whenever he tried to deal with the Palestinian questions. 
Even to refer to the Palestinian- rights or a Palestinian 
homeland could set off shock waves within the American 
Jewish community. These would be instantly felt in Congress 
and relayed back to the White House. Before long Carter 
learned to say less in public, thereby giving the 
impression that he was backing down under domestic 
pressure. 
Finally, when Carter turned his attention from the Mideast 
after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, 
-both 
Arabs and Israelis knew that American attitudes and 
priorities had changed. '4 
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Political restraints could conceivably be linked to similar con- 
straints felt by media. Which would come first is another matter. 
The lack of truly independent news about the Palestinian crisis 
reaching Carter might have compounded a political sensitivity. 
The US press's relationship to Israel was and is careful 
regarding events elsewhere it might have criticised. The 
economic-military relationship cannot be divorced from the 
attitude the US press displays towards the Mideast. 
The essential features of the U. S. contribution towards the 
creation of a greater Israel were revealed in a stark and 
brutal form in the September 1982 massacre of Palestinians 
in Beirut, which finally did elicit widespread outrage, 
temporarily at least. ... The Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
was supported by the U. S. and editorial comment generally, 
though qualms were raised when it seemed to be going too 
far (perhaps threatening U. S. interests) or to involve too 
many civilian casualties. All of this is reminiscent of the 
U. S. attack on South Vietnam in 1962, then most of 
Indochina a few years later, to mention an event that did 
not take place according to standard U. S, journalism and 
scholarship. 15 
The US attitude regarding aid to Israel (which may possibly 
include the knowledge that helping in the creation of Israeli 
nuclear capacity thereby broke their signatory agreement to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) had a distorting influence on 
the US press. 16 They avoided the obvious in preference for 
detailed information, and never come close to criticism of the 
basic tenets that underpin US military and economic aid to 
Israel, let alone the fact itself. 17 As for critical Arab voices, 
these were treated in the US media often in terms of anger and 
resentment that the Peace Treaty should be jeopardized. Criticism 
was seen as intransigence, a short-term irrational rejection. 
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With media treatment such as this the public could have had 
little choice (offered the option of pessimism or constructive 
optimism). 
Whether on television or in newspapers the constant portrayal of 
a leader or issue may be an effective way of capturing an 
audience. It may make them identify with the matter and believe 
in its solidity or at worst abstain and distance themselves from 
it; the latter would take (at least initially) a greater 
intellectual jump. Thinking under these circumstances was more 
likely to be geared to the sentimental or confrontational: thus 
Western admiration of Sadat and his politics did not arise from 
any understanding of Arab politics or the uniqueness of the man 
as an Arab leader, but instead because of Sadat's own admiration 
of Western alternatives. Egypt's cosmopolitan history might 
partially explain the dualism Sadat represented but taken out of 
context by the Western media he became (from the November 1977 
visit onwards) an image of logic and realism in a corner of the 
world portrayed as lacking both. ` 
Western journalists have advantages not enjoyed by their Third 
World counterparts (see Chapter 3): relative freedom to report, 
greater mobility because of greater resources, little interfer- 
ence from government, and traditional latitude for interpretat- 
ion. International- issues create different dilemmas, since they 
matter to a specialized group and effect the ordinary public only 
tangentially, or, in the case of the Egypt/Israel Accords, with 
an appeal to national pride. Publics, primarily seeing politics 
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in terms of the advancement of domestic interests, purchase and 
consume news which views the world in a similar way. 
4.5 THE MIDEAST AND WESTERN MISPERCEPTIONS 
If Egypt could now be classed (alongside Jordan and Saudi Arabia) 
as within the loose ties of Western influence, 18 then its 
consolidation and stabilization were important; other Mideastern 
states could be relegated or ignored. Whether Washington took its 
cue from the press, or the press took their cue from politicians 
or vice versa is debateable; what is clear is that the US media 
did not fully report all aspects of the Camp David process. 19 
It had been difficult dealing with (or sympathetically reporting) 
people not culturally or ideologically similar, and journalistic 
integrity could be said to have been undermined by stereotypical 
characterization. Images of corruption, religious fanaticism, 
political terrorism and catastrophe quickly were used to build 
up a vision of Arabia (see footnote 18). The dumping of socio-po- 
litical areas into easily retrievable stereotypes-categories with 
which journalists could feel comfortable did not produce an 
atmosphere conducive to unbiased reports on Arabia. The reporting 
of criticism of the Camp David Accord is typical. That Sadat was 
isolated and rejected, not only by the rest of the Arab world but 
increasingly by his own people, failed to dampen the enthusiasm 
of western journalists for the Peace treaty. 
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Since Mideastern issues were measured by their political, 
economic or strategic value (or threat) to the West (the October 
War of 1973, Iranian revolution of 1979, Iran-Iraq War and 
finally, Gulf War of 1991 illustrate this). Israel's 
proliferation of weapons systems (and their attendant support via 
other "pariah" states, notably South Africa which helped 
considerably in the development of the Israeli nuclear weapon 
during the 1970s20) were non-events compared to the coverage of 
Libya, Iraq, Lebanon or Iran. Most problems concerning the 
Mideast were measured as frustration suffered by -Western 
countries (especially the US) faced with Arab hostility. Arab 
defiance could reflect their desire for independence from Western 
policies (or an independence commensurate with their oil-based 
power). I 
Another reason for US complacency was its self-absorption. What 
goes on outside its sphere of direct political activity and 
cultural similarity sinks low on the agenda. Although usual, this 
has been one of the prime reasons for 'discontent among non- 
Western states. While South Africa occupied a great deal of media 
time during the 1970s, equally reprehensible non-European regimes 
such as Indonesia received scant attention. (Challenges to the 
international information order (see Chapter 1) derive from a 
similar discontent with the world system. ) Israel may often be 
perceived in the Mideast as a symbol of Western antagonism. The 
US aid package and unstinting support of Israel in international 
fora, fostered among Palestinians in particular a perception of 
their fight being against a form of US/Western colonialism as 
107 
much as against the harshness of the Israeli state and its 
actions since 1948. 
Given the cultural and historical experience of Europeans and 
their Jewish groups, any attempt to change the relationship built 
around Israel is difficult. Alternatively, the changes through 
which the Arab world passed in the period since 1945 did not make 
it easy for Arab countries to acquire friends or change attitud- 
es. The Islamic revival created a wave of criticism and misunder- 
standing, not only of the Arab character but the Islamic religion 
as a whole. From it came the use of the term "fundamentalist" 
which, by the early 1980$, had come to cover any overt or 
organized expression of Islam. It also appeared because of the 
profoundly anti-religious streak in 20th Century Europe and, 
contrastingly, the pervasive Christianity of the US. 
There are other factors governing the US's media relationship 
with Islam: but the bias of information may be due to the 
incomprehension of one culture by another. Any understanding of 
the media imbalance between Israel, her allies and the Arab world 
has to take this into account. The Arab camp, whether 
collectively or represented by aggrieved groups such as the PLO, 
has little history of political endeavour or sufficient 
secularization of thought. Arabs were at a disadvantage, 
especially where the manipulation of the US media was concerned. 
The argument that Arabs need to learn how to perceive political 
topics without recourse to religious analogies is a self- 
justifying truth, since US political and media systems (and with 
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them a wider Western model) can only be moved significantly by 
appeals they understand. The secularization of Western societies 
has now proceeded so far that religious thought has ceased to be 
a consistently major element except in a purely negative way. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
When Third World issues are assessed and judged in the US media, 
journalism can either be tinged with apologetics (both The New 
York Times and The Washington Post saw the Lebanon debacle of 
1982-1983 as regrettable but necessary), possible distortion 
(coverage of Nicaragua from 1979 to 1988) or perhaps even 
ignorance (a non-event such as the genocide in East Timor since 
-1976). 'This last may have direct political causes, for example 
the need for the US in the Pacific Basin to cultivate a powerful 
and mineral-rich country to offset a general regional antagonism; 
or could be coupled with media and public' apathy about a lit- 
tle-known nation, and even the success of Indonesian propaganda 
in creating a communist insurgency out of the Fretelin 
resistance. But the media, despite proclaiming a freedom from 
political bias, will always find it difficult to free itself from 
forms of previous public misinformation. 
Journalism as a profession (like most other professions) finds 
it difficult to exist outside the range of domestic political 
expression through which and to which it is reporting. From 1974 
to 1979 the stress, politically and diplomatically, was on 
rapprochement (possibly in the aftermath of Vietnam, or because 
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of a general tiredness with the repetition of confrontation in 
the Mideast) . Criticism was acceptable in small doses for Israel, 
and large doses for Arab parties. Movement outside the consensus 
was unlikely, and as the September 1977 reporting of Camp David 
within the US media may suggest (see Chapter 5). At crucial 
moments of national policy there is a likelihood that media may 
converge to make a similar commentary. Journalists' overall 
support for the Accords has a wider context: a) the given nature 
of the political and social composition of their own societies, 
b) the personal experience, education and political leanings of 
journalists themselves, c) the commercial and editorial' impact 
on the outcome of the journalists' work and d) the general 
Jewish/US experience. Jewish/Arab problems were largely viewed 
by even' the more liberal US journalists from a single 
perspective: the (innocent) victim versus (fanatical) aggressor. 
-It took the shocking images of the Intifada to jolt US 
journalists out of this complacency, so that (even for those Jews 
within the Lobby itself) the old idea of Israel as an outpost of 
Western values in a hostile area began to change. 
The ideological composition of journalists, added to their 
political myopia in given situations, combine to create ,a 
strongly subjective coverage of international affairs. Within the 
period 1964-1989 this has proved to be one of the most potent 
reasons behind US journalists' misinterpretations of the Mideast 
(which despite its size and importance is covered in a very 
sparing way by US agencies and newspapers). In The US Press and 
Iran, Dorman and Farhang point out th6 failings of journalists 
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when their roles as news-gatherers are corrupted by poor 
coverage, lack of domestic interest and (most importantly) their 
own personal misinterpretive ideologies. 21 The narrower the 
public debate the more likely will be the establishment of 
"circular delusion". In such circumstances what debate there is 
takes place on a small range of issues (such as the Shah as 
friend to the US, the Ayatollahs as fanatics bent on spreading 
an Islamic Revolution, the upheaval in Tehran as an example of 
this (with innocent US diplomats caught up in it) which either 
then distorts or obscures the wider explanation for events. The 
US and its journalists had a limited understanding of the events 
in Iran (often because of disinterest or access to limited strata 
of Iranian society) in a similar way that it had limited 
understanding of events in the Mideast. Israel was well-reported, 
with figures like Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, household names in 
the US; but the Arab -inhabitants of the region had no such 
footholds (except negatively) as thus the "circular delusion" 
became chronic. 
Students of the American press who argue that it is not the 
role of journalism to go beyond the surface of events but 
simply to state the objective facts will do well to compare 
American news coverage of, and editorials on, strikes in 
Poland and resistance to martial law there, with the 
attention given to the strikes in Iran in 1978. Where 
Poland is concerned, the Solidarity movement, its leaders, 
its tactics, and its achievements are well-known to the 
attentive American public, and sympathy and admiration for 
their cause and conduct among Americans, cannot be in doubt. 
In the case of Iran in revolt, the opposite was true. n 
It has taken the 1987 Intifada, the Beirut debacle of 1982-1983 
when 241 US marines and 58 French soldiers died, as well as a 
group of "terrorist" incidents worldwide, to put"the Palestinian 
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question on the US political and media agenda. Whereas bias is 
obvious in its cruder forms, once it covers itself with 
references to a secularist political climate taken for granted 
in its domestic picture and transferred to the international 
arena, reporting becomes thoroughly antagonistic to non-Western, 
non-US societies. 
It was possible in the case of Iran for the regime apolog- 
ists to appeal to prejudices, sensibilities, and a world- 
view of the journalistic fraternity that was at once a part 
of but separate from the statist political perspective and 
ideology ... . In short ethnocentrism was in the service of ideology. However ... ideology is the constant and 
ethnocentrism is a variable. The same or similar qualities 
in Iranian revolutionaries which were repugnant to American 
journalists were ignored or transformed into virtues when 
the subject at hand was resistance to the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. 
When Camp David is assessed in terms of the links likely to be 
made by US journalists reporting the Mideast then it is clear 
there is imbalance. The Mideast was seen in the mid to late 1970s 
in terms of superpower conflict, potential Soviet aggression, and 
the need of the US to support a client Jewish state because of 
the recent history of that people. Ignorance of the Arab 
viewpoint, life-style, religion and politics, combined with a 
feeling that oil-based power was an artificial and unnaturally 
damaging anomaly to be used against the West (a charge which 
Western media writers might not think could be levelled against 
Western military and economic power) fed a feeling of "us versus 
them". 
us journalists may claim their motives to be governed by 
objectivity and neutrality. But it would be difficult for them 
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to substantiate such claims after the imbalances in the coverage 
of Camp David. Essentially what is faced by those who study the 
US coverage of Camp David is a wall built since 1948 (or some 
would say the start of the Cold War) constructed with a 
singularly US-centric world picture. 
... To make attitudes to Islam very clear, a whole information and policy-making apparatus in the United 
States depends on these illusions and defuses them widely. 
Large segments of the intelligentsia allied to the 
community of geopolitical strategists together deliver 
themselves of expansive ideas about Islam, oil, the future 
of Western civilization, and the fight for democracy 
against turmoil and terrorism. ... Islamic specialists feed into this great stream. ... A little lower down come the 
mass media, which take from the other two units of the 
apparatus what is most easily com-pressed into images: 
hence the caricatures, the frightening mobs, the concentra- 
tion on "Islamic" punishment, and so on. All of this is 
presided over by the great power establishments - the oil 
companies, the mammoth corporations, the multinationals, 
the defence and intelligence communities, the executive 
branch of the government. 24 
Not only is domestic and foreign news coverage separated by 
feelings of their relative importance to the domestic consumer, 
it is also separated by differing supplies of accurate 
information, the personal political and social bias of individual 
journalists, and underlying ethnocentrism. This latter helped 
the US media refuse to acknowledge the extent of Palestinian 
. 
grievance until ten years after the Camp David Accords. The peace 
initiative itself, extremely limited in reality, achieved in US 
press terms what it never managed in the Mideast, a feeling of 
progressive stability and a limiting of'regional tensions and 
violence. What the region has witnessed since 1978 is exactly 
opposite to the feelings encouraged in consumers by the 
favourable response of the US press. 
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Media-directed efforts by the PLO during the early 1990s (in the 
form of their representative Isam Hirawi) were more successful: 
partly this may have been due to the westernized profiles of the 
representatives (speaking English well and dressing in Western 
fashion). Israeli intransigence and Palestinian deftness with 
media during the abortive Madrid Summit of November 1991 could 
have contributed to an alteration in US bias. How far US media 
was attempting to understand the Mideast is impossible to judge. 
It could be possible that, tired of one angle on the news, and 
excited by a new pantheon of sympathetic characters, media chose 
to show things from a Palestinian viewpoint for a while. " Real 
US support for Israel would be unlikely to wane. There would have 
been a different perception of Israel had there not been so large 
a Jewish Lobby in the US but it is debateable whether its absence 
would have led to no involvement at all. 
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CHAPTER 5: A COMPARISON OF THE US AND EGYPTIAN REPORTING OF THE CAMP 
DAVID ACCORDS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on the method and style of coverage of 
Camp David, looking at Egyptian and US press. My analysis will 
have two sources of data, the first will cover all three papers 
over the Camp David period. The second source involves a detailed 
content analytical sampling of the papers during -September 1977 
(see 5.6). The result will be an examination of-journalism in 
practice in the developed and developing world. The New York 
Times and The Washington Post were chosen because of their 
international profiles; ' both are aware of their., international 
audience in a way which, say, The Boston Globe is not, and both 
consider objectivity and professionalism to -be. essential 
foundations of journalism. Al-Ahram is of value since, during 
Sadat's period, the government was heavily involved in journal- 
istic affairs (this involvement was highly visible in what is 
Egypt's most famous newspaper2). Government involvement extended 
to appointments and purges. Al Ahram's position as an Egyptian 
voice in the Arabic-speaking world, quoted beyond that world 
because of its English language sister copy, made it very 
vulnerable to the nervousness of an uneasy government. Al Ahram 
in many ways epitomizes difficulties facing . newspapers 
in 
developing countries. 3 
The last twenty years have not shown a proportionate increase in 
the amount of coverage of international events by Western papers 
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and agencies as they witnessed a vast increase in media 
I 
facilities. At least 45% of all major Mideast stories covered by 
the Washington Post during camp David were, taken from news 
agencies such as Reuters or AP: whereas Washington Post reporters 
would write major analytical pieces, these would be bulked out 
in agency reports which by their nature were stating basic facts 
rather than offering a point of view. Journalistic commentary had 
to wait for a "significant" event which could then be built into 
a major news article or editorial. The resulting image of the two 
newspapers studied was "less monolithic than expected, even in a 
paper like The New York Times whose constituency contained many 
supporters of Israel. 
Views of Israel, of Jews or Arabs generally, of Begin or Sadat 
and-of Mideast peace in the Western press proved to be governed 
far more by individual events than by any world picture. If there 
was. -censorship 
akin to the cruder and more forthright type 
suffered at Al Ahram it lay in the omission of news from the 
Mideast rather than its treatment. During the period under study 
us newspapers, again suprisingly considering their 
constituencies, covered less of the Mideast than their 
international counterparts. 4 Finally September to October 1978 
in both papers showed less sympathy towards the alienation felt 
by Palestinians and other Arabs to Camp David. The story, 
exhaustively covered during 'September, 1978, was perhaps 
suffering fatigue. 
Although prominant, news of the Mideast in both papers never 
challenged space given other leading international stories during 
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September 1977. Panama and Europe both received more coverage 
than the Mideast, the former because of the renegotiation of the 
Panama Canal Treaty being debated within the Congress, the latter 
because of the US commitment and presence there. Reports on South 
Africa (the murder of Steve Biko occurred. within this month) and 
China both occupied similar space. What news was covered was 
covered differently by each paper, with The New York Times 
offering a range of smaller articles on the Mideast, while The 
Washington Post offered less space but greater depth. Often The 
Washington Post treated Mideast items of more esoteric interest, 
at the base of pages otherwise concerned with US news. (See for 
example September 11th and 12th, 1977 for this unusual placing 
of different news varieties. ) 
But what exactly were the forces acting on the newspapers 
concerned? What role did editors play in the direction their 
newspapers took? Did the' "gatekeeping" role of the editorial 
become a censoring role?, (See particularly the sections on the 
editorial within The New York Times, below. ) Or were attitudes, 
which considered Arab behavior in a negative light, combined with 
a fear of too much criticism of Israel in the Western press the 
motivating force? 
The study will begin by looking at Al Ahram from 1977: here the 
task will be to trace the way the media treated the Palestinian- 
Israeli issue from the starting-point of 1977, moving to 1978, 
when the Accords were signed. 1979 will be examined to witness 
the damage done to the Arab and Palestinian argument by what was, 
117 
effectively, an extension of Western media consensus into a 
Mideastern political arena. It must be remembered that throughout 
this period Al Ahram remained a controlled organ of the state; 
as a propaganda medium it was a running apologia for Sadat. 
5.2 "AL AHRAM" 1977-79 
Faced by the different structure of Egyptian society Al Ahram's 
reporting must be analyzed with that social context in mind. Of 
what is Egyptian newspaper coverage representative? No society 
can be represented by a single newspaper, but political messages 
the ruling party wish to convey (and the readers of Al Ahram were 
a narrower class than read The New York Timess) are shown by the 
extent to which the paper during this period represents the 
party's views (ie Sadat's) rather than any other group's. 6 
Although Al Ahram is an influential newspaper among readers, its 
influence on Egyptian government policy must be negligible since 
it is an organ of government. The only time this paper managed 
to raise consciousness in Egypt and the Arab world was under 
Nasser, not because he gave it freedom of expression but because 
of his initiation of a political system which appealed widely at 
a time when the aim of most political arabs was to fight 
colonialism. 
The structures of state adopted by Nasser were monolithic. This 
made the transition to Sadat from Nasser (from a charismatic arab 
to a Westernized "moderate") an interesting adaption of a 
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previous closed system into a new, still anti-dissentionist 
system of control.? After Nasser national newspapers became tools 
to consolidate public opinion, and continued in this role until 
the early 1980s. Nasser like Sadat made enemies within the circle 
of media professionals but his restrictions were part of a vision 
for an independent Egypt, less the result of a growing paranoia 
such as Sadat's, where criticism became anathema. "Under the 
press law which followed the 1979 "law of shame", it is an 
offence to challenge the truth of divine teaching, to advocate 
opposition or hatred of state institutions, or to publish abroad 
false or misleading news ... which could damage the interests of 
Egypt. "a The press laboured under the same restraints it'had 
under Nasser, but without the excuses; a gap of credibility thus 
developed within the system. Although the papers continued as a 
platform for the government's and Sadat's objectives, the 
political climate began-to change. The newspapers' hold on public 
opinion between the October War of 1973 and the Bread Riots of 
1977 was eroded. Although strains can be witnessed by the 
turnover of editors on Al Ahram, this was not reflected in open 
debate. The effect was to constrict journalists' action and 
diminish the authoritativeness of the press, eroded, by misap- 
plication of resources and lack of trust in the elite which 
controlled it. Sadat's vaunted new air of openness failed to 
materialize. (During August and September 1978, Sadat's photo- 
graph appeared in all but four editions of Al Ahram, and his 
statements or proclamations in all but three. ) While in the West 
media works within a self-perpetuating consensus, in the Third 
World consensus is enforced from above. 
119 
The Arab world reacted slowly to the news of Sadat's 1977 trip 
to Jerusalem. (The Arab League was used to dissention but action 
- of whatever kind - was rare; when it took place, and proved to 
be antithetical to accepted thought and practice, the shock was 
profound. ) Suddenly the most vital front line state (the concept 
of confrontation states "du"el jeb'het el muwajeha" was an oft- 
repeated one in Arabic newspapers, and Egypt was the state which 
had been the standard-bearer in the confrontation with Israel 
since the original Arab Army in 1948) had conceded to US 
pressure. This was difficult to accept. Al Ahram, with its wide 
arab readership, was filled more and more with expressions of 
hope for the new US-brokered Israeli-Egyptian peace move (this 
began as early as September 1977 - see below). Editorials 
extolled Sadat's statesmanship, using rhetoric about his place 
at the head of the arab world: particularly galling to other 
Mideast readers. The newspaper was in the unique position of 
isolating its domestic readers from adverse external arab 
criticism while galvanizing external criticism by those1very 
editorials. 1977 showed that what had appeared as a culturally 
united entity (arab countries of the Mideast) was deeply divided. 
The Arab League, never much more than a talking shop, became 
after 1977 even more of an anachronism. Al Ahram acted as the 
weathervane of changing arab nationalism, marking in particular 
the way Egypt pursued its own self interest. Al Ahram tended to 
construe arab anger as intransigence and Sadat's position as 
realistic. 
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While Al Ahram mentioned adverse Arab reaction it did so in a low 
key, often days after the event and the attendant reaction (see 
below). One of the jobs of mainstream Egyptian media was to 
shield government from adverse criticism. -The hostility of other 
Arab states, started as surprise at Sadat's initiative with 
Begin's Likud coalition government which had made its determined 
position regarding occupied territory extremely clear before 
receiving Sadat or signing any Peace Treaty. Al Ahram sought to 
avoid confrontational issues and simplify problems Sadat. faced. 
Sadat used staged demonstrations of support (such as the ones on 
his return from Jerusalem and Camp David, both trumpeted in the 
pages of Al Ahram) as the peace process continued but difficult 
to ignore was the expulsion of Egypt from major Arab fora (which 
translated into political pain when the rich oil states withheld 
aid) . Al Ahram gave an 
idea of Sadat's position domestically, but 
often inversely: the size and positioning of his picture on the 
front page was in proportion to the level of hostility his 
government faced. In late 1978, following weeks of unrest, 
Sadat's picture on the front page of Al Ahram (21st December, 
1978) suggested that even Nasser himself never managed to attract 
such crowds in the Nile Valley. Compare with this the comments 
of el Jamal. "President- Sadat, when he decided to focus on 
freedom and democracy as a basis for his government, was trying 
to give each citizen the opportunity to express his opinion even 
though this might contradict that of the head of the republic. 119 
Al Ahram acted as a major support vilifying critics and ignoring 
opposition, and as it was an Egyptian paper read abroad Sadat had 
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to be aware that it was a window into Egyptian society, and 
because of its reputation Al Ahram might be perceived as more 
than a cosmetic media reporting the government line: an authorit- 
ative, semi-official source of information about Egypt. No 
criticism and only moderate width could be allowed. Al Ahram from 
1977 to 1981 struggled to portray a unified country, a perfect 
candidate for continued US aid. 10 (Al Gumhuryah is the only other 
Egyptian newspaper mentioned during 1978 and 1979 in The New York 
Times or The Washington Post, once, in the former, in September 
1977, while Al Ahram is mentioned in four major New York Times 
editorials, and is quoted as "authoritative""). 
While Al Ahram was considered a useful instrument of propaganda 
it-must also have served to isolate Sadat within his own 
misinformation; visits to the streets where unrepresentative 
crowds could be encouraged (the parallel with Ceaucescu is worth 
noting) and then, duly, reported in photographic detail. 12 
It is difficult to gauge exactly the support Egyptian journalists 
gave Sadat: how much of a reporter's work was good journalism 
(investigative, objective and critical) and how much was rote 
(churning out the type of material the editor demanded). In Al 
Abram between 1977 and 1979 there is nothing critical of Sadat, 
even the mildest irony is absent. The writing is direct, matter- 
of-fact and repetitive, or, in certain sections very rhetorical. 
The most important use during 1977, both of the editorial within 
the paper (called "Comment of Al-Ahram") and more general copy, 
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was to give the impression of tough government, while actually 
Sadat was bending more and more to US demands, both on internal 
and external matters. In July, 1977, the paper was careful to 
show Sadat giving no ground, retaining the tough bargaining 
position he had been portrayed as adopting. On July 14, the 
headline was typical. 
Sadat: no end to the state of war as long as there is one 
Israeli solider on the soil of Egypt. ... 
Sadat went on to say "We hope to achieve positive results 
for the new peace initiative we started together. We have 
no objections to ensuring the security of Israel, so long 
as Egypt received similar assurances". 13 
Sadat is, throughout 1977 and 1978, quoted appealing to public 
sentiment concerning the "sacred" land of Egypt, often about the 
importance of the Palestine question. Occasionally this was 
topped up with calls to arms. On September 19 , 1977 , as the whole 
Geneva protocol looked like failing, and Sadat was under fire 
from critics within his own cabinet (unrest in the country as a 
whole seemed muted however), he signalled "we will retake by 
force what the Israelis took if the effort for peace fails" . 
14 
As it had during the wars of 1967 and 1973 Al Ahram's level of 
propaganda rose steeply, this time not in response to a military 
emergency, but to a peace campaign which the authorities felt 
might not be well-received. '5 
Al Ahram during the 1976-79 period shows an intriguing level of 
misrepresentation with two basic strands: the constant mentioning 
of guarantees regarding Palestine, and the trumpeting of domestic 
democracy. Regarding the first, July is a typical month from 
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1977: on July 2,14,17 and 29 the vital link with the fate of 
Palestine for any Egyptian-Israeli peace process is strongly 
stressed. On August 13 the editorial is a repeat of the govern- 
ment line. 
What Israel Must Understand: 
How with Vance's visits to the region's leaders finished, 
the realities of the peace effort have emerged. 
1. Egypt, and with it the rest of the Arab world, has put 
forward its position very clearly. If peace is to return to 
the region, and if Israel wants to be one of the region's 
states, then Israel must contain herself, enforcing inter- 
national laws which stress the illegality of territorial 
occupation, and recognising and implementing UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 and indeed all General Assembly 
resolutions regarding the Palestinian question. 
2. The Palestinians, vital to any just solution of the 
present problems, have been recognized as flexible and 
diplomatically-inclined recently. Discussions between the 
PLO and Washington are in the offing, a positive step we 
should bear in mind. 
3. The Israeli side once again adopted an intransigent 
series of positions, rejecting the representation of the 
Palestinians at the Peace Conference [at Geneva] ... . 
Disregarding the ... realities of the need for separate 
treaties between Israel and each Arab state ... the main 
problem is that of Palestine and the Occupied Territor- 
ies. 16 
The editorials (and wider copy) had to articulate criticism of 
Israel, support for the Palestinians and for a wide range of 
peace moves. The US had always to be given a favourable press, 
and even the Jewish Lobby could only be spoken of obliquely as 
"hidden powers". 17 Al Ahram's timidity during 1977-79 showed how 
narrow the journalistic guidelines were. By the time of Camp 
David Al Ahram was a government organ in a way it never had been 
(even in Nasser's more autocratic later years it ran articles 
critical of the government). What Al Ahram did know was that, 
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despite Sadat's occasional belligerent outbursts (such as that 
of 19 September, 1977) 18 Israel had ceased to be a target. After 
the visit to Jerusalem, Al Ahram would wait for Sadat to 
criticise Israel over a specific point before the paper launching 
an attack. Israel was the only shifting ground. Palestine was 
mentioned as major copy in over 70% of editions between October 
1977 and August 1978, almost never critically (though the PLO 
leadership did occasionally receive criticisms). The US was 
mentioned in 32 major stories over the same period, and despite 
the oblique reference to the Lobby mentioned above, there was 
little overt criticism. The USSR now ranked with Syria and Libya 
as states most worthy of scorn. 
By-the time Camp David was on the agenda, even criticism of 
Israel softened. On August 1,1978 the "Comment of Al Ahram" 
editorial section (on, the front page) avoided criticism of Israel 
by reporting on US disappointment regarding Sadat's preparation 
for land negotiation. By shifting stress onto the US Al Ahram 
avoided aportioning blame. On August 5,1978 he stated that the 
aim of forthcoming talks was "total and just peace": the phrases 
had begun to repeat themselves. Without any proper criticism or 
width of reporting the paper recirculated observations, which 
ended their media existence as meaningless quotations. On August 
10 the "Commentary" read "If the US is just a spectator for the 
sake of its own security, rather than getting involved, it would 
be intolerable": while the official line had to remain supportive 
of US aims and later Camp David, Al Ahram felt free ý enough to 
express mild discomfort. 19 
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By August 18 the government line was firmly established. Warnings 
about possible failure of Camp David were stressed (warnings 
within editorials on page 5 were very frequent, 12 within a month 
and a half, combined with full page expositions of Sadat's grand 
strategy). The phrase "last chance" was re-used so that, rather 
than thinking about wider implications of the process under way, 
readers would ignore criticism for the sake of that vital window 
. 
for peace. It is a curious cross-fertilization, since The 
Washington Post had been' saying that this was indeed a last 
chance for Mideast peace. As Camp David proceeded Egyptian 
reporters relied heavily on US journalists for information and 
opinion. This identification was a top-down process at Al Ähram, 
a result of the growing identification of Sadat's administration 
with US aims. 
- September, 1978, proved to be a predictable month for Al Ahram 
(and no less so for Al Gumhuryah which fitted a similar pattern) . 
Dissent from the opinion of the importance of Camp David was 
obscured by repeated assertions of the need for a positive 
outcome, 20 while criticisms of Israel became less strident (and 
concentrated more on the character of Begin). On September 3, 
Omar Asel, a member of the Egyptian Writers' Union (but no friend 
to-'fellow members Mohammed Heikel or Naguib Mahfouz, both of whom 
held out against Camp David) wrote a wide-ranging article which, 
despite it's support for Sadat's policies, nevertheless offered 
a slightly different tone (the reason for this might have been 
the need to offer an amount of divergence for the sake of 
plausibility within the main copy). "We want the residents of the 
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region who have suffered from Israel's existence over the past 
30 years to offer their thoughts and ideas on this subject [of 
peace). Let them see the US as a partner who feels duly respons- 
ible for this present situation. "21 The variation was minimal - 
Omar Asel was only the third major "independent" voice to be 
quoted in Al Ahram in more than a year. 
Once Camp David began Al Ahram's rhetoric increased. On September 
6, Sadat was pictured from the previous day with Carter and the 
headline "Mideast Peace the Agenda for the Camp David Summit 
Beginning Today". Sadat was quoted at length, which was not 
unusual. "There is no time now for discussion or old-fashioned 
ideas. The challenge is enormous, and we must not disappoint the 
world's hope of peace. Indeed, the eyes of the world are on this 
perilous summit, and everywhere there are conflicting ideas about 
the result. "22 Through September a simple agenda was maintained. 
September 6 saw a page of photographs of arrivals at Camp David, 
while the editorial, general copy and report by Hamdi Fu'ad on 
September 6 were the last direct response to events for almost 
a fortnight. Carter's desire to negotiate without the world's 
press wanting details of every move meant that Al Ahram became 
more repetitive from September 7 on, with editorials sent from 
Washington, fearful of Israeli and specifically Begin's 
subterfuge, and confused by the lack of information. Even The 
washington Post was no more revealing. Lack of commentary was 
excused by the fact of Camp David's secrecy. 21 
e 
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By September 9, coverage was general., with nothing to add to 
earlier reports. The following day offered one of three variat- 
ions on a theme: "Positive Progress at Camp David". The other 
choices could reflect intense discussion or problems and by 
September 11 it was the latter the editorial was sensing, as the 
sub-heading indicated: "Egyptian Sources Say there is Deep 
Division, and Forward Movement is Difficult". Direct commentary 
was replaced by vague references and continuing praise for "US 
Efforts". 24 The limited analysis included assurances that Sadat 
maintained his commitment to justice, while trying hard not to 
appear to ditch the more specific Palestinian agenda. "The 
essence of the problem at this latest stage of the talk at Camp 
David is Egypt's desired aim of an agreement over a just and 
permanent Mideast peace, while the specifics of the Palestinian 
question remain to be tackled. "25 
oddly neither this edition of Al Ahram, nor that of the following 
day mentioned Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League, despite a 
report on September 12 of a meeting of that body, and an 
editorial ignoring Egypt's novel status. What the editorial did 
instead was offer Camp David as a more important event, where 
Sadat was fighting for Arab rights, a line repeated on September 
15 when the editorial praised Egypt for standing alone and 
"playing its role [at Camp David] on behalf of the Arab world". 
By September 13, the low-point at the negotiations, with 
widespread rumours of breakdown, Al Ahram's headline admitted 
problems, blaming Israel, while the editorial vilified the Arab 
League - presumably to deflect attention. Fears for the collapse 
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of the Summit and the consequences grew and on September 17 the 
editorial prepared to heap blame on Israel. 
The Structure Israel Demands: 
The only Israeli experience is with enmity and greed. ... They talk of peace but come to their own conclusions, 
meanwhile through these discussions - which Menahem Begin 
started - it is obvious that Israel wants no other 
framework for peace than everlasting military 
preparedness. 26 
When September 18 brought the announcement of a peace treaty, the 
editorial was lost for words, commenting that Camp David had been 
a "clash between two viewpoints" while it was "difficult to 
comment on the outcome". This could be shorthand for saying the 
outcome was far from noteworthy, and that previous commentary had 
been nearer the truth. The Al Ahram editorial now seemed to come 
increasingly into conflict with the official line, insinuating 
that Israel had been the only real winner of Carter's initiative. 
These reflections on September 18 were camouflaged on the news 
pages in what read more like sports than news coverage, with no 
analysis, dissenting notes appearing as muffled editorials. V 
Typically of Al Ahram (and other Arabic newspapers) criticism had 
to be read from what was not said rather than what was. To expect 
other from Al Ahram (or Al Gumhurvah whose coverage was much the 
same during this period) would be mistaken. Al Ahram followed a 
government line as a civil servant might, while finding it 
difficult to lose totally his distrust of Israel. Nevertheless 
he performed his propaganda task, using the editorial to stress 
Sadat's achievement. On September 19 his commentary was headed 
"The Impossible Achieved", stating "the whole world, without 
exception, applauds the agreement". The gap between the style of 
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journalism in The New York Times, where bias was tempered by fact 
and balanced opinion, and Al Ahram, whose role was merely to beat 
out the government line remorselessly, was glaring. Where The New 
York Times followed consensus, Al Ahram stated policy. And this, 
in a nutshell, is the difference between the two types of world 
media: one comments on events and reflects social concerns, the 
other seeks to impose the policy of an autocratic government. 
Detail or balancing opinion were absent from Al Ahram. In the 
West government and popular consensus are similar, in Egypt they 
are not: Al Ahram's editorials were propaganda, reading more like 
ministerial statements than newspaper opinion, espousing over the 
Camp David period what was termed "Sadat's responsibility". 28 
The-period following Camp David saw Al Ahram alter its portrayal 
of the peace process: caution replaced the repetitive propaganda 
of. -the- previous months. For the first time that month, September 
20 saw a headline not about Camp David but Sadat's internal 
political restructuring. 29 The results of Camp David were 
relegated to internal pages, with favourable international 
reaction (quotations from the Tokyo Shinbun, The Times and The 
Daily TelearaPh of London),, and stressing Egypt's position within 
an international consensus. Arab opinion was ignored (though a 
brief article on September 21 acknowledged a dispute with Jordan) 
and both the Editorial and an opinion article by Mohammed Ali el- 
Oweni entitled "The Responsibility of the Arab After the Birth 
of Peace" further minimalized dissent. 30 The Editorial was 
typical. "... Had the treaty been simple it wouldn't have taken 
13 days. ... (It was] a unique conference in the history of 
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recent Egyptian diplomacy, but the principles arrived at proved 
a framework for a just settlement to dispute, especially 
regarding Palestinian problems. "31 
As 1978 progressed, Al Ahram shifted in two areas: reporting the 
Palestinian problem, and continuing the reorientation towards the 
US (supported, according to Al Ahram, by an Egyptian consensus). 
Palestinian opposition to Sadat's initiatives received media 
condemnation in Egypt (though how far this was reflected in 
popular condemnation is difficult to say; it is possible (given 
similar reactions in other Mideast states) that Egyptian public 
opinion reacted negatively to Palestinian criticism of Sadat, and 
that in this area at least the government found a degree of 
public support). 
By denying the opposition newspapers access to officially- 
generated news and by harassing their journalists, the 
government has sought to induce the opposition papers to go 
to excess, to report rumours as fact ... and to use intemperate language. In general this strategy has succeed- 
ed, for as the novelty value of the papers wore off in the 
middle 1980s, so did their circulations plateau and their 
reputations as reliable sources of news deteriorated. 32 
Al. Ahram did what it was meant to do, uniting a sufficiently 
large consensus behind actions which may have otherwise been 
unpopular. 
5.3 THE US PRESS AND THE MIDEAST 1977-1979 
Despite the freedoms US journalists enjoy in comparison to their 
Egyptian counterparts, the respective coverage showed a similar- 
ity at, certain points - for example at the signing of the Camp 
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David Accords themselves. US journalists did not consider wider 
consequences within the Mideast of Carter's new Pax Americana: 
much of The New York Times' analysis especially was limited to 
immediate rather than long term concerns. It is possible that, 
at times and under certain pressures, news media tend to the 
anodyne because it is perceived the readership want a certain 
type of resolution: at these times coverage tends to be based on 
what are perceived to be the salient moral issues of that 
particular incident at that moment. 
Although Egypt played a crucial role in the US Mideastern policy 
from Kissinger onward, the US press still treated the Mideast 
simplistically. 33 Occasional articles covering the area in depth 
were outweighed in my sample month of September, 1977 by basic 
agency news which often merely repeated what had been printed the 
day or-week before. And whereas there were no obvious biases and 
suprisingly little in the way of pro-Israeli sentiment (Jewish 
reporters such as Elizur in The Washington Post and Gwertzman in 
The New York Times were particularly objective and critical of 
Israeli policy) news items tended to be foregrounded in one of 
two ways: as part of a peace initiative or a military event (such 
as the Israeli incursion into Lebanon). 
The New York Times despite its large Jewish readership looks at 
Mideastern affairs as special interest foreign news and judges 
through what it sees as lessons of Western history: understandab- 
ly criticism of Israel often is made through the Western 
perspective of Jews in Europe. But the agenda set by politics is 
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not the agenda of the media. The lines of conformity show there 
are major rifts between the media perception of major stories and 
the mainstream political perception: both the Washington Post and 
the New York Times can be said to have been well to the left of 
attitudes expressed about the Mideast on Capitol Hill throughout 
the 1977-1978 period. (Within Egypt similar lines of conformity 
were under strain, which increased during the Sadat years and was 
at its height during the period under investigation. ) The 
similarities between the two US papers and Al Ahram must be 
related to the relationships both have with their respective 
governments; the wish of the Egyptian government to influence, 
and the fear of US legislators to offer maverick opinion (which 
is how criticism of Israel would be seen). While the Egyptian 
media system exists within a relatively simple symbiosis, US 
media exists in a heterogenous climate of interest groups, and 
offers-a great width of opinion. Depending on the issues, certain 
groups may gain ascendancy, but it would be rare to single out 
just one group or strand of interest. 
Simplification will always occur within media (by necessity, 
almost no one wants to open a paper with articles running to 
fifty pages) yet the Israeli/Arab issue, communicated to a public 
which cannot be said to be particularly pro-Arab, was rarely 
couched in simplistic terms. While relatively little attention 
had been paid to the core problems of Lebanon's civil war or the 
collapse of the Arab consensus of 1972-1974, this was more than 
offset in both papers by coverage of Arab League affairs and 
occasional snapshots of the daily realities for Lebanese coming 
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under bombardment from the Israeli military or their client 
Christian militias. During the September, 1977 analysis neither 
newspaper can be accused of lack of sensitivity to the region. 
There might even be said to have been great care taken not to 
mis-report events. However, processes of simplification and 
identification of complex issues with personalities (Sadat and 
Begin) shifted, during the Camp David Conference itself, media 
discussion away from historical consequences towards personal 
differences, influences and impacts. There are similarities to 
the reporting of the Iranian revolution. 
It may be some measure of the lack of understanding of 
Iranian history by American journalists that it took them 
so long to discover Khomaini, given the penchant of the 
American media to explain politics, revolutionary or not, 
in terms of personalities. 
... Coverage 
in the weeks before and after the Ayatollah's 
return to Iran ... gave the clear impression that Khomaini 
had made the revolution, instead of the other way round. 
This tendency to see the politics of a country as ... 
synonymous with a strongman was neither new to press 
coverage of Iran ... nor to the Third World ... . 
... [S]uch treatment by the press reduced a mass movement that had complex and long-standing forces behind it to the 
product of the iron will of one man. 34 
John P. Wallach, foreign editor of Hearst Newspapers, fell into 
this trap. 
Television has often been a constructive force. Walter 
Cronkite's simultaneous interviews with Anwar Sadat and 
Menahem Begin created a kind of camaraderie that certainly 
facilitated the peace process. Having Corazon Aquino and 
Ferdinand Marcos on the same show (even if they did not 
talk to each other) made a similarly constructive 
contribution. 35 
Once planted firmly into personalities, difficult issues can be 
handled and resolved by such as Walter Cronkite at CBS, or Hunter 
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and Brinkley at NBC. The US newspapers I studied may have 
inclined more to personality-led news coverage during the brief 
euphoria linked with Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, and when he and 
Begin signed the Accords with Carter. Until then the Begin 
government had been criticised by both papers for its policies 
on settlements and intransigence in negociation, while Sadat was 
seen as ruling over a country racked with poverty and corrupt- 
ion. 36 The optimism linked to personal appearances mentioned 
above seems to be a short-lived and specific phenomena. Only 
Dayan (identified as individual, liberal and intelligent), 
Begin's foreign "minister, might fit Dorman and Farhang's 
criticism of the US press. 
Neither were there -negative semantic codes for groups elsewhere 
vilified by the US media: Palestinian fighters were consistently 
. 
described as "guerillas" in both papers over the September 
period, and the PLO was referred to in neutral terms. Where 
necessary Arafat or his aides were reported without bias in 
positioning within an article or adverse commentary in introduct- 
ion. Ariel Sharon (Begin's housing minister) was characterised 
in both US papers as somewhat extreme. Allegations of Israeli 
torture were reported (though not well-covered in the long-term, 
and indeed "proved" false by a major article in The New York 
Times in 1978, see below). on certain occasions Arab spokespeople 
and their opinions took precedence over Israeli counterparts (see 
below) but much depended on wider events and the editing team's 
(or owner's) decision to foreground those events as of greater 
overall importance: this is what happened during Camp David 
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itself, but not for long. While the wider US media brought Sadat 
credibility among audiences who were, prior to this, skeptical 
of Arabs and ignorant of their politics, the quality press 
(represented by the two newspapers I studied) treated Arab 
politics with a degree of complexity. 
5.4 HOW THE EDITORIAL WORKED WITHIN "THE NEW YORK TIMES" AND "THE 
WASHINGTON POST" 
The Editorial in all three papers played a key role (though its 
role in Al Ahram was a dogmatic summary of facts and statement 
of political obedience). In some cases the editorial can be seen 
as a governor, controlling the attitude and direction of the 
paper"s bodycopy. Nicholas Coleridge37 considers both paper's 
editorials to be relatively free of proprietorial intervention 
(unless in a subtle, hands-off way) and there was nothing I saw 
which offered an alternative view. During my period of research 
there seemed in the US papers to be three editorial positions: 
forward (an encouraging, sustaining copy which supported other 
journalists); neutral (taking an objective position or not 
commenting at all) and reverse (where the editor may have found 
himself at odds with some of his staff). The effect this had on 
the rest of the paper varied. In some cases (especially in The 
Washington Post) editorial realignment during the Camp David 
period can be seen encouraging other writers to change tack in 
a typical "reverse" mode. 
From 1967 onward The New York Times editorials had more or less 
supported Israeli moves, while the views of independent reporters 
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varied. 1973/4 showed a consistent approval of Israeli actions 
(perhaps partially as a reaction to the unpopular Arab oil 
embargo), but approval was never unequivocal. When Begin arrived 
as a suspiciously new political character after the relative 
"liberalism" of Meir and Peres, both papers found much to 
criticize. The New York Times generated an image of qualified 
support by tempering its journalism, using opposing voices at 
crucial times and not avoiding criticism of Israel. The New York 
Times cleverly introduced levels of support into editorials, 
indicating a maturity and depth which would then build more 
general attitudes and important judgements to be made later into 
a plausible structure. Hence the editorial of July 28,1977, 
"Israel's Unsettling Settlements": the activities of the Gush 
_, - Emunim were a useful " way . 
to balance reporting of Israel. 
(Criticism of the Gush Emunim, in similar ways to the later 
-treatment 
of the Kach h-and Kehane Chaim, was very frequently 
strong: these organisations were seen (are seen) as very 
negative. Yet links with Israeli structures such as the security 
forces-or Knessit parties were almost never explored. Israeli 
extremism remained maverick, while Palestinian (or Arab) groups 
such as Hamas were representative. While falling short of full 
condemnation the July 28 editorial showed that if the newspaper 
had a "line" it took into account the interests of the US 
administration in its foreign dealings. Begin's authorization of 
more settlements on the West Bank were described as "complicating 
further his relations with the US". 38 
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Editorials set a tone, of acceptance, criticism or rejection, 
mirroring not just wider political opinion but also the events 
behind them as a cross between analysis and personal viewpoint. 
Dayan could be openly praised (because of his Western appeal and 
relative distance from Begin39, see above), and the PLO 
criticised for any Fatah violence. 40 But there was, both within 
editorials and the wider journalism of The New York Times, a 
divided attitude to rights and wrongs in the Mideast. While the 
editorial most of the time expressed support for Israel, there 
were lapses. For example, the already-mentioned editorial of July 
28,1977, where an important central plank of Begin's domestic 
policy (the absorption of "Judea and Sumaria" into Eretz Israel) 
was thoroughly criticized. Then there was, two months later, an 
--attack on a major aspect of US Government Mideast policy, the 
supposedly forthcoming Geneva Conference. (Earlier criticism of 
--the- proposed conference 
from the-Jewish Lobby had not been 
reported. ) But the incursion of the Israeli armed forces into 
Southern Lebanon, Carter, ' s criticism of the incursion, and a lack 
of positive images of Israeli activities (even in The New York 
Times itself - see below), combined with a September 14 editorial 
which talked of a "Palestinian Entity". (See 5.6 for further 
analysis. ) The editorial then tipped the balance in the opposite 
direction, showing some support for Israel, (perhaps to offset 
us criticism of Israeli actions). The editorial shifted 
perceptibly from support (September 14) to neutral (September 26) 
to criticism (September 29 ). 41 
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The editorial of September 29 is the key tone-setter for the 
newspaper's journalism over the next month, (only interrupted on 
October 14th with a neutral/positive shift into criticism of 
Israeli West Bank policy). The editorial of September 29 was 
fiery and alarming (this was almost never the case with The 
Washington Post, where editorials were notoriously stodgy): 
editorial rhetoric went beyond immediate criticism to give an 
impression of deeper disapproval (see 5.6). For two weeks 
following the September 29 editorial The New York Times ran a 
series of articles supportive of Israeli policy. The effect was 
to offset New York Times material which had preceded the 
September 29 editorial. Typically, The New York Times offered 
Mideast material in a series of pulses, perhaps in an attempt to 
-,? --balance out other, 
less. pro-Israeli material (see Chart 5.1.3). 
(Such "sandwiching" of items to their advantage or disadvantage, 
-- . or simply 
in order to introduce variety similar to domestic 
reporting, without endangering a stance on a particular issue, 
is not unusual. ) On October 15, the editorial returned to the 
subject of Israeli actions on the West Bank and tacit support for 
Gush Emunim. There was concern expressed, less this time about 
confounding the Carter proposals for Geneva than that the Israeli 
government should wrong-foot itself (in the form of Dayan's so- 
called "Mideast Plan" discussed the day before). The context of 
October 15's editorial is of particular interest. 
Criticism of Israel, as often the case in The New York Times, was 
more a tool of support than of opposition. On October 13 
(reported the following day) the Carter cabinet had been pleased 
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by the Israeli approval of their working paper for Geneva. 
Although the editorial position on Geneva remained ambivalent, 
what was salvaged from the news was proof ' of Israeli reasonable- 
ness, "an important aspect to Mideast news for the paper. This 
proof opened a window through which the paper could be critical 
of Israeli policy. Hence the editorial of October 15, "Unsettling 
the West Bank", strong in its censure of Israeli (and specifical- 
ly Begins) intransigence regarding settlements. The editorial 
did not once mention Palestine, the PLO, any Arab leaders or the 
feelings of Israeli Arabs to Israeli expansionism (though wider 
copy did). Problems exist only in terms of chosen criteria: 
Israel and US policy. It is possible that the paper felt it had 
more latitude to criticise Begin because it had already reported 
-, glowingly of 
Dayan's separate "peace plan", 42- discussed Israeli 
approval: of the Geneva pre-talks protocol, and planned articles 
:.. on-Sadat to swing attention away from unfriendly Arabs such as 
Arafat and King Hussein. Although there were variations, editor- 
ials in the two US papers I studied were often an opportunity to 
be carefully critical, proving journalistic credentials about 
impartiality and avoiding the numbing effect of a prolonged 
single viewpoint. 
Sadat's name became a key for editorial choice of where exactly 
good initiatives occur. Dayan, another useful key, this time to 
prove Israeli moderation, created when referred to with Sadat a 
feeling that there was level ground in Mideast politics, and that 
dissention was neither representative nor productive. In this 
atmosphere, whatever the specific merits or demerits of Geneva, 
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The New York Times managed, through editorials and the design of 
the paper's running stories sandwiching those editorials, to 
dismiss the Peace Plan in favour of an appeal to an amorphously 
rational accord. The October 23 report on PLO rejection of the 
Geneva Peace Talks protocol was structured to show Palestinian 
antagonism. In the first paragraph of the bodycopy, there were 
five negatives associated with the PLO response, the first time 
in five months that there had been any major reporting on the PLO 
(apart from small news paragraphs on meetings or Fatah actions). 
Despite the fact that The New York Times editorial staff appeared 
to be running a line highly critical of Geneva, presenting Arab 
opposition to Israel in a gloomy light. This is bias through 
tone, rather than the action of editorials aiming to discredit. 
--The subtle nature of this anti-PLO and anti-Arab (minus Sadat) 
line was illustrated in the November 1 editorial. 43 Again, this 
, was_a -consolidation piece, effective 
through omissions rather 
than direct comments. Whereas the subject is the occupied 
Territories there is no mention of Palestinians or their 
treatment by Israelis. This was The New York Times' favoured 
point of view, and it is possible, looking at editorials over the 
three-year period, that the omission was not due to any simple 
bias against Arab. culture, certainly not a deliberate attempt to 
propagandize, but rather a lack of knowledge of or interest in 
a different social, religious and political outlook. The New York 
Times, like Al Ahram, had constantly to confront wider aims 
(editorial and constitutional in the former's case, political in 
the latter's) with events. Generally The New York Times did very 
well by anticipating changes. The changing role of Sadat was 
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anticipated as far back as 1974/75, and played a part in allowing 
condemnation of Arab anti-Israeli policy to continue without 
creating questions as to why such condemnation existed. Once a 
major Arab state broke ranks such questions became editorially 
redundant anyway. Here with Sadat was proof of Mideast progress 
despite other Arab intransigence. On 21 November The New York 
Times presented a major headline: "Sadat Offers Israel 'Peace 
With Justice', but Calls for Return of Occupied Lands; Begin 
Hails his 'Courage', Asks Wider Talk". The eulogizing of Sadat 
now grew stronger. All but one small front page column on 21 
November, 1977 was dedicated to the detail of Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem on the 20th. Each section of the front page began with 
reference to one of the major leaders (Carter, Begin or Sadat, 
-the -latter praised 
in profiles) and pages 17-22 contained 
comments and direct transcripts. All this was very different to 
, the_. usual style of the paper, with high-profile photographs on 
page 22. The final comments only referred to the PLO and 
Palestine, and were negative in reference: "PLO Condemns Speech 
by Sadat, Calls for Sanctions Against Him". 44 Again it was the 
editorial which summarized the day's news (and illustrated that 
there may have been more in-house unanimity than in The 
Washington Post). 
Only the innocent and the cynical deny the value of 
ceremony, because the formality of manners suppresses the 
reality of selfishness. Where pain has destroyed innocence 
and where hope survives cynicism, as in the Mideast today, 
the traditions of civility embodies wisdom itself. 
Do not let go, therefore, of the images that, television 
conveyed so dramatically yet fleetingly. ... 
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And if the Soviet Union cannot bring itself to respect the 
promise of this encounter, it will need to be blocked from 
mischievous obstruction. 45 
The next day's editorial shifted to play up the positive role of 
the US in the Jerusalem visit (offsetting months of criticism of 
Carter's proposed Geneva protocol, now out of date). Arab 
criticism was cast negatively, comment on the details of such 
criticism being out of place once pictures of happy Cairenes and 
Tel Avivians on page 5 appeared. (The effect was similar to Al 
Ahram's use of photographs to prove a wide-spread opinion which 
could not possibly then be criticized or doubted. )46 
Once this large supply of news on the Egyptian/Israeli 
rapprochement was over, wider reporting began again. Between 
November 28 and December 6, Arab and other criticism was 
foregrounded. The "soft" criticisms of Assad came ahead of the 
"harder" criticisms of the PLO or the USSR, but still there is 
the negative note, sustainable by its duller formatting and lack 
of interesting visual material (no Sadat/Begin handshakes) and 
positioning (bottom of pages, or next to full-page advertising) . 
As the Arab criticisms were reported they slipped back from 
leading columns to relatively minor positions. On December 6, the 
headline "Egypt Cuts Relations with Five Arab Nations Opposed to 
Peace Bid" sandwiched the previous days' disturbances with 
evidence of what was regarded as "rational" or "non-radical" 
political action. The balance was restored in typical New York 
Times style and the sandwiching was strongly supported in the 
editorial. 
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Simplistic words like radical and moderate do not serve 
very well in this situation. But from the point of view of 
American interests the radical group seeks instability and 
unending hostility to Israel. The moderate group seeks 
stability and economic development. It is clear that 
Americans must favor stability, for the sake of Israel and 
the people of the Mideast. It is just as clear, as so often 
before, that an outmaneuvered Soviet Union seeks to profit 
from turmoil by encouraging the radicals. It is a poor 
partner for peacemaking at this juncture. 47 
A transcript of Victor Rothschild's essay "On Palestine" first 
published in 1946, followed the editorial with anti-Arab 
commentary sustaining the idea of embattled Israeli moderation, 
Soviet and Arab radicalism, and the endangering of hope for 
change in the new Sadat/Begin detente. The New York Times 
persisted in this duality throughout the period of Camp David. 
The good moderates were those talking on US terms with each 
other, and constituted Israel plus any others who wished to join 
the talks; radicals included every other Arab nation. Hence the 
spread of photos of Sadat, the in-depth concentration on his 
administration and country, and on December 9, a paean of praise 
in favour of Sadat's chief negotiator, Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguib. 
Known in Egypt as just another of Sadat's creatures, Meguib's 
character received an amount of acclaim out of proportion to his 
usual international profile or role within Egypt. 
The New York Times had, with its divisions of right. and wrong in 
Mideastern terms, and its support for the faction within Begin's 
coalition lead by Dayan, plus its eulogizing of Sadat and his 
cabinet, constructed a highly simplified vision: a portrait of 
Egypt as a partner for peace, a country both the US and Israel 
could trust. Christopher S. Wren, The New York Times' correspond- 
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ent in Cairo, shifted from criticism of Egyptian and Arab 
society: "Egyptians Rally in Support of Sadat as he Calls his 
'Hard Line' Arab Critics 'Dwarfs" ran a headline on page one of 
December 9. The fact that Sadat used rallies like Carter used 
press briefings was ignored as Wren went on to profile a 15 year 
old schoolgirl. 
Suzan Attef ... stood in the warm sunlight of Cairo's 
Abdine Square today with tears welling in her eyes. Her 
father died fighting in the war against Israel in October 
1973. ... 
"Now we are going to live in peace thanks-to Sadat" she 
said, "now our fathers will not be killed in wars". 48 
Simplified, high positivity (semantically uncluttered)49 had been 
in evidence since the pictures of the Jerusalem visit (and 
---. emotional appeals were present at some' time in almost every 
newspaper). Here strong positivity was used to prove a form of 
=-historical force: an inevitable fairness bringing nations to 
realise a view of politics which demanded a positive denouement. 
This positivity continued from mid-October, 1977, right into the 
Camp David Accords in September, 1978. Editorials shifted to 
compensate (the editorial board perhaps realizing that too much 
of a good thing is not a good thing for a newspaper) . To balance 
the emotionalism of 15 December's photographs of Begin and his 
ambassador to the US, Simcha Dinitz, embracing, with a charged 
commentary on peace in the Mideast, the editorial discussed less 
palatable issues and actually tackled the rights and destiny of 
a hitherto almost invisible group where The New York Times 
editorials were concerned, Palestinians. Palestinians had been 
obscured in the euphoria, now editorials linked together praise 
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for Sadat, S° and concern for the Palestinians. 51 The New York 
Times went so far as to pursue criticism of Israel, the West Bank 
and Gaza settlements, calling them "indefensible". 52 This was 
nothing new, the settlements and Gush Emunim had been singled out 
for criticism within the paper since early 1977 (see above). 
February, 1978, was the high water mark of this softened New York 
Times line, followed in March by the Fatah attack and another 
major Israeli incursion into Lebanon (the first within the aegis 
of this research had been September, 1977). While it lasted the 
complexion of the paper was softened; there was greater latitude 
of thought and encouragement for articles which might tread on 
what had been dangerous ground. James M. Markham was allowed to 
write a couple of articles on the Palestinian diaspora and the 
PLO, ----both more sympathetic than comparable articles written 
before Sadat's Jerusalem visit. Once Mideast confrontation 
.,. -dropped; empathy 
for Palestinians rose. 
After the March 13 Fatah killings in northern Israel, positivity- 
/empathy had no place; . editorials retracted to a hostile 
position, and debate (minimal with Markham's material) vanished. 
The New York Times continued to support Israeli military action. 
Again editorials set the tone. "Israel Poses a Test: By sending 
troops into Southern Lebanon, Israel has asked the world, and 
particularly the Arab world, to give it some assurance that 
terrorists will not be left free along the border to prey upon 
its vulnerable population. It is a fair request ... . 
03 This was 
followed by copy strongly sympathetic to pro-Israeli-outrage. 
"Letter to a Palestinian Military Spokesman" by Cynthia Ozick 
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directly compared Fatah violence at the Imri Tel-Oren killings 
to Israeli "civilization". 
The rest of March and April 1978 saw a slackening of interest in 
the Mideast; possibly enough material supportive of Israel had 
been printed to allow a return to the pre-March debate. Sabah 
Kabbani, Syria's US ambassador, replied to the paper's strong 
advocate of Israel, William Safire, 54 and Nicholas Gage, Safire's 
strongest opponent on The New York Times' staff, wrote of the 
Israeli destruction of Bint J'bail. This was an attempt at 
balance, with articles designed to offer a wider picture and 
leading, during the 1970s and early 1980s, to a series of Arab 
and pro-Arab voices (often ambassadors or novelists)- supported 
- -in occasional sympathetic articles by Nicholas Gage, or Frankel, 
and sandwiched between layers of pro-Israeli writing. The period 
_-up to Camp David 
illustrated this exactly, and the month of June, 
1979 illustrated it in miniature. 
On June 2,1979, a large article by Monroe H. Freedman and Alan 
M. Dershowitz called "Israeli Torture They Said" effectively 
destroyed (at least for the readers of The New York Times) the 
case of Sami Esmail, a Palestinian-American accused of Fatah 
links in Israel. ss Allegations were rubbished and Esmail impugned 
as a liar. The piece concluded "on the basis of direct observa- 
tion of the Israeli criminal' justice system ... it is our 
conclusion that Israel's system ... is one of the most highly 
civilized in the world. " The guilt or innocence of Esmail, and 
the veracity of his allegations of Israeli brutality, acted as 
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metaphors for Freedman and Dershowitz's conclusion (a conclusion 
which, once again, offered the model 'of civilized Israel and 
uncivilized Arab states) and the investigation illustrated a 
boundary of sympathy towards Israel which The New York Times 
rarely crossed. In June and July, 1978, the growing realization 
that some kind of peace initiative was in the offing generated 
an editorial commitment to a greater level of exposure for 
critics of Israel such as Abdullah Salah (Jordan's US ambassador, 
and long-time advocate of some form of Israeli-Palestinian 
confederacy), 56 as well as editorials which again mentioned 
Palestine (of itself a likely indication that The New York Times 
felt Israel's position to be strong -enough to support wider 
discussions). 57 The New York Times' position on the occupied 
Territories had already been stated, so criticism by Wren need 
not be construed as anything more than another part of the 
"_paper! 
s- line of "acceptable" criticism-58 Despite these minor 
gestures towards a wider viewpoint, major articles and editorials 
always provided information anchored in a belief that, 
fundamentally, Israel was not a client state using, repressive 
measures (all of which' was part of The Washington Post's 
mainstream criticism of Israel up until July 1978 - see below) 
but a democratic independent state which, if sometimes over- 
zealous, could be excused. 59 Sadat helped a lot in this portrait 
of Israel: here at last was an Arab who saw it "our" way, proving 
the old structure of moderates versus radicals, with Israel and 
Egypt in the first camp, and everyone else in the latter. On July 
8,1978, the headline and page 2 were devoted to picking up the 
Mideast peace process after nearly three months on ice, and 
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although Egypt is painted as "undemocratic" in comparison to 
Israel, the suggestion of the further coverage on page 3 was that 
Egypt must be a good partner in any peace process. July's 
editorials, sympathetic to a Palestinian "entity", were typical 
of the paper's to and fro structuring of the Mideast debate: one 
moment allowing more latitude for critics of Israel, the next 
compensating with tough pro-Israeli editorials and critical anti- 
Arab articles. 60 These compensations by the editorial staff were 
scattered with guest writers whose views were outside the usual 
New York Times consensus. 
The printers' strike (August 10 to November 5,1978) took The New 
York Times out of general circulation, though I read' the 
unprinted copy. Because of the nature of the writing (without 
audience) only basic points can be made about that particular 
period-(though I detected no particular deviation from previous 
trends or characteristics). The meeting itself was covered by 
Frankel in a sentimental and uncritical fashion, while, following 
the Summit. were articles by Henri Zoller on Israeli settlements 
in Sinai (specifically at Sadot) and Volkhard Windfuch (of Der 
Spiegel) sympathetic to Jewish settlements. On November 6 The New 
York Times was restored, and printed a lead article on Camp David 
by Hedrick Smith, with a photograph of Begin and Sadat embracing, 
entitled "After Camp David Summit, A Valley of Hard Bargaining". 
Smith was optimistic, but dismissive of Arab opposition. "The 
brilliance of that moment [Camp David] was darkened almost at 
once by the angry reaction of most of the Arab world ... ." By 
November 1978 the Mideast and Camp David were exhausted as 
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newsworthy items. The absence of editorial coverage at this stage 
was typified by bland and matter-of-fact articles written on 
December 6/7 about the demolition of houses belonging to families 
suspected of PLO links: there were no "special correspondent" 
articles nor direct condemnation. 
The New York Times found itself at an impasse. It could not 
generate enthusiasm for Camp David after the event, and a 
significant section of Jewish-American public opinion was 
antagonistic to Carter's peace plans. Whereas the paper's "News 
Analysis" sections talked about Carter's difficulties, the 
editorials stayed clear. On December 18, William Safire, writing 
in the "Essay" sectionýof the paper, contributed a major attack 
on-Carter and Camp David: "Carter Blames the Jews". 
We now know that the Camp David summit - that pre-election 
public. -relations extravaganza that halted, for a time, the 
crumbling of confidence in Mr Carter's competence - 
produced no genuine agreement at all. ... With Israel 
accepting and Egypt rejecting the draft treaty submitted by 
the Americans, Mr Carter showed his pro-Arab tilt: coolly, 
deliberately, he betrayed the Israelis. 61 
Other articles supportive of the Summit, such as that by Anthony 
Lewis ("Still Within Reach" in the "Abroad at Home" section of 
the same date) which took the broad Kissinger line, could not 
hope to be as interesting and controversial. Polemic was provided 
by Safire - readers had to wait until January 29,1979 for a 
compensating article by Edward Said. What had been a sandwiching 
effect before Camp David, with the bias towards Israel but 
supporting a broad Carter plan, became -a- more antagonistic 
structure. The editorial as governor seemed to have broken down, 
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either as an after-effect of the strike which had somehow 
interrupted the continuum, or because The New York Times had 
boxed itself into a corner: unable to support the Camp David 
Accords, yet committed to a warmer attitude toward Egypt; slowly 
backing away from any public support for Carter's foreign policy, 
yet remaining critical of some aspects of Israeli activity. There 
had, between March, 1978, and the same month a year later, been 
a shift to the right, away from the careful balancing act of 
previous years. 
The Washington Post had (and has) no commitment to a narrow 
constituency, nor the same range of political restrictions 
governed by minority sensibilities. If it has a specific audience 
then--it is Capitol Hill- itself: it considers itself, by virtue 
of its position close to the Hill, as a nationwide US newspaper. 
It.. is_ a larger paper than The New York Times, spending more space 
on coverage, yet with fewer resources, not covering as much of 
the globe. 62 
The editorials were themselves different in content, in the sense 
that the editor, Ben, Bradlee, did not attempt to regulate the 
paper in quite the rigorous way that his opposite number at The 
New York Times. There was a balance of power at The Washington 
Post, with a dominating editorial voice in concert with the 
feelings of the owners. Russ Wiggins had managed this under the 
conservative owner Phil Graham, and Bradlee maintained the same 
kind of symbiosis with Kay Graham (Phil's wife, -who took overall 
control when he died). Whereas The New York Times had a wider 
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range of journalistic opinion on its staff (the majority may have 
been right of centre, but there remained those such as Wren to 
offset the trend) The Washington Post contained a band of more 
liberal opinion. Hence there was much less counterpoint and more 
harmony, with Bradlee gently conducting rather than having to 
plot the management of-trends and issues. 63 
Editorials frequently covered as many as four issues, and spoke 
mainly for a Democratic Senatorial consensus. But the wider copy 
of The Washington Post was not like the editorials. It was 
heterogenous, and allowed an element of irony and humour absent 
in the strict, matter-of-fact style of The New York Times. The 
editorial was a follower of already-stated opinions and trends 
: from-its lead-writers and acted as 
if its role was not be to lead 
or direct but encourage. TM From March until July 1977 the 
editorial only mentioned Mideast problems directly seven times, 
but as Carter's push towards a conference became more determined 
the editorials picked up on this. Unlike The New York Times, The 
Washington Post had been systematically critical of Carter's 
foreign policy: a typical editorial comment would have been that 
of July 2,1977 which accused Carter of "disingenuousness", and 
built on these criticisms a fortnight later (July 21) in a piece 
called "Begin"s Beginning", it appeared cynical about Carter's 
Genevan plans and implicitly acknowledged the wealth of problems 
ahead, the biggest being Begin himself. On 28 July, the editorial 
summarized what was felt to be crucial to the debate in a piece 
entitled "Israel's -Challenge to Carter"*. "The Israeli 
government's decision to legalize three previously illegal 
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settlements on the West Bank-is more than `deeply distressing' 
as the State Department declared. It is reckless, provocative and 
indefensible. 1165 Unlike the structure of The New York Times 
where, if there were a deeply critical editorial then there would 
be relative silence in other comment columns or, perhaps, a 
balancing item in the next few days, The Washington Post used the 
same edition for the most damning article on Carter's foreign 
policy that year, "Carter's Illusory Mideast Policy" by Edward 
R. F. Sheehan. "United States policy in the Mideast has assumed 
dreamlike dimensions. There exists an almost phantasmagoric 
contradiction between American theory and practice in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. "66 
Editorial policy where the Mideast was concerned appeared not to 
offer a single opinion though he determined that Israeli policy 
was,,. wrong, and US policy disingenuous. Where the PLO was 
lambasted or ignored in other papers, The Washington Post was 
less dismissive. August 14's editorial, responded directly to the 
announcement the previous day by Arafat in Cairo that the PLO was 
prepared to accept the principle of UN Resolution 242. The 
response was positive (while The New York Times did not react, 
though there was a small article on an inner page A16). (When The 
Washington Post felt the need to criticize the PLO, as it did on 
September 24,1977, it did so in broad terms, refraining from the 
condemnations offered in The New'York Times - see Table 5.2, 
A/B. ) The most profound 'difference between the two papers 
regarding Israel is how-they saw that country internationally. 
The Washington Post appeared to show Israel as more independent, 
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on a par with other nations in terms of criticism. The September 
21 editorial, "Offering Israel a Choice" (the choice being the 
land for peace alternative) illustrated this. "If Israeli Foreign 
Minister Moshe Dayan accomplished anything else in Washington, 
he put at least a temporary gloss of flexibility on an Israeli 
policy that had seemed increasingly rigid and negative ... . 
Perhaps this, rather than real progress towards a settlement, was 
his purpose. " the editorial went on to describe Dayan's offer of 
"limited autonomy" for the West Bank and Gaza as "an appalling 
idea", but was not immune to the emotional positivity described 
earlier. When Sadat visited Jerusalem the response was a mixture 
of emotionalism and limited criticism entitled "Shalom/Salaam". 
Peace cannot be made on one Sunday morning in Jerusalem. 
But peace can be madeover time, we believe, in Jerusalem 
and Cairo and Damascus and Amman and, yes, Geneva. It can 
be made if Arabs and Israelis deepen and extend their 
direct relationship on the model that has now been set so 
courageously, and-so respectfully, and so touchingly, by 
Anwar Sadat and Menahem Begin. 67 
on November 28,1977, the editorial used the word "breathtaking" 
for the visit, but the effect of editorial caution (despite the 
adjectives) was to allow parallel developments in writing within 
the paper, one cautious, one optimistic. These strands lasted 
until after the Summit, and petered out once Begin began 
backtracking on his commitments in late 1978 and 1979. Therefore, 
there is a broad parallel between The Washington Post's editorial 
outlook during this period, and that of The New York Times. As 
the title for the editorial of December 23,1977, "No Turning 
Back", shows, while previous editorials had been skeptical and 
widely-balanced, once the peace process began to pick up momentum 
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in early December with Sadat's acclaimed return to Egypt, 
articles by skeptics such as Joseph Kraft changed to a fuller 
endorsement of events. The December 23,1977, editorial 
illustrates The Washington Post's changing perspective. 
As President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin prepare for 
their second summit meeting at Ismailia on Sunday, their 
course, or so it seems to us, is firmly, almost 
irreversibly fixed. It derives its trust with overwhelming 
force, we think, from two extraordinary personalities, from 
the roles they have cast for themselves in concert, and 
from the relationship they have, accordingly, struck up. Mr 
Sadat and Mr Begin give every evidence of men gripped ... by the idea of peace. Each conveys an unmistakable sense of 
the moment. Each has subordinated normal state calculations 
to a historical imperative. ... They have set out, we 
believe, on a road on which there can be no turning back. 
Through January 1978 editorials maintained this optimism, 
forgetting earlier criticisms of Begin's government, and warnings 
about the plight of the Palestinians. In some ways Sadat's 
Jerusalem visit was a more powerful media event than Camp David, 
in that it was unexpected, photogenic, personality-governed and 
short. On The Washington Post there were also two streams of 
writing, one skeptical, the other endorsing the new peace 
process. -Editorials initially followed the former. Yet the 
editorial of 12 February, 1978 compared interestingly with 
previous editorial statements about Begin. 
The squabble over whether Prime Minister Menahem Begin and 
his government did or did not assure President Carter that 
Israel would establish no new settlements and expand no old 
ones in the occupied territories is corrosive and distract- 
ing and badly needs ' to be set aside. We are prepared to 
accept that, on both sides, words were spoken and heard 
selectively without there being any intent to mislead. The 
United States and Israel cannot afford to let a mutual 
misunderstanding disrupt what ought to be a cooperative and 
trusting approach to Mideast negotiations. 
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While the editorial did go on to criticize the Israelis for their 
continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, this condemnation 
diminished in favour of the Israeli-Egyptian peace. By March, The 
Washington Post almost achieved the flavour of The New York Times 
when the debate was soured by the Fatah action on March 11. The 
Palestinian attack encouraged a reaction suggesting the Israeli 
viewpoint had not been put sufficiently strongly. The edition of 
March 12,1978, offered this wider focus, with articles by Simcha 
Dinitz, Kraft and George F. Will all strongly in favour of a new 
attitude towards Israel. The wider issues of Mideast peace were, 
by March, hijacked in partisan discussions about minor changes 
of Israeli policy and detente with Egypt. A year before Begin had 
been The Washington Post's bete noire; by April 1,1978 a lead 
staff. reporter, Clayton -Fritchey, could write "A Pause in Judging 
Begin", critical of Sadat and positive towards Begin. 68 
While there were reporters continuing the older criticisms, and 
seeing the process of detente as a Mideast side-issue (notably 
Greenway and Raspberry), editorials offered optimism, but each 
seemed to contain contradictions. On April 6, in an editorial 
entitled "Goading Israel" Bradlee lambasted Secretary of State 
Vance for exactly the same criticisms Bradlee had voiced nine 
months before: using US-supplied weaponry outside Israeli 
boarders. Bradlee implied Israel had a special case, despite the 
breaking of US legal restrictions, and took Vance to task for 
"insensitivity". Even columnists such as Kraft reflected a 
certain doubt of confusion by being guarded where criticism of 
Israel. was concerned. 
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When faced with unpredictable change in the Mideast, The 
Washington Post opted for status quo policies in its editorials. 
It never marked the idea of arming Arab countries positively 
(with the later exception of Egypt) but equally distrusted the 
Begin administration's commitment to peace. Much of 1978 was 
filled by positive calls for peace in editorials and wider copy, 
and anything which seemed to prevent summitry was castigated. The 
problem of Israeli activities in the Occupied Territories was 
downplayed in favour of virtually any moves towards Israeli- 
Egyptian rapprochement. 69 Then suddenly the editorials fell 
silent. For the period of August 9 to September 19, when the Camp 
David Summit was concluded, The Washington Post editorials said 
almost nothing about the Mideast peace process. Then on September 
19 ý-. in-a sweeping editorial on' Camp David, it offered an encomium 
on Carter and "The Jimmy Carter Conference". 
It is a marvelous thing that has been done at Camp David. 
For the first time in a 30-year conflict that has 
repeatedly brought the region to war, a "framework" for 
peace has been found. ... It is the best available 
agreement ... the only one in 30 years ... that addresses the heart of the problem in a comprehensive way. ... It was in truth Jimmy Carter's conference. We salute him: he did 
a beautiful piece of work. 
Underneath praises for Carter the phrase "the best available 
agreement" hints at what were to be the perceived shortcomings 
of Camp David as a whole. 
5.5 THE EDITORIAL IN CONTEXT 
Editorials are never alone: they are contextualised within their 
newspaper, and closely linked to the editorial's influence over 
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structure is the way different views are placed. Often the 
running order and the way items are sandwiched dictates how items 
will be read. In The New York Times editorials did not crudely 
balance criticism of Israel (say by a guest writer) with benign 
comment. This would be too obvious in a newspaper such as this, 
and therefore ineffectual in terms of either stating or leading 
opinion. The New York Times aimed at widely-based consensus and 
there would be periods of greater and lesser criticism, depending 
on the editor's judgement. Criticism of Israel could be sustained 
while Israel itself was in dialogue with Egypt but the more 
isolated Israel was the less attractive criticism became. As we 
shall now see, one or two Washington Post journalists also were 
muted by editorial changes through the latter months of 1978, 
-while--journalists writing in The New York Times maintained 
previous positions (mostly supportive of'Israel). 
The New York Times- aimed at political inclusiveness in its 
limited coverage, but tended to reinforce editorial opinion by 
offering token non-standard articles. Where The New York Times 
was dour and plain The Washington Post (despite the plain matter- 
of-fact editorials) could be ironic, which together with the 
layout (quality photographs, better print quality, fewer basic, 
information-only articles) made the paper more immediately 
accessible. In style of reporting, The Washington Post seemed 
closer to Newsweek in accessibility. 
[Shmuel] Katz (Begin's representative in Washington) 
rejected an Israeli return to the pre-1967 borders, the 
creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the 
Jordan River, or any negotiations with the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization. At the same time, he said Begin is 
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willing to negotiate with the Arab states "without precon- 
ditions" . 
70 
Also more typical of broadcast media- was the paper's sampling of 
a wide range of opinion, much critical of the status quo. 
Criticism of Israel was frequent, with discussion from the 
Palestinian point of view. As the paper recognized a , greater 
width of opinion the tone was less optimistic than that of The 
New York Times. Finally, foreign press enquiry played a more 
important part in The Washington Post, a typical example being 
Nicholas von Hoffman "Israeli Torture: Disturbing London Times 
Report" (the next 'year The New York Times was to carry a'large 
article of denial - see above). 
To some extent all news in America is what The New York 
.. _--Times calls news, 
but even more so with foreign news. In 
part this is because the Times spends the money that other 
papers, the magazines and the networks can't spend on 
foreign correspondents; but it is also because so few print 
or broadcast editors are able to make independent 
judgements ... [They] ... prefer the safety of letting the 
nation's most prestigious paper do their decision-making 
for them. 
This is particularly easy with an issue like Israel where 
any adverse publicity is likely to win an editor vociferous 
abuse from the nation's best organized lobbies. It doesn't 
work that way abroad, however, where the mass media are 
giving the publics in the other democracies far less-biased 
accounts. 71 
Von Hoffman was setting out not only his own vision of how US 
print media operated, but also, obliquely, the manifesto of The 
Washington Post, which liked to think it could avoid these 
pitfalls and be independent. For the long period of Mideast 
tension up to Camp David this was true (though as I have stated, 
Camp David itself narrowed the paper's approach). The paper 
ranged widely in its search for comment, where The New York Times 
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kept to reliably conservative sources. For example, Begins visit 
to the US in July 1977 received a warm review but little analysis 
in The New York Times. The Washington Post on July 16 offered a 
front page story and major analysis (page A12) by staff writers 
Stuart Auerbach and Susan W. Stewart which showed how far apart 
Begin and Carter were regarding Palestine and settlements, and 
mentioned Arab reaction to the visit (something The New York 
Times hardly ever did on such occasions). Analysis was thorough 
(in contrast with that during Camp David), ' with one section under 
the sub-heading "Seen From Syria, The Outlook is Gloomy for a 
Mideast Peace". The Washington Post cultivated an atmosphere 
where to be without that wider picture would have been running 
against the style of news. "Syria fears that Egyptian president 
Anwar -Sadat, economically dependent on the US and Saudi Arabia 
and beset by internal unrest, may feel complained (sic) [compell- 
ed) to make'a deal that is unacceptable to Damascus, as he did 
in the Sinai Agreement of 1975.1172 The New York Times had a clear 
editorial conclusion about agendas (much in the same way as Al 
Ahram), while The Washington Post offered broad analysis rather 
than a single editorial point of view. 
Three major Washington Post staff reporters, Rowland Evans, 
Robert Novak and Edward R. F. Sheehan wrote at length on the holes 
in Carter's approach to the Mideast question. While these 
reporters were critical of Israeli and US policy, the paper 
maintained independence from a "viewpoint" by using pro-Israeli 
Robert G. Kaiser, and printing articles in support of Israel. The 
structure of balancing was much the same therefore in The New 
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York Times as in The Washington Post; the latter however started 
from a position which was much less orthodox and editorially more 
critical. Ideas such as Kaiser's (or James H. Sheuer's, one of 
the Lobby's favoured Representatives from New York) were stated 
from the defensive. 
On November 21,1977, following a reactive Washington Post 
editorial the previous day, Ronald Koven and H. D. S. Greenway 
expressed skepticism. Koven's front page report covered the 
growing Arab boycott of Egyptian policy and the anger of West 
Bank Arabs (a group seemingly invisible to The New York Times), 
while Greenway debunked the relationship between Sadat and Begin. 
"The Israelis can no longer say ... that no Arab leader is 
willing to recognize Israel as a legitimate neighbour. But there 
was little indication tonight that Sadat's unprecedented visit 
and his presentation of -the Arab position had caused any dramatic 
breakthrough. 1173 
A different attitude is visible in Thomas Lippman 's`report from 
Cairo. "Egyptian officials have been warning against overoptimism 
as a result of the Sadat visit, saying that no matter what the 
response there would be difficult negotiations before peace could 
be achieved. But those warnings were largely ignored as Egyptians 
saw their leader undertake a mission that strained credulity. 1174 
That Sadat himself was not a favourite among non-Egyptian Arabs 
was left in no doubt by Fitchett's reports from Beirut: Arab 
views were presented by The New York Times" team not as reaction, 
but as thought-out skepticism. 75 Papers such as Al Amwar and Al 
161 
Thawra in Baghdad were quoted as part of a regular piece called 
"Other Voices", which over the 1977-79 period quoted many major 
Arab newspapers and broadcast media, as well as European 
sources. 76 During the euphoria of Camp David such alternatives 
were avoided. 
Joseph Kraft is a good example to take since he was the most pro- 
Israeli of the regular columnists-77 The rest of the Mideast 
Desk's staff were typically more skeptical. Jonathan C. Randal 
(who, with Jim Hoagland and Claiborne, disagreed with Kraft over 
most Mideast issues) offered a rare Palestinian perspective: 
"Dejection, Anger on the West Bank"; 78 after a week of bland 
reporting of the various Egyptian-Israeli meetings, Randal wrote 
a report that tipped the paper away from polarization. Sympathy 
for the residents of the Occupied Territories supported Bradlee" s 
concern about the increasing number of Jewish settlements in 
those areas, but there was little in the way of a precise 
editorial line: whereas The New York Times editorial had opinions 
and made these felt, The Washington Post offered no overall 
vision. I 
On September 19,1978, The Washington Post showed its divisions 
with an in-depth analysis on several pages (including the front 
page) of the Accords. The editorial quoted above was supportive 
and made sure there was enough primary material (speeches by 
Carter, the texts of the Accord itself) to provide padding for 
any awkward observations. Hoagland mentioned disagreement at Camp 
David, David Brodie concentrated on domestic political effects 
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for Carter, while Lippman's report (taking in Cairo, Amman and 
Jeddah) ran under the title "Camp David Accords Deepen Split in 
Arab World". 
Following Camp David The Washington Post, sensing media overkill 
as it had after Sadat's Jerusalem visit of 1977, concentrated on 
domestic issues, and Carter's brief popularity before the 
disastrous final eighteen months of his presidency. In October 
and November 1978 there were only five major reports from the 
Mideast (Lippman repeating criticism of the Israeli treatment of 
Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza) and in December a shift 
of interest to Lebanon, and of course Iran. 
The New--York Times' closest approximation to Lippman was Henry 
Tanner, the paper's Cairo correspondent. Tanner was, however, 
often antagonistic to Arab states, associating them with violence 
and intransigence, and together with Shultzberger painted Begin 
(still a new politician for the US public in June and July 1977) 
as a radical re-born as a moderate, and the Begin administrat- 
ion's determination to settle the Occupied Territories as 
understandable. The pro-Israeli line pursued on The New York 
Times was only partially balanced and thereby softened in the 
commissioning of articles from those likely to take an opposite 
point-of-view. Ghassan Tueni, the publisher and editor of the 
Lebanese newspaper An Nahar, wrote critically of the US 
involvement in the region on August 19,1977. Other notable Arab 
voices included Ismael Fehmy (September 23,1977), Sabah Khabanni 
(March 17,1978), Abdullah Salah (June 20,1978), Fouad Adjami, 
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(November 22,1978). Like pro-Israeli commentary these were 
printed ex-nihilo, with no reaction or introduction. 
5.6 SEPTEMBER 1977 -A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ONE MONTH OF "THE NEW 
YORK TIMES", "THE WASHINGTON POST" AND "AL-AHRAM" IN AN ATTEMPT 
TO DEFINE BIAS WITHIN THOSE PAPERS 
5.6.1: The Theory Involved 
Content analysis, the most well-used of all unobtrusive data- 
sifting methods, is essentially "... a research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences' from data to their 
contextj79; making and partially substantiating inferences 
without conclusive data, of gathering data systematically and 
objectively analysing it without creating patterns where they 
might--not exist. The results of content analysis should be 
obvious as data ("manifest"), not the result of subjective 
reading ("inferring"). 
With this in mind the content analytical approach to the three 
newspapers follows these stages: 
(i) Defining, gathering, offering the data and making the 
data manifest (as information in the form of graphs, charts 
or other systems). 
(ii) Concluding - or inferring - information from that data 
within its context, analysing the result to test initial 
understanding of the newspapers from previous observations. 
Content analysis is a tool not a complete kitSO. It may offer a 
certain objectivity and insight into data (especially within the 
field of media studies) but it is limited by the resources 
available to measure data as well as by the unquantifiable 
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subjective influences on that data (in the case of Al Ahram how 
do we quantify government influence, the influence of particular 
editors and journalists, or of specific events)? 
5.6.2: How The Theory is to be Applied 
Taking this methodology I have developed analyses to show how the 
newspapers reported camp David- with specific concentration on 
linguistic elements: (1) frequency distribution of linguistic 
markers (positive and negative markers / more detailed semantic 
markers of highest distribution) and (2) the interrelation of 
these elements between the three newspapers. I shall be analysing 
what these newspapers said (and inferring- from this the 
descisions- regarding news). From this I shall attempt to 
establish criteria for judging the meaning, influence and emotive 
effect of what is being said. 
What I hope to identify is a socio-ideological theme within the 
papers in their use of raw news events. Are these events 
transformed by the papers themselves, and, if so, how? Can 
judgements be made on the papers' linkage of information about 
the Mideast peace process and the surrounding society for which 
the news is destined or aimed? What kind of "designing" (of 
newspaper contents) goes on? With this aim I have concentrated 
on specifying what may have been influences, trends and biases 
in the three papers. The context was the short-lived Geneva peace 
initiative: the antecedent to the Camp David Peace Accords. 
Because of the importance of context sensitivity, " I have 
165 
attempted to avoid de-contextualizing any data. Should this 
happen I try to redress the effect in the final section dealing 
with specific linguistic patterning. 
5.6.3: The Period Chosen 
September 1977 was chosen out of the three-year period centering 
on Camp David itself (September 1978) because: (1) The material 
reporting Camp David itself has already been extensively covered 
and incorporated into the earlier sections of this chapter in a 
wider criticism which includes as great a time period as 
possible. Therefore I needed a period that would, without 
actually being September 1978, effectively mirror the concerns 
of that-'month, perhaps by illustrating that period more clearly 
as the first official steps in the thawing of the relationship 
between Egypt, Israel and the US. Prior to the month under 
content analysis this thawing had been shrouded or negligible. 
(2) Camp David was the direct heir to the planned-for Geneva 
Peace Conference, and thus press coverage mirrored the later 
developments (especially in Al Ahram) for which September 1977 
was the model. The significance of the abortive Geneva Conference 
has been underestimated in studies elsewhere. 82 (3) The nature 
of Al Ahram's coverage of the Camp David Accords was essentially 
a re-working of US State Department press releases and US media. 
During September 1978 the level of rhetoric and repetition used 
to fill pages was high, based around material from elsewhere. (4) 
One month was chosen rather than a longer period because thereby 
analysis could be concentrated. A shorter period would have 
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offered too little. (5) The distorting sentiment of September 
1978 was less apparent allowing a clearer view of those 
newspapers' treatment of Mideastern and Israeli-dominated issues. 
(6) Lastly, September 1977 was unique; talks of and moves towards 
peace escalated through that month, allowing clear inferences to 
be made with regards to comments within the papers and their 
treatment of events. The month also contained a major Israeli 
incursion into Lebanon which had more or less ended by the 28th. 
This event was not repeated a year later, yet may excite 
precisely those potential biases to be studied. Although there 
were other Israeli incursions into Lebanon, and a great deal of 
involvement by proxy, it could therefore be said that September 
1977 contained in microcosm many of the elements effecting the 
Accords--and Treaty. 
5.6.4: Criteria Used - the Purpose of Content Analysis Regarding 
Any Understanding of Newspaper Coverage 
In the analysis of and comparison between The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and Al Ahram, I use the following parameters: 
(1) Any news about Israel excepting domestic news with no 
international importance (such as the banking scandal 
involving Begin on September 10th83). 
(2) Egyptian news subject to the same criteria as (1). 
(3) Any mention whatever of Mideast peace moves (at this 
stage designated as "Geneva Peace Plan"). 
(4) Any mention of the PLO. 
(5) Wider reference to Jewish and Arab culture in US 
papers, if germane (within the above contexts). 
167 
Using these designations I set out and offer conclusions from: 
(i) What percentage of the newspapers' daily international 
coverage over the month chosen (September, 1977) was given 
over to Mideast peace moves and questions of Mideast 
detente. (See Table 5.1 and Chart 5.1.2/3). (This may 
indicate the newspapers' attitude to international news and 
to Mideast news in particular. ) 
(ii) Were biases visible in the papers' coverage? (See 
Table 5.2, A/B/C, 5.5, A/B. ) If so, in what direction did 
they lead? Were there similarities between them? How 
objective were the papers? (This will be measured as 
balance of references within and between articles. ) 
(iii) What form did the coverage take? Were there trends in 
--word use? Were certain groups/ideas given greater space or 
analysis; if so, where lay these emphases? (See Tables 5.3, 
A/B/C,. and 5.4, A/B/C. ) 
News stories were categorised according to: 
(a) Position within the paper (front-page leader; agency 
news; correspondent article; editorial; guest writer). 
(b) Subject (general Mideast; Israel; Palestine; Egypt; 
combinations of these three; other Arab states/Arab culture 
and society generally; the US and the Mideast). 
(c) By linguistically analysing and comparing the 
newspapers using specific sets of semantic markers as 
stylistic features. 
There will be explanations of how data may have been formed by 
its environment. (Al Ahram is useful as an example not only 
because of its reputation as the leading Arabic newspaper but 
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also because its format allows comparison with Western 
counterparts. ) 
5.6.5: Defining Terminology 
The following terms will be used in specific ways and are defined 
as follows: 
"A Marker" - words/phrases (either nouns, adjectives, verbs 
or adverbs) used to describe, explain or somehow delineate 
a certain group. 
"To Pulse" - "Primary/Secondary Pulsing" - to surge, or 
increase in freqency. 
"To Cue" - to start or initiate. 
a specific group of associated meaning. 
"Meaning set" -a specific semantic group. 
"Noun-Phrase" -. a group of words clustered around a noun, 
modifying it. 
"Modification" - adding, extending or precisely locating 
meaning. 
"Modifier" - an adjective or adverb (or adjectival or 
adverbial structure). 
"To Code" - to give a linguistic unit a numerical 
alternative for the purposes of tabulation. 
Symbols used in the various Tables: 
Arabs/Arab groups 
#= Israel 
I= Israeli-associated groups (e. g. the Lebanese Christian 
Falange and the Israeli Lobby in the US) 
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P= Palestinian people 
*= PLO 
US = The United States 
$= US economic interests (e. g. arms sales) 
+= Peace moves/ Genevan Protocol 
E= Egypt 
5.6.6: Analysis of September 1977 in the Three Newspapers 
Whereas The New York Times concentrated an average of 17.5% of 
its foreign reporting during 1977 on the Mideast, The Washington 
Post's Mideast average was only 13.5% (despite mounting political 
pressure towards a peace agreement this showed barely any change 
from>, =1976 - 14%: although the decrease may not have been 
statistically significant of itself, the-fact that there was no 
increase -despite' heightened activity may be). This included 
routine material from press agencies: a significant amount of 
which was from Reuters, UPI and AP. (Over the month 11% of 
stories on the Mideast were agency-sourced in The Washington Post 
as opposed to 8% in The New York Times. This may show fewer 
resources or a different sorting of material, say into a greater 
category of day-through-day facts and a smaller category of news 
for analysis and debate. ) Although The New York Times averaged 
a higher frequency of stories on the Mideast Peace and associated 
matters as a percentage of all Mideast stories (20.5% as opposed 
to The Washington Post's 18.2%), and. although its greater 
resources meant that a larger proportion of those stories were 
not agency-sourced (43% of The Washington Post's Mideast stories 
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were from agencies) there were 13% more in-depth reports of 
greater complexity and length in The Washington Post (including 
editorials, feature articles and articles by guest writers). The 
significance of these differences is visible in the complexion 
of the news stories (measurable using the tables of 
positivity/negativity markers - 5.2, A/B/C and 5.4, A/B/C). While 
The Washington Post made specific criticisms (especially of 
Israel) The New York-Times offered a wide spread of criticism 
through one grouping (Arab/Palestinian/PLO) and a wide spread of 
support through another (Israel/US Peace efforts). 
The parameters of the content analysis of Al Ahram was to 
consider the front page headlines and <Rai' Al Ahram> ("Al 
Ahram's Opinion", - equivalent to the editorial in Western 
newspapers). The structure of Arabic newspapers differs from 
those in the West (and especially English language papers) by 
being simpler in design. The paper is governed by the headline 
(and head story plus pictures), and carries smaller stories as 
bodycopy, continuing the themes of headline and headcopy into the 
second and third pages. (In the case of the reporting of Camp 
David, when Sadat and Begin had signed the Accords, Al Ahram ran 
almost every square centimetre of seven pages of copy solely 
about the event. ) With editorial commentary on both the front and 
(usually) fifth pages, and little discussion by external writers 
or staff, the paper took on the shape of an inverted cone, 
narrowing down to the final editorial and never deviating from 
the standard line. The effect of quotations (usually Sadat's), 
photographs (mostly Sadat), and commentary (on Sadat's 
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effectiveness), was to create a political broadsheet. Al Ahram 
excluded dissenting voices. 
Besides the structure and content of headlines and bodycopy, the 
second consideration was the tone in which they were written. 
This varied from declamatory, through matter-of-fact to inquisit- 
ive (though it must be admitted that Al Ahram was inquisitive 
often only in a rhetorical sense). " Al Ahram's headlines, the 
reports of government response and the editorial condemnation of 
anti-government activity were divided from Western newspapers not 
by differing moral standards as much as the relative simplicity 
with which Al Ahram went about its business of propping up the 
status-quo. 
The percentage of Mideast stories varied through September, 1977, 
and naturally increased in all three papers as talk of a Geneva 
conference developed and positive noises from Egypt increased (in 
advance of Sadat's surprise visit to Jerusalem in November 1977). 
Table 5.1 indicates percentage freqencies and presence of major 
articles. This data can also be presented as a histogram (Chart 
5.1.2) to show more clearly shifts and frequency alternations 
over the month. (0.5% of international stories in The New York 
Times were on Arab issues excluding Israel-centred stories or 
Egyptian stories, while The Washington Post offered 0.4%. These 
were almost all on the meeting of the Arab League and Arab 
Foreign ministers meeting. ) Chart 5.1.2 compared the whole range 
of Mideast news connected with Camp David (Egyptian politics, 
Israeli settler issues, Arab issues). However when the 
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frequencies were stripped down to three subjects (Egyptian/ 
Israeli detente, Palestinian rights, Genevan protocol) a slightly 
different picture emerged (Chart 5.1.3). 
Starred dates would not weight the frequency for that day, but 
should (for example) length or importance of article be 
incorporated by measuring only those articles over 500 words, and 
those articles whose subject was specifically centred on the 
Mideast Peace Protocol, and the inter-relational problems of the 
Israelis, Palestinians and Egyptians (Chart 5.1.3) then this 
enhanced the pulsing effect (see below). Specific bursts of press 
activity can be seen occurring between September 1 and 3,4 and 
81 10 and 13,14 and 17,18 and 24,26 and 30 (though these could 
be confuted into three, "between September 1 and 8,9 and 17, and 
18 and 30). The difference between the two charts suggests there 
may be semantic shifts occurring which partially obscure 
underlying trends (with news concentrating on Mideastern topics 
peripheral to the Peace Protocol in-between days with more 
specific news). 
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TABLE 5.1: REPORTS ON THE PEACE PROCESS AS A% OF TOTAL INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
SEPTEMBER, 1977. 
DATE Al Ahram W'ton Post New Y Times 
SEPT 1 18% 5% 18% 
2 16% 0% 23% 
3 *33% 10% *7% 
4 23% 19% 9% 
5 33% *22% 25% 
6 39% 17% *18% 
7 32% *10% 9% 
8 32% 0% 17% 
9 21% 17% 13% 
10 47% 15% *23% 
11 *32% 11% 18% 
12 60% *27% *7% 
13 44% *20% 25% 
14 *31% *8% 15% 
15 47% 8% 15% 
16 *25% 14% 18% 
17 . 
36% *10% 10% 
18 33% 14% *21% 
19 *35% *33% 26% 
20 *32% 38% 25% 
21 25% *25% 31% 
22 35% *50% *18% 
23 *32% *18% 31% 
24 48% *23% *13% 
25 56% 18% 11% 
26 *35% 25% 30% 
27 *47% *33% *50% 
28 *50% 8% *33% 
29 *51% *27% 40% 
30 *58% 22% 17% 
Presence of 
major artkICS 
12 13 9 
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5.6.7: Information "Pulsing" 
The first conclusion about the Al Ahram figures of Table 5.1 and 
Charts 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 is that they may indicate how finely 
planned or controlled the paper was: at peaks of reporting on the 
peace initiatives there were often major stories about the US, 
or US involvement in the Peace moves. Starred dates in Table 5.1 
show when these major stories occurred. Most reflected a new 
interest in the US as peace-broker or friend of Egypt (Table 5.2 
C indicates this semantic trend more clearly) . It is notable that 
the starred dates increase after the mid-point of the month and 
towards the end of the month (and peaked during the visit on 
November 19 by Sadat to Jerusalem, at which time most lost their 
earlier continuous criticism of Israel for a more sparing form) . 
On only one of the high-percentage or starred occasions was there 
an article in Al Ahram critical of US efforts, and that was a 
relatively short criticism within an editorial on September 11 
of US arms supplies to Israel (see analysis of editorial content, 
table 5.4 C below) . This compares interestingly to September 1976 
when 32% of articles about the US were either directly or 
indirectly critical. By September 1977 even in articles critical 
of the US/Israel relationship there were more neutral or positive 
markers, and articles elsewhere in the same edition of a less 
critical cast. However the most surprising correlation is between 
reports of the peace process and comment on Israel. While starred 
dates or high-frequency dates held stories on Israel (as usual 
with almost all editions of the paper during Camp David), 
following dates infrequently contained Israel-based stories of 
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the greatest critical content regarding Israeli activities 
(September 4,7/8,16,21/22). Following the last pulse of peace 
process news (ending October 3rd) there were a series of articles 
with high percentages of critical markers modifying Begin, Dayan, 
Shamir and certain Israeli responses to peace. This secondary 
"pulsing" is visible in table 5.2 C, where pulses of strong 
negative modifying of Israeli markers were followed by pulses of 
positive modifying of US markers. (On all three papers secondary 
sets of figures were sampled in random topics usually contained 
in the non-specialist home/international sections: Al Ahram on 
health, The New York Times on US-Soviet relations, The Washington 
Post on judicial matters. It was found that, over a larger 
period, a similar if irregular pulsing may be present, though 
less marked 'on more specialist topics. US-Soviet relations in The 
New York Times most closely mirrored the coverage of Camp David. 
During the SALT talks between the Soviet Union and US under the 
Reagan administration the same pulsing can be seen, increasing 
in frequency up to the actual summitry, then falling off unevenly 
afterwards. Perhaps the more recurrent the topic the more likely 
it will have this frequency profile in the media. This pulsing 
is designated "primary". ) So, despite the fact that other topics 
may have had more news-space allocated, this frequency profile 
would suggest that Mideast issues in US papers (the pulsing was 
visible in all papers consulted to some degree) were in a 
category of importance along with other strong issues at that 
time, (eg superpower detente). Although there was the 
aforementioned frequency patterning in Al Ahram, the pattern 
tended to be initiated and then resolved within a very short 
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space - (i) initial story; (ii) what could be designated a 
"balancing" story (though this may suggest direct control too 
strongly) [usually same date); (iii) resolving story [often 
following date] (see Table 5.2 C, comparing US and Israeli issues 
covered). However with the US papers there did not appear to be 
a similar short-period fluctuation. This may reflect either (a) 
short-term editorial reaction in Al Ahram, and longer-term 
planning for the US papers, or (b) a differing awareness of 
consuming groups. In order to establish whether pulsing is a 
phenomena occuring across newspapers independent of topic I took 
a random period of a month from a four-year period of the British 
newspaper The Independent (August 1993). I also chose a random 
topic from a list comprising 20 recurring topics within the 
British press at this time : 85 this was ecological issues (also 
designated "environmental" or "green"). I only measured major 
articles on, and important references to the issue, discounting 
haphazard references. Looking at Table 5.1.4 there seems to be 
evidence of "pulsing", with frequency peaks between August 6 and 
10, and again between August 23 and 30. This phenomena would not 
necessarily be expected in more general topics: in fact the wider 
the topic (eg the Mideast in general) the more likely the spread 
of articles will show fewer patterned fluctuations (the presence 
of a regular correspondent to cover an issue almost guarantees 
regularity of information). 
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TABLE 5.1.4 "Coverage of a range of environmental issues in 
The Independent, August 1993" 
DATE ISSUES ---> 
AUG ECOLOGY ENVIRON- 
MENTAL 
GREEN 
POLITICS 
"GREEN- 
PEACE" 
GLOBAL 
WARMING 
1 1 
2 
3 
4 
s 1 Crhorpe] 
6 1 [Diesel Cars] 
7 1 IMnleysiel 
8 1 [Elephants] I [Green business] 1 
9 1 [Bicycles] 1 
10 1 1 [Ozone] 
11 1 [Ozone] 
12 
13 1 [Sizewell] 
14 
15 1 [Ozone] 
16 
17 
18 1 [Architecture] 1 Profile 
19 
20 
21 1 [Been) 1 
22 
23 1 [Garbage] I [Germany] 
24 1 
25 1 [Rio Treaty] 1 (penguias) 
26 10 1 [CFCs] 
27 1 [LbDems] 2 [Green 
Anger] 
1 
28 
29 
30 1 [Dangers] 1 [Garbage] 1 
31 1 1 1 __ 
7 
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The figures for the two US papers indicate four pulses of 
interest (see Chart 5.1.2): the first between the Ist and 7th; 
the second between the 12th and 15th; the third beginning the 
19th/20th; the fourth beginning the 26th. The periods of highest 
frequency are demarkated by more obvious low frequency days: 7/8; 
14-17; 24/25. Although these pulses indicate a slow shift of 
increasing frequency roughly corresponding to Carter and Vance's 
push towards the proposed Geneva Conference and generally 
increasing towards the end of the month, there are two 
observations: (1) That the pulses do not coincide with any 
particular activity (Dayan's movements, the Arab-League's 
statements or US moves) except the Lebanese incursion by the 
Israeli army (the third pulse coincides with the height of the 
incursion and the heaviest losses, and does contain a major 
statement on peace moves by Dayan regarding the proposed Geneva 
Conference). (2) The initial dates of the pulses are consecutive 
for the US papers and Al Ahram. Whether one cued the other is not 
easily quantifiable. (There was no obvious influence of one paper 
on the other where individual words/phrases were concerned, and 
therefore no direct linguistic evidence for such cueing. ) 
Increasing frequencies within the pulses may be because, as 
Israeli involvement in Southern Lebanon increased in depth and 
violence, so the percentage of news devoted to peace (and 
specifically the Geneva Conference) increased. This would be 
supported by the frequent incidences of "balancing" which the 
visible "peaks and troughs" in news coverage of a number of 
issues may suggest. Another could be that information about 
Geneva became more specific as Carter unfolded the idea and the 
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paper simply elaborated. However there does not seem to have been 
more incidences of reported peace specifics at particular times. 
5.6.8: Semantic Shifts 
From pulse to pulse there was a shift apart from frequency or 
subject and that was in the way news changed complexion. The task 
was then to measure this change if possible; to attempt to 
pinpoint any linguistic/semantic changes within and between 
individual pulses, and across the entire month. Was there any 
evidence of specific changes in the complexion the coverage had? 
Was there any patterning of markers from which to infer 
intention, policy or interference? Were there any biases? Did 
specific words or phrases (linguistic markers) associated with 
groups (PLO, Carter, Israel) which were positive, negative 
(condemnatory/dismissive) or neither (neutral) show greater 
frequency in the different newspapers? 
Al Ahram might have been predictably negative about most Israeli 
actions (had Sadat been contemplating some form of rapprochment 
with Israel it may have been possible that he could signal 
compromise through Al Ahram and other newspapers and at the same 
time make "appropriate noises" for domestic consumption). 
However, were there other aspects discoverable by isolating 
specific linguistic markers? Table 5.2 (A, B, C) has sections for 
each paper and bands to locate approximately linguistic markers 
as either (1) very positive, (2) positive, (3) neutral (ie with 
no obvious cue towards positive or negative), (4) negative and 
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(5) very negative. 
Establishing quality of linguistic markers would be threatened 
by the writer's subjective judgements, and could only be done (i) 
in context of immediate comment, treating one piece or section 
of news (the major subject of a paragraph; or article; secondary 
subjects and sometimes single noun-phrases if the modification 
was strong enough to merit inclusion) as a single entry in the 
table; (ii) in the context of general knowledge readers may be 
expected to have had of the subject (as far as possible estimated 
subject to subject); (iii) in the context of the stream of news 
of the month. For example, Al Ahram's description of Israel's 
actions as a threat <tahdeed> would be more negative than their 
use of the depracatory Arabic adjective <mesrahiyah> meaning 
theatrical. The New York Times' description of the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as <mild> was a positive 
judgement (or possibly neutral if other. judgements within the 
same article were more condemnatory), while Dayan's offering of 
<substantive concessions> would be very positive due to the force 
of the pre-modifier. 
Where there was a potentially damning report (say of the Israeli 
kidnapping of Lebanese civilians on September 3 "Israel Army 
Units Said to Kidnap 16 in Lebanon Villages, 86) which included 
a denial presented without comment (in this case by the Israeli 
military) then it may be estimated that the headline contained 
more semantic impact that is negative to Israel. Later 
information might shift a reader's response to either the less 
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negative or neutral column (otherwise only used for substantial 
reports or articles which neither criticised nor praised). For 
example September 12 in The New York Times fully reported Dayan's 
peace plan with a number of positive words ("substantial self- 
rule", "... West Bank Internal Autonomy" [headline], "formula ... 
would rely heavily on ... moderate West Bank leaders") but added 
neutral-to-negative and purely negative words and phrases in 
association with the PLO ("excluding strong supporters of the 
militant Palestinian Liberation Organisation" - "strong" takes 
on a slightly more negative meaning within the context created 
by both the marker "militant" and noun phrase "Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation"). Israel would move up the positive axis 
because of phrases such as "[Israel] stands ready to integrate", 
"(Israel) would offer [Palestinians] a choice ... and be able to 
negotiate with the 700,000 Palestinians on the West Bank" 
(showing flexibility and reason). 
These tables should be seen as preparation for the following 
section of linguistic analysis of sampled texts, and the 
measurements can only be an approximation. However what they lose 
on exactness they may gain on exposing patterning. 
Some points must be made beforehand: I have tried to make the 
tables context-sensitive on several levels (i) in The New York 
Times the word <settlements> would not automatically be negative 
or positive, while in Al Ahram <mustotanat> (meaning "settlement, 
occupation") would be strongly negative by association with 
groups such as Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) and notions of 
183 
theft of Arab land (in Al Ahram for 1978 <mustotanat> was used 
293 times in reports on the West Bank and Gaza, only 23 times was 
it contextualised by specific adjectives or other structures to 
identify the settlements as Israeli; we may therefore infer the 
noun was strongly associative). Also, after Arab complaints about 
Israeli settlements on the 7-8 September (New York Times), the 
word may take on greater negativity in US papers. Mentioning 
Israeli security arrangements would similarly not be negative in 
US papers (September 4's mention of a "security belt" on page 7) 
unless in context of Israeli incursions into Lebanon. Photographs 
can have an enhancing effect on markers within text (on September 
10 the photograph of an armed settler may suggest notions of 
brave frontiersmen rather than aggressive expansionism among US 
readers) and this is taken into account. Articles from different 
viewpoints specifically designed to balance each other (18 
September) are discounted. Markers indicating sympathy are taken 
to be positive. Although detail may be absent, the aim was to 
offer a construct as context- sensitive as possible. Table 5.2 
records only major articles (nothing from agencies or stringers 
which tended to be short, factual accounts whose effect may not 
be as strong as an extensive "personal" account) leavng US 
newspaper editorials for table 5.4. There may be different 
symbols for the same date to show different treatment of various 
groups. 
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TABLE 5.2: USE OF LINGUISTIC MARKERS WITHIN TEXT (EXCLUDING EDITORIALS) FOR EACH OF TIIE PAPERS 
Use of square brackets I] indicates a possible alternative reading of the data. Underlining indicates repetition of marker in same article. 
(A) The New York Times 
Very 
Positive 
Positive Neutral Negative Very 
Negative 
Sept 1 # #* * @ 
2 # 
3 # # 
4 @ # 
5 @ # 
6 @ # 
7 #+ Us @ 
8 
9 # $#@ 
10 # $@ 
11 + # 
12 # P 
13 US P 
14 E 
15 + # 
16 # 
17 #@I 
18 US @E @ 
19 + 
20 +I US P 
21 P+I 
22 # 
23 E # @ 
24 ## @ 
25 P * 
26 #+ US # 
27 *E #@ 
28 P # 
29 @+ 
30 + 
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Text cut off in original 
TABLE 5.1: (B) e Was ingzon rosz 
Very 
Positive 
Positive Neutral Negative Very 
Negative 
Sept 1 [#] 
2 
3 
4 @ [#] 
5 A@ [*] 
6 @ [#] 
7 + @ 
8 @ 
9 [@] # 
10 [#) I # 
11 # [#] @ 
12 # [#] [#] @ 
13 US ± [#] 
14 [#] 
15 *_ [+] # US 
16 P # [@] 
17 [*] # 
18 [S] @$ 
19 *# 
20 * (US) [#] 
21 [E] P+ (#) [#] (US) [#3 [#] @ 
22 E US # 
23 @ [@) [@) 
24 
25 (E) 
26 #*+ 
(US) 
27 E [#) # 
[E] 
28 + [#) 
29 @+ [#] 
30 
=*P 
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Text cut off in original 
Very 
Positive 
Positive Neutral Negative Very 
Negative 
Sept 1 E* [*] # ### 
2 * ## 
3 + @ E+US * # 
4 E+ # [#] 
5 @ (E] @ [US] 
6 (US] US * [#] 
7 US US # 
8 [US] 
9 *+ [E] (#] 
10 [*] US ## 
11 E (+] @ (US] # [$] L#$ 
12 US 
13 US (+] * [P] #+ # 
14 US US + US + [US] 
15 + US *E 
16 US $E US # 
17 * (P] US # 
18 US E 
19 E # # 
20 US + @ # ### 
21 US [+] E [E] @ # [US] #. 
22 [US] + * [+] 
23 E (US] 
[E] 
(*] # # 
24 E+ [US] 
25 E (E] E [US] 
26 #+ [E] 
US 
(#] 
27 E US [@] [US] I # 
28 US E [@J # [#j 
29 US [E] US [E] 
[US] 
# 
30 [US] +E [E] I # 
Reports within reports (for example direct or indirect quotations) are not 
registered as positive or negative markers for the subjects of those 
reports unless that quotation is the major subject. 
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These tables reveal predictable frequencies (the negativity with 
which Al Ahram treated Israel, the greater spread of positive 
markers for Israel in The New York Times than in The Washington 
Post), also shifts (Al Ahram was less negative towards Israel 
during the last days of September, while markers for peace and 
the US were notably highly positive). Less obvious is the 
consistent way both US papers treated arms sales to Saudi Arabia 
(negatively) and the frequency with which comments on Carter's 
administration's foreign policy were negative. 
However, there were unpredictable elements. (Given that The New 
York Times could be seen as more likely to be less critical of 
Israel and more critical of Arab/Palestinian/PLO points of view, 
and that The Washington Post spoke within the context of the 
Capitol's Democratic majority - see above Chapter 4. ) Therefore 
the thoroughgoing criticism in The Washington Post of Carter's 
policies could be judged unusual. Attitudes to Mideast groupings 
(Israel, PLO, Palestinians, Arabs in general) might be considered 
less predictable in The Washington Post than The New York Times, 
however there was still an interesting polarisation in the 
former: only 33% of markers modifying Israel could be judged 
either neutral or positive, while 57% of PLO markers were 
positive (though none very positive). 50% of US markers ($ and 
US) were negative or very negative, while 65% of Arab markers 
were either neutral or positive. 
The New York Times proved unpredictable some of the time. 37% of 
the recorded markers in The New York Times were negative/ very 
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negative in the context of Israeli markers, or positive/ very 
positive in the context of Palestinian/Arab markers. In The 
Washington Post there was a shift from the 21 September: despite 
two more days of strong criticism of Israel (23 September 
particularly strong) there was a shift towards positively marking 
a wider set of groups. Comparing Tables 5.2 (A, B, C) there may 
be a correlation with the frequencies recorded in Chart 5.1, 
which may be expected. But while there seem to have been two 
groupings of positivity markers in Tables 5.2 (A, B, C) before 
the 21 September watershed (5-7,11-15) the second more obvious, 
these were not a representative grouping and in fact reflect 
single events (Arab League meeting, Dayan's diplomatic shuttle) 
rather than trends. These single events occurred during the- final 
period (Fehmy's visit to Washington, Sadat's declaration of 
intent, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon) and there was a 
sustained multi-group positivity with peace moves mentioned on 
three separate occasions (21,26 and 29 September). Since there 
was no corollary within The New York Times (excepting a shrinkage 
of negativity markers towards the end of the month) the shift 
within The Washington Post may have been an attempt to bring a 
number of groups within a peace-orientated concensus, or a 
response to a political and media momentum. 
The New York Times had fewer very negative markers (7) than The 
Washington Post (10) and had broad bands of positive and negative 
markers with much less day-on-day variation, and was slightly 
more inclined towards strongly-positive markers (two marking 
Israel, one marking peace talks and one the Palestinians). The 
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New York Times was in general more positive towards Israel and 
Israeli groups than The Washington Post (discounting neutral 
markers, 46.2% of markers were positive or very positive (25.8% 
in The Washington Post); 53.8% were negative or very negative 
(74.2% in The Washington Post]). Although the weighting itself 
within The New York Times may be expected (see above) the small 
deficit between overall positivity and negativity, slightly 
inclined towards the latter may be unexpected. However this may 
have been offset by the nature of the linguistic modification 
described below. 
The conclusions to be drawn from these Tables are: 
(1) That Israel was criticised negatively by both The New 
York* Times and The Washington Post, but while the former 
concentrated its negativity on specific events (Israeli 
incursions into Lebanon) the latter's negative markers occurred 
in the context of other events linked with the peace process, 
Israel's Arab population, Israel's treatment of those indigenous 
to its Occupied Territories, historical events (the sinking of 
the Liberty in 1967) and so on. 
(2) That Arab issues were consistently more negatively 
marked within The New York Times: 28.6% of markers on Arab 
subjects were positive, 71.4% negative (again excluding neutral 
markers). In The Washington Post 61.5% of'markers were positive, 
38.5% were negative. This was context-sensitive within The 
Washington Post (Arab League rejection of peace moves, Egyptian 
criticism of Israel) less so in The New York Times where negative 
(not very negative) markers occurred in articles which were not 
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contextualised around a specific Arab act. This may suggest (a) 
a more general viewpoint regarding Arabs/Arabic culture within 
The New York Times, (b) sensitivity to its. Jewish readership, (c) 
a more "conservative" attitude towards Mideast events which 
considered negatively those groups historically antagonistic to 
US moves and interests. 
(3) Al Ahram consistently criticised Israel (only on three 
occassions were markers neutral, none were positive), 
consistently praised Egypt (most often in terms of its leadership 
- specifically Sadat), and increased its positivity markers for 
the US as the month progressed (often linked specifically to talk 
of peace). Only on five occasions was the US negatively marked 
(and one of those was in the context of US arms sales to Israel) . 
US and Egyptian positivity markers may be linked, and increase 
towards the end of the month. Without there being evidence at 
this level of any obvious linkage, there also seems to be some 
kind of break in frequency distribution trends around the mid- 
month (as there may have been in the US papers, especially The 
Washincrton Post). While US-Egyptian and Peace markers increased 
in frequency, PLO-Palestinian markers decreased (while having 
remained at a more or less consistant level within the paper over 
the year previously) . If the same demarkation is made as was done 
for The Washington Post using the 21 September as a watershed 
date, only 15.4% of (positive) markers for either Palestinians 
or the PLO occurred after that date. This may have been due to 
(a) growing Palestinian hostility to the Genevan Protocol, but 
(b) a wish to avoid direct criticism of Palestinian groups within 
the paper, (c) a shift in agenda (despite rhetoric) away from 
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Palestinian centrality in the Peace process towards a new 
US/Egyptian axis. 
These tables suffered from two major drawbacks: (i) When a 
particular event was reported a number of ways, and when there 
was no consistant negative or positive attitude within those 
markers collated, it was difficult to combine the differing 
impacts. I attempted to circumvent this by chosing only major 
analytical articles which were, in general, easily diagnosed as 
positive or negative. (ii) Linguistically it is not always 
obvious what constitutes a negative, positive or neutral word 
without analysing the context: such analysis could allow a 
certain amount of unwanted "intuitive" elements into the 
analysis. However, I feel the overall impression from these 
Tables is objectively obtained and clear. 
5.6.9: Linguistic Markers Within Editorials 
Tables 5.3 (A, B, C) continue this analysis of positivity/- 
negativity markers specifying editorials as context. It is 
possible that (1) these tables are merely "snapshots" of the 
previous Tables (5.2), (2) show some form of exaggeration of the 
newspaper's trends, or (3) indicate maverick opinion by the 
editorial staff. In neither of the US newspapers was the PLO ever 
positively marked (though The New York Times was predictably more 
damning). Nor did either paper produce any positive markers for 
the US administration: this time The Washington Post was the more 
critical. The major discrepancy from the markers recorded for 
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bodycopy was in the manner Palestinian and Israeli markers were 
distributed: Palestinians were treated very positively by The New 
York Times (almost identically in terms of positivity markers 
with Israel) while The Washington Post treated Israel 
consistently more positively. While both newspapers were 
condemnatory about more groups than they praised, once again The 
Washington Post was more thoroughly negative over a wider range. 
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TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
J lice FWI ULJ iiiue5 
September 
1977 
Very 
Positive 
Positive Neutral Negative Very 
Negative 
Sept 2 [P] P * [#] + [*] 
Sept 14 # [#] [P] [P] 
Sept 29 [P] [#] # [P] US * 
[+] 
* US 
B) The Washington Post 
September 
1977 
Very 
Positive 
Positive Neutral Negative Very 
Negative 
Sept 9 #@ [#] 
Sept 14 # [#] (+] [*] + [US] US 
Sept 18 E $ US @ (E) [US] 
Sept 21 (#] t- + [@] @ [@] 
Sept 24 [P] # [+] P (*] 
YC) 
Al Ahram 
September 
1977 
Very 
Positive 
Positive Neutral Negative Very 
Negative 
Sept 3 + US @ [@] # 
Sept 4 [@] [US) # 
ept 5 + [US] # 
Sept 6 @ [+] # [+] 
Sept 11 # [+] [US] [#] 
Sept 13 
(front pg] 
[+] [+] 
Sept 14 [+] US [+] (US] 
Sept 17 [@] @+ [US] # 
Sept 18 [US] +@ [#] 
Sept 19 [+] [#] 
Sept 20 + [I] [#] 
Sept 22 [E] + [US] #+ 
Sept 24 [P] + [@] @ US # 
Sept 26 E [P] 
Sept 27 # [I] 
Sept 30 [+] +E [*/@] # 
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The two US papers treated the possibility of Geneva (symbol "+11) 
in different ways. The New York Times' response (see Table 5.2 
A) contrasted with The Washington Post's less positive marking 
of Israel. However, during the final five days of September The 
New York Times marked Israel negatively three times, once very 
negatively (compared with only one negative Arab marker). on only 
one occasion were Palestinians as a group negatively marked. 
While The Washington Post offered greater criticism of Israel it 
never used negative markers for the Palestinians as a people. 
Shifts during the month are worth comparing between the two US 
papers with markers becoming spread apart into strongly negative 
and positive for The New York Times, while The Washington Post's 
reports on Israel, Arabs, the PLO and the US showed a distinctly 
negative shift. Illustrated by the histogram of reports on the 
peace process as a percentage of total international news (Table 
5.1.2 / 5.1.3) the same pulses may be identified pushing apart 
the markers in The New York Times, but in The Washington Post 
shifting those same markers into the negative bands. The 
characterization of Egypt in Table 5.2 shows almost all positive 
or neutral/positive in The New York Times, but not in The 
Washington Post. (It may be that The New York Times, within the 
Genevan protocol context, found it easier to criticise the wider 
group "Arabs" than specific nations. In other contexts this may 
be expected to be the reverse. ) Finally, whereas Al Ahram offered 
a consistency (Israel always negative, the US always neutral or 
positive) the two US papers seemed only consistent in one 
respect: linguistic markers linked to Arab news (excluding the 
Palestinians and Egyptians). These were either neutral (reports 
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on the Arab League) or negative or strongly negative (reports on 
the PLO, Syria, Iraq and Libya). 
5.6.10: Specific Language Use in the Three Papers 
I recognise that there are many complex theoretical models used 
for linguistic analysis (from structuralist to post-structuralist 
semantics) ; what I have tried to do here is offer a core analysis 
based on linguistic context and interpretation, suggesting 
possible variables and meaning-sets rather than any wider 
model. 87 
This section further develops the enquiry into semantic shifts 
with the newspapers, concentrating on specific words and word- 
groups. It is more about the linguistic potential in certain 
structures and usages of the three papers than extensive mapping 
of linguistic usage. By "potential" I mean the semantic qualities 
in terms of judgement implicit in any set of meanings associated 
with a particular word or word-group, and any sub-sets of 
meanings/associations that word or word-group may have. For 
example, would the word <apprentice> have any particular 
associations within the context of, say, The Irish News88, An 
Phoblacht89, or The Belfast Telegraph90? And would these 
associations tell us something about the judgements implicit in 
those papers at particular times, and changes in those judgements 
over a period? It is possible that such associations may be 
telling in terms of overall semantic shifts mirroring more 
profound changes within the newspapers. 
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I wished to identify as precisely as possible (using Table 5.4 
A, B, C) what characterisation was given to the following groups, 
and whether that characterisation changed over the month: 
Palestinians, PLO, Israel, Israeli groups (specifically the 
Lebanese Christian Falange), the US, Egypt and Peace moves in 
general. To establish meanings objectively in key words I sampled 
them in non-Mideast contexts for a random month in 1980 (July) 
and used standard dictionaries. 91 In both the English language 
and Arabic papers these sets of words/word-groups could (1) vary 
widely in meaning according to context and within the contexts 
used; (2) occur in similar contexts with similar meanings and (3) 
frequently or only occur within associated contexts with a stable 
range of meaning. However, within the English language papers 
most of the words occurred as (1). or (2), while for Al Ahram more 
occurred as (2) or (3). This was partly because that paper 
concentrated its coverage (and associated discussions on 
war/peace) on its relations with Israel and the Israeli relations 
with its neighbours. It is also possible that linguistic patterns 
were more various in the English language papers, less so in Al 
Ahram (where the afore-mentioned linguistically conservative and 
rhetorical content was large). The phrase <salam adil wa-da Iim> 
("Just and Meaningful Peace") occurred only semantically linked 
to Israel in articles on the Israeli treatment of its neighbours 
or arab populations (mostly Palestinians). The word <muharib> 
("Warlike") mostly pre- or post-modified the noun <Israel> 
(though occasionally modified Libya (8%), the Phalangists (6%) 
and other, non-arab countries or groups (5.5%)). 
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The difference between the papers in terms of vocabulary use may 
have been partly due to factors in the US newspapers such as (1) 
wider writer-base, (2) a greater interest in providing 
information, (3) possibly a larger available vocabulary than the 
classical Arabic used as journalistic Arabic. There may also be 
a genuine difference in the re-use of words or word-groups 
reflecting differing views of audiences. Whereas a US 
(intellectual, white, middle-class) audience would reject some 
predicatable modifications (though such stock use of modifiers 
does occur within the realm of journalistic English employed by 
the "popular" or tabloid presses92) an Egyptian (or Arabic- 
speaking) audience might not. What this-linguistic examination 
may show, therefore, is a series of possible differences in 
93 reading groups. 
Since there can be no certain analysis of the causes of such 
differences, I then went on to look at the similarity in 
frequencies. Could it be that the similarities indicated below 
suggest that the rhetorical style of Al Ahram (following set 
patterns of criticism/ praise/ description) might also be 
followed to a lesser extent within The Washington Post and The 
New York Times? There was some evidence (though nothing 
conclusive) to show this may be the case. (see below). 
Any words (often adjectives but also nouns with powerful 
associations - for example the nouns "guerilla, enemy, struggle, 
threat, settlement") which recurred in more than 5% of articles 
analysed were listed; proper nouns were excluded; as were words 
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recurring merely because the same piece of news was repeated in 
a later edition; neutral words (pronouns, modal verbs, articles, 
conjunctions) and non-associative words (such as "say", "report", 
"fly", "meet") even if they were in sentences which were not 
neutral, were excluded. Words with approximately similar meanings 
for similar contexts were pooled if their frequencies were also 
similar. (Certain words which did not have a definitive 
modifying function in articles linked to camp David were 
omitted. ) When a word/word-group had a specific cognitive 
association (ie <settler> with Israel) then a secondary 
association (ie comments of Egypt regarding such settlers) was 
recorded linked to that word group. Words from the same root (ie 
settler/-settlement) were treated using the same word-code. This 
left a core of words (or word groups) used frequently to attack, 
criticise or praise, or in neutral association. None of these 
word-lists are in order of frequency of occurrance within texts. 
Square brackets were used (1) for references which were not 
directly linked either to the word group, or more generally to 
the momentum towards Geneva/Camp David, or (2) to indicate words 
derived from the same root, or indirect association of a category 
with a modifier. 
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TABLE 5.4: Distribution of semantic markers within text (A) THE NEW YORK TIMES 
WORD 
CODE 
SEPT 1-5 SEPT 6-10 SEPT 11-15 SEPT 16-20 SEPT 21-25 SEPT 26-30 
1 P{x3} *{x2} ®{x2} I 
#{x3} 
US{x4} 
P{x2} 
#{x5) I 
P{x3) 
US{x3} E 
#{x3} P 
*{x2} E 
E{x2} 
@{x2} #{x3} 
US #{x2} P 
[`l 
2 #{x3} #{x5) #{x2} US{x2} #{x2} P @{x2} 
3 [®{x2}] #US PI US# 
4 #0 ®[#{X2}] I{X2} E [I] E#{x2} 
I{x2} 
# 
5 # P *{x2} # [a] + E [I] *{x2} [P] *{x2} 
6 *{x2} P *{x2} 0 * [P] * * 
7 #/m #+ E 
8 P P{x2} * P* *{x3} [P] 
9 #{x3} I{x2) 
E* 
#{x9}I{x2} #{x3} E 
I{x4} 
#{x4}I{x3} 
_ 
#{x5} 
P/*{x3} 
#{x9} 
@{x2} 
10 P P{x2} P P P{x3) 
11 #@P* E{x2) #{x3} #{x3) E{x2} 
P 
#{x3} E # ®{x2} E #P [*] 
12 # P PE # 
13 * * * 
14 P P{x2) p P 
15 # US 0 US # 
16 #{x2} US # P/* 
17 US US US # 
18 P P P{x2} @ ] P{x2} 
19 # 
V 
` [®] #i 
20 #{x2} E 
@{x2} US 
+ {x4} 
#+ US{x2} #0 P/*{X3} 
+{x3} 
#{x3) US 
P/* +{x3} 
+{x5} 
P/*{x3} E# 
21 # * # # 
22 # # 
23 P [#] +P 
24 0 + US 
25 # E #{x3} P #{x2} 
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TABLE 5.4 (B) THE WASHINGTON POST 
WORD 
CODE 
SEPT 1-5 SEPT 6-10 SEPT 11.1S SEPT 16-20 SEPT 21-25 SEPT 26-30 
1 # # # 
2 P P{x2} p P P 
3 # * # # 
4 # # #{x3} # 
5 US E# #{x2} US US P #{x3} 
6 # #{x2} # # 
7 # # 
8 # #{x3} #E # #{x2} # 
9 0 P# [0] US{x2} 
[Pl#/*] 
P{x2} 
US # P{x2} 
US {x2} 
E{x2} *{x2} 
P# *{x2} 
10 # a{x2} #@ #{x3} P #{x2} #{x2} US # 
11 0 # #/[I] # 
12 # [*] # 
13 0 P P P P 
14 #{x2} #{x3} #/I #{x3} # # 
15 P P P P 
16 #0 #aP P/US #PUS P* 
17 
18 P P *{x2} *{x2} 
19 # # 
20 P P(x2) P E 
21 #P @{x2} @{x3} P# ®P US US{x2} 
#{x2} P. 
* P{x3} 
#{x2} 
US{x2} 
22 # # 
23 0 P 
24 # # #{x2} #{x3} # #{x2} 
F25 
# # #{x2) #{x3} 
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(C) AL AIIRAM 
WORD 
CODE 
SEPT 1- 
5 
SEPT 6- 
10 
SEPT 
11-15 
SEPT 
16-20 
SEPT 
21-25 
SEPT 
26-30 
1 US{x2} 
[#] [E] 
US 
*{x3} # 
US E# 
* 
US{x2} 
E 
US{x4} 
E{x3} # 
#*P 
2 US US E{x2} # US 
3 #{x3} #E 
*{x2} 
# US P US 
#{x2} 
US 
P{x2} 
4 # #{x2} # #{x3} 
5 # #{x3} #{x2} 
6 E US US US # 
7 #{x2} #{x2} #{x2} #{x3} 
8 E US US E 
9 # #{x2} # # (US] # #{x2} 
10 # # #{x2} # #{x3} # [I] 
11 # [I] #{x2} # #P # 
12 P [*] P *{x2} P* P{x3} * [P] 
13 P# # P{x2} @ [P] # #P 
14 # # # #{x2} 
15 # #{x2} # [I] #{x2} 
I 
16 # # I{x2} # # #{x3} 
17 # #{x2} 
18 # #{x2} I # # 
19 US + + US{x3} US + 
20 # # #{x3} #{x2} 
I 
21 * [P] *{x4} *{x3} * [P] *{x2} 
22 # # #{x2} #{x2} 
23 # # # 
- - 
#{x3} if 
24 
7 Us 
@ US{x2} US [+] 
25 @ US +@ US us 
[] indicate either words derived from the same root, or 
indirect association of a category with a modifier. 
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TABLE 5.4.1 (A) 
List of 25 Highest Frequency Words in The New York Times: 
1. <Peace>/<Peace initiative>/<Peace plan, treaty etc> 
2. <Settler>/<settlement> (Not "peace settlement") 
3. <Agreement> 
4. <War> 
5. <Threat> 
6. <Militant> 
7. <Controversial> 
8. <Legitimate> 
9. <Military>/<army>/<armed forces> 
10. <Autonomy> (3 times pre-modified by <limited>) 
11. <Negotiate>/<negotiation>/<discuss>/<discussions> 
12. <Objections> 
13. <Terrorist> 
14. <Guerilla> 
15. <Doubts> 
16. <Obstacles> (- to agreement/ - to peace) 
17. <Deadlock> (- to break (the) deadlock) 
18. <Rights> ([political] rights / the right (to exist)) 
19. <Acceptance> 
20. <Talks> (often pre-modified: <crucial/important> etc) 
21. <Inflexible/inflexibility> 
22. <Insensitive/insensitivity> 
23'. <to Link> 
24. <to Enforce> 
25. <Withdrawal/ to withdraw> 
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TABLE 5.4.1 (B) The Washington Post 
(60% of words were also recorded in The New York Times frequency 
list, modification patterns remain similar. ) 
1. <to Condemn> 
2. <Moderate/ to Moderate> 
3. <Aggressive> 
4. <to Annex/ Annexation> 
5. <to Propose/proposal> 
6. <to Reject> 
7. <to Dispute> 
8. <Security> 
9. <Peace>/<Peace initiative>/<Peace plan> 
10. <Settler>/<settlement> 
11. <Threat> 
12. <Militant> 
13. <Legitimate> 
14. <Military>/<army>/<armed forces> 
15. <Autonomy> 
16. <Negotiate>/<negotiation>/<discuss>/<discussions> 
17. <Terrorist> 
18. <Guerilla> 
19. <Obstacles> (- to agreement/ - to peace) 
20. <Rights> 
21. <Talks> 
22. <Inflexible/inflexibility> 
23. <Hard-line> (applied to states, groups and people) 
24. <Occupy> (also Occupied Territories) 
25. <Withdrawal/ to withdraw> 
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The English meaning The Transliteration The 'Arabic Words 
1. Peace plan Khutat salam PQ Z L&. 
2. Peace initiative Mubadarat salam rN.., 
3Tust and durable peace Salam Adil wa-da'im j. A- tN-W 
4. Settlements Mustawtanat 
5. Delusion Wahm t. aºj 
6. Mis-understanding Su' fahm 
7. Intimidation Tahdeed . ý;. 
8. Challenge Tahaddi 
9. Stubborness Inad 
10. Confrontation Mu-wajaha 
11. Strife Nidal JL, &:, 
12. Struggle Kifah CU5 
13. Fight Sira' 
14. -: Stage play Masrahiyya 
15. Warlike or belligerent Muharib 
16. Aggresive Udwani 
17. Violent Aneif 
18. Demands Matalib 
19. Suggestions Iktirahat lI,: a I 
20. Terrorist Irhabi LA j1 
21. Guerilla Maghawir 
22. Two-faced Muthabthab 
23. The -enemy Al-adow 
24. Helpful Musa'id . ýir.. a 
25. Positive Eijabi v4týl 
TABLE 5.4.1 (C) AL AHRAM [PART I] 
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TABLE 5.4.1 (C) (PART II) Further clarification of meaning of 
certain words: 
(i) <MUSTAWTANAT> - Settlement implying occupation, specifically 
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories generally seen 
as illegal within Arab culture. 
(ii) <WAHM> - Hoping for something impossible, wishful thinking, 
delusion. 
(iii) <SU' FAHM> - Strong misunderstanding, with bad intention 
on behalf of the person giving the information. 
(iv) <TAHDEED> - To threaten strongly, to belittle. 
(v) <TAHADDI> - To challenge with a show of superiority. 
(vi) <INAD> - Stubbornness and defiance. 
(vii) <MU-WAJAHA> - Battle of armies. 
(viii) <MASRAHIYYA> - Funny, comic and theatrical. 
(ix) <UDWANI> - An emotional word often used to describe covert 
hatred as well as aggression. 
(x) <MATALIB> - To barter or demand. 
(xi) <AL-ADOW> - Antagonistic enemy state, immediately linked 
to Israel. 
(xii) <EIJABI> - Constructive; not a different point-of-view, 
positive. 
On occasions where the word "peace"/<salam> was the coded word, 
then it was not separately referred to under the symbol [+) for 
peace efforts. 
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There are questions this type of table (Tables 5.4) may not have 
answered, and may have obscured. Would it be accurate to state 
that peace moves involving the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe 
Dayan, should be semantically linked directly to Israel, or was 
there a perceptual difference to be recorded, a difference 
between Israel (a state, racially identified, with problems and 
complexities of judgement like any state)'and Dayan (popular War 
hero with charismatic personality)? Strictly-speaking I only 
needed to record direct semantic links (peace mentioned in 
context of Israel), but it should be realised that readers" 
perceptions may be quite different (in this example, criticisms 
given by a dynamic and likeable personality). Both The New York 
Times and The Washington Post had a tendancy to "personalise" 
peace moves, but not (in the instance of Camp David) incidents 
of belligerency. This was a tendancy reflected in the use of 
personalities such as Sadat and Dayan, and sometimes Carter, but 
was underplayed for Begin, Arafat and other Arab leaders. This 
may have reflected the perception that some characters were more 
positive in association than others. The other problem is one of 
semantics: for example "peace" can be meant without the word 
being used (ie The Washington Post front page head, "Role in 
Peace Talks Seen for Palestinians" by Marder, where although the 
word "peace" is used in the headline, there is no further re-use 
despite the fact that the bodycopy is directly concerned with 
that issue). This may also work negatively, for example as irony 
(reversed meaning association). Despite these inadequacies Tables 
5.4 (A, B, C) do indicate where certain levels of semantic 
association occur. Twenty-five words were coded as a sample 
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median: The Washington Post offered 22 words whose recurrance was 
higher than average, The New York Times 30, and Al Ahram 43. A 
group of 25 was therefore considered a good working sample. 
(1) THE NEW YORK TIMES 
Within The New York Times the recurrance of highest-frequency 
words or word-groups was not as high as with Al Ahram (see 
below). But as with each newspaper there were a small group of 
words (and associated word-groups) which recorded significantly 
higher frequencies: <Peace>; <War>; <Threat>; <Legitimate>; 
<Military>; <Negociate>; <Talks>. These can be grouped into two 
sets: (i) (Peace/Negociate/ Talks) and perhaps (Legitimate) and 
(ii) (War/Threat/ Military). (Indeed with all higher-frequency 
words it was noticed that there was this underlying split between 
those associated with belligerency and those associated with 
peace. This may have been because of the nature of the material, 
or because semantic references within individual newspaper texts 
tended to be more polarised. In turn this could be because of the 
stylised nature of the language used, or the fact that 
journalistic language may tend to use extremes as reference- 
points more often. ) 
Firstly, as might be expected, there was in the-high frequency 
groups a split between Israel (and Israel-sponsored groups) and 
Palestine/the PLO (and other Arab nations). Association with the 
coded word of the US was infrequent and references to peace 
(outside the realm of code 1) was relatively small, with the 
exception of code 20. 
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Code 4 <War> showed association more frequently with Israel and 
Israeli groups, and there were no significant changes over the 
month. 
Code 5 <Threat> was predominantly associated with Palestinian and 
PLO groups, almost never with Israel or Israeli groups. 
Code 8 <Legitimate> only was associated with Palestinian/ PLO 
groups. 
Code 9 <Military> had significantly high-frequency association 
with Israel and its groups. 
Code 11 <Negotiate> showed a balance between groups. 
Code 20 <Talks> also indicated balance between major groups. 
Firstly there were realms of association: for example, the PLO 
(and Palestinians and Arabs) were the only groups linked to code 
6, <Militant>, Code 13 <Terrorist> and Code 14 <Guerilla> which 
may be predictable. However some were less expected: Code 22, 
<Insensitive> was only linked to Israel, and Code 21 <Inflexible> 
was predominantly linked to Israel, while Code 18 <Rights> was 
predominantly linked to Palestinians. Secondly there were shifts 
over the month. Whereas in the code 1 group there were strong 
PLO/Palestinian references in the first three date categories, 
after the middle of the month these are less frequent, whereas 
references to other Arab groups, Israel and the US are more 
frequent. However, as with Code 4, association remained static. 
(2) THE WASHINGTON POST 
Again, a small group of words (and associated word-groups) 
recorded higher frequencies: <Peace>; <Settler>; <Threat>; 
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<Military>; <Negociate>; <Guerilla>; <Talks>. These were almost 
identical to those for The New York Times (with the exception of 
<Settler> and <Guerilla> included and <Legitimate> excluded. 
There were however significant differences in the use of these 
words/word-groups. 
Code 9 <Peace> had less association Israel, and there was more 
association with both Palestinian/PLO and arab groups, as well 
as the US. 
Code 11 <Threat> was associated with arab groups twice, but with 
Israel and Israeli groups three times. 
Code 14 <Military> was almost exclusively associated with Israel. 
Code 16 <Negociate> has a relatively high association with 
Palestinians and the PLO, far fewer for Israel. 
Of the words not frequent in The New York Times, Code 18 
<Guerilla> was used associated with the PLO/ Palestinians, 
<Terrorist> only once, while <Settler> was, expectedly, only 
associated with Israel. 
Generally, the US government figured more often associated with 
the high-frequency words in The Washington Post than The New York 
Times (and this may be expected). There did not appear to be 
significant shifts over the period examined (see below), but 
there were some. The first was in the use of the word/word-groups 
<settlers> / <settlements>, which at the beginning of the month 
in The New York Times were associated only with information about 
Israel, but, as the peace process involved the settlements, so 
the association shifted to Arab and Palestinian association (in 
their condemnation of the Israeli settler movement). However the 
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coverage during the first half of the month, was replaced by less 
extensive items. If reference is then made to Table 5.2 it can 
be seen that the shift is not only in the use of the word-set 
<settler> but also towards a negative group of Palestinians/Arab 
associations. 
(3) AL AHRAM 
Partly because of the rhetorical quality of both headlines and 
articles (with high use of repetition, assonance, symbolism and 
metaphor, and relatively low instances of factual information in 
the form of specifics) there were groups of words which recurred 
with a greater frequency than groups in the US newspapers. 
Interestingly, although as the month progressed there was no 
obvious decline in Al Ahram's criticism of Israel (see previous 
Table 5.3 C) , there were linguistic shifts visible in two related 
areas. (i) The first was words used for or related to the Geneva 
Peace Plan in a positive rather than in a negative context (ie 
when the meaning was to show what is possible or hoped-for) , and 
(ii) the second was a shift in the use of words/phrases 
signalling the deepest criticism of Israel. It was found that 
while positive shifts were visible towards the peace plan, the 
number of phrases critical of Israel increased. This accords with 
the information from the positive/negative tables (5.2 C) . By far 
the deominant subject was Israel, except where peace was the key 
word (Code 1,2,3) or the key word was positive (Code 24,25). It 
is notable that the majority of the recorded words were negative 
in association, and that the negativity increased when the 
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frequency of peace words/phrases was highest (especially towards 
the end of the month - compared Tables 5.4 and Chart 5.1.3). For 
key words such as Code 7 (Intimidation),, Code 10 (Confrontation),, 
Code 15 (Warlike), Code 16 (Aggressive), Code 17 (Violent), Code 
20 (Terrorist) and Code 23 (Enemy) there were clear surges during 
peak periods of information on the peace process. This may be 
because, if peace were discussed, the paper sought to balance 
what could have been an unpopular policy with popular, anti- 
Israeli sentiment. 
Why were there few shifts over the month for the US papers and 
measurable shifts for Al Ahram? Perhaps because, although the US 
newspapers recorded "pulses" of interest, the underlying semantic 
field with its associations remained unchanged. 
5.6.12: Editorials 
There were three editorials in The New York Times (September 2, 
14,29), five in The Washington Post (September 9,14,18,21, 
24) and fourteen in Al Ahram (September 3,4,5,6,11,13,14, 
17,18,19,22,24,26,27) specifically relating to Camp David 
(see table 5.4 A/B/C). Again words were coded according to their 
use within other linguistic structures from very positive to very 
negative. 
Editorials may be expected to offer differing measures of a 
newspaper's attitudes. 
What is distinctive about newspaper editorials is not that 
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they offer values and beliefs, but that they employ textual 
strategies which foreground the speech act of offering 
values and beliefs. 94 
In other words it may be expected that editorials have different 
linguistic/semantic qualities to other sections of newspapers, 
that, in fact, there are close affinities with "opinion" sections 
(conversational style, colloquial language, rhetorical elements). 
Methods of saying as much as direct semantic content may be 
considered vital to the editorial. 
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TABLE 5.5 (A): ANALYSIS OF EDITORIAL CONTENT 
The New York Times The Washington Post 
USED ISRAELI 16 (12 in Lebanon 4 (7 articles 
RESPONSES TO fighting, 4 in other reported Israeli 
REBUT CRITICS stories) denials) 
WHAT WERE THE 4 within ist 2 in 1st paragraph, 2 
ISRAELI paragraph, 10 within in final paragraphs 
REBUTTALS? Ist 3 paragraphs 
ARTICLES 3 offered PLO 1 (September 19, pg 
SUPPORTIVE OF activity as A14, article by J. 
ISRAEL? justification Randal) 
ARTICLES 6 (2'on settlements, 13 (4 used strongly 
CRITICAL OF 3 on Lebanon, 1 on censorious language: 
ISRAEL peace) cf Randal, September 
2) 
TABLE 5.5 (B) PERCENTAGE ANALYSIS OF EDITORIAL CONTENT 
The New York The Washington 
Times Post 
OF QUOTATIONS 58% 46% 
FROM ISRAELI 
SOURCES: 
% OF QUOTATIONS 16% 19% 
FROM PLO: 
% OF QUOTATIONS 26% 35% 
FROM OTHER ARAB 
SOURCES 
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The Washington Post marked Israel/Israelis/Israeli groups 
negatively only within two editorials (September 14 and 21) and 
on the latter occasion this was balanced by the negativity of the 
sentence "the Arabs, always ready to suspect the Israelis of 
tactical diversion, have a special grim regard for the architect 
of their humiliation in 1967 (Dayan]". This was not an unusual 
use of two semantic structures acting as negativity markers: the 
first the phrase "always ready to suspect the Israelis of 
tactical diversion" (an extended adjective-phrase surrounding the 
verb "suspect", which unless otherwise marked normally suggests 
non-valid suspicion) contextualises the noun "Arabs" negatively, 
while the following "have a special grim regard for their 
humiliation" uses two internal referents as markers: "grim" 
(usually a negative connotation whether meaning "aggressively 
determined" or "ugly") and "humiliation". Journalistic English 
(see above) enjoys such modifications more frequently than other 
forms of written English, but when these modifications are 
compared between differing head-nouns there is a clear semantic 
bias. 
The three papers had very different linguistic editorial styles. 
The Washington Post offered ranges of criticism and avoided 
journalistic styles of English (even within the editorials); Al 
Ahram was declamatory and rhetorical (using repetition, 
assonance, exaggeration, metaphor and strong symbolism95) rather 
than humorous or witty; The New York Times offered rhetorical 
techniques (especially within editorials and "viewpoint" pieces) 
but (as with The Washington Post) these techniques were either 
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used to amuse, even within a serious context, or within complex 
frames of meaning (intellectualised rhetoric). It may be that it 
was recognised some topics' complexity or controversiality could 
be restructured (deconstructed) by linguistic techniques more 
usually called "literary" than journalistic (topic-developing 
external references and a level of humour may be two evident 
techniques). Such adaption of language was more frequent in The 
New York Times than The Washington Post. Of the latter's five 
editorials which dealt either directly or tangentially over this 
period with Camp David none offered such techniques. Over a year 
from August 1977 to July 1978 the use of humour, 96 perhaps the 
most frequent rhetorical device, was evident in approximately 28% 
of The New York Times' editorials, but in only 8% of The 
Washington Post's, and there limited to sarcasm. Within the 
period under study all three New York Times editorials concerning 
Camp David used humour in some form, none of The Washington 
post's used similar structures. The most colourful of all the New 
York Times' editorials in September (on the 29th) was typical. 97 
Al Ahram's "Ra'il Al Ahram" or "Comment of Al Ahram" was not 
quite the same as the editorial in the US papers. There is no 
such thing as "journalistic Arabic": the language used by most 
Arabic newspapers is Classical Arabic. However, this style can 
be used (and, indeed, is most often used) in a rhetorical style. 
Thus objectivity, or attempts to forge a recognisable editorial 
voice are less likely to be extensive. Rhetorical devices would 
exclude humour. Nevertheless like Western editorials it was 
written by the editor, el Jamal, took up the problems posed by 
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other stories in the paper, and offered a viewpoint rather than 
just news. In each edition there was only one editorial section 
(sometimes split between the front and inner pages). 
Daily coverage varied considerably, and although the main 
interest was the political and military problems of the Mideast, 
other news was covered: cultural, religious, social, economic. 
But as has been noted The Washington Post offered less Mideast 
news than The New York Times. Whereas every day of September 
contained some Mideast news in The New York Times, The Washington 
Post had one day without any news whatever (September 2) and five 
days when the news was either peripheral (September 8- front 
page "Cholera in Mideast") or only news in outline (September 1, 
15,16,25,30), and a further four days when news reporting fell 
below 200 words (September 6,11,26,28). However, as if to 
counterbalance this paucity, there were nine occasions when the 
newspaper offered significant in depth coverage, with major 
articles: September 5,12,13,19,21,22,23,26,29. There were 
also five relevant editorials: September 10,14,18,21 and 24. 
These editorials were directly applicable to events, two were 
supported by other copy within that day's paper. 
This suggested two immediate conclusions. The first (supported 
by wider commentary on The Washington Post98) was simply that the 
paper had limited funds for expensive international news (see 
above) which needed to be specifically applied. The second that 
Israel and the Mideast were seen as only one part of a wider 
international picture which should be given equal attention. A 
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third might be that tradition or editorial policy (or a mixture 
of both) dictated that news be covered either in outline (perhaps 
using agency material) or carefully. For want of a better 
expression The Washington Post offered a more considered 
approach. 
This was reflected in the language. Although reports critical of 
Israel were couched carefully (as with The New York Times, see 
below) they were less attentive to Israeli government sources. 
Words such as "reportedly" played a role in both papers, but when 
a single day's report on one issue is compared between the two 
papers the distinguishing characteristic of The Washington Post's 
journalism was a care to avoid quoting the combatants regarding 
the veracity or not of a story. As usual Mideast reports were 
carried on page Alb, this time column 4: 
Israeli Raiders Reportedly Seize 16 in Lebanon 
Israeli troops backed by armour stormed across the border 
into Southern Lebanon before dawn today and seized at least 
16 people from 2 villages, usually reliable sources 
reported. 
12 of the seized were released after several hours of 
questioning in Israel, the sources said, but at least 4 
were still being held by Israel. 99 
Compare this with a report of the same event in The New York 
Times which stated "Israeli Army Units Said to Kidnap 16 in 
Lebanon Villages"100 (the verb "said" acting in exactly similar 
way to "reportedly" in the first story). The report was smaller 
and less visible (at the base of the page) though it made up for 
this by being closer to the front page of the paper. But while 
The Washington Post treated its sources as "reliable", the New 
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York Times ended its report by a denial issued from the Israeli 
military that any incursion or hostage-taking had occurred. There 
is one other area of comparison: this was The Washington Post's 
only Mideast story for that day, but not The New York Times', 
which ran a major article (not by a staff reporter) on page 15 
entitled "Appointment in Samaria" by Beverly Bar-Illam, a piece 
in support of the settler movement Gush Emunim. This is 
frequently described as "militant". It dwelt on the beauty of the 
place, its importance for Jews, and the fact (according to the 
writer) that until the settling of the 1970s it had been a 
deserted land. The effect on readers of one article running 
simultaneously with another is not quantifiable, but it is 
possible that Ms Bar-Illam's article (fluent, even poetic) could 
be more persuasive than the news article, casting Israeli actions 
in a softer light. (The piece contained 28 words or phrases 
either saluting the beauty of "Samaria", or in support of Gush 
Emunim; the fact of this latter was important since even Begin 
found the Gush an embarrassment at this stage, while calling the 
West Bank "Samaria" partly in an attempt to legitimize the 
title. ) Linguistically The Washington Post's report carried fewer 
markers readers might feel biased: a style often called 
authoritative. 
5.6.13: Conclusions from the Content Analysis 
Evidence pointed to a number of possible interpretations of the 
way in which the three papers treated Camp David. 
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1. Israel and Israeli news were treated in a different way to 
other international or home news in all three papers. The New 
York Times was the most sympathetic towards Israel (for reasons 
outlined above). Despite that sympathy (which was more obvious 
in the editorials than the bodycopy) there was a considerable 
percentage of criticism aimed at Israel, especially in the 
context of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and recidivism 
regarding the Geneva Peace initiative. There was, nevertheless, 
a greater element of criticism attached to the PLO and Arab 
states (Table 5.2 A), and more specific linguistic analysis 
indicated a certain stability in the realms of criticism and 
support despite rather than because of individual events. 
The Washington Post may have been more inclined to criticise 
Israel and less predictable where the PLO was concerned, and in 
key linguistic analysis (Table 5.4 B) showed itself to have no 
obvious or measurable biases, though certain key words such as 
<obstacles> and <guerilla> were uniquely the territory of 
Palestinian subjects. This may have been because the details of 
linguistic tendancies as mirrored in Table 5.4 are more likely 
to show up subtle biases, and these would be the most durable of 
all imbalances. 
If biases do exist with the US newspapers, they are not easily 
detectable as inclusion/exclusion of news rather as 
subjectivization of news; or as negative modification or as 
opinion. The New York Times was consistently careful in its use 
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of the noun <guerilla> rather than <terrorist> to describe the 
PLO. 
Al Ahram was predictable in most areas. There was no evidence 
that it took any linguistic cues from the US newspapers but it 
is possible that this occurred. The pulses visible in Chart 5.1.3 
were less obvious with the Egyptian newspaper, which appeared to 
vary on a day-to-day basis. 
2. There are "natural" journalistic trends visible in the 
treatment of Camp David over September, 1977. One of these is the 
way an issue "pulses", and does not appear to have a relatively 
continuous level of coverage over a period. It might be expected 
that some news items would not be liable to fluctuate in this way 
(for example, daily political news would rely on chance news 
items available to print). Other news items (where the material 
may be more continuously available, but where the interest to 
print it may be editorially-generated, for example traffic- 
related mortality rates or ecological issues) may rely on 
triggers to release interest within a paper. It is possible that 
these triggers may have been present during September 1977 in the 
US newspapers, although no obvious events suggested themselves 
at the start of the pulses discovered. It may be that the rise 
or fall of interest could be a natural phenomenon of the news 
media, but my conclusion from this data is that since information 
on the Mideast was more or less continuously available over the 
period, the pulsing of interest represented an editorial 
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perception that audience sympathy/interest for the material was 
limited. 
3. There may be subtle linguistic biases, visible as trends in 
the way certain groups were described (positively/ negatively) 
or modified (what kind of adjectives/adverbs, how often these 
occured, whether the occurrance could be interpreted as 
stereotyping). There appeared to be clearer unchanging tendancies 
in the way the groups studied were marked. The conclusion from 
this may be that once opinion is established within a particular 
newspaper it is unlikely to change and that, predictably, 
habitual attitudes were rarely disappointed. 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
While coverage of the 1977-79 detente between Egypt and Israel 
was often positive in the West it was almost universally negative 
in Arabic newsprint of the Mideast. However Al Ahram and its 
fellow newspapers in Egypt (with the exception of minor papers 
such as Al Wafd - see above) followed the presidential line. How 
many of its reporters (and indeed editors) disagreed with what 
they were asked to write is not the matter: what Al Ahram 
presents in its 1977-79 period is an illustration not of 
journalism (whether biased or not, whether subjective or 
objective) but of media under political control. Adventurous, 
inquisitive dissenting reporting (at a premium even under 
Heikal's editorship) vanished from its pages, the paper becomming 
instead a government broadsheet dominated by Sadat. Journalistic 
ethics had been subverted: Al Ahram became propaganda in much the 
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same way as the Majlis or Egyptian broadcast media, supporting 
a head of state. The difference between Al Ahram in 1979 and 1921 
is vast. 
The same cannot be said of The New York Times or The-Washington 
Post. There have of course been changes but not in their 
reflection of modern Western attitudes towards the Muslim or Arab 
worlds and the Mideast in particular. The moral complexity of the 
problem of Palestine and Israel (partially subjectivised by 
identification with a Western Jewish state) are wiped away by the 
desire (partially habitual) for simple bi-polar politics. The US 
press was caught in its professional desire for a balance between 
a desire for greater heterogeneity and the tendency media may 
have naturally (or perhaps develop under certain conditions) of 
creating a black-and-white morality for issues close to its 
constituency. The Egyptian press mirrored Sadat's ideas through 
to the ratification at Camp David, though Al Ahram may have 
register-ed a level of disapproval through lack of commentary. 
From The Washington Post and The New York Times a lot can be 
learnt both about the way the media develop and sustain a world 
view, and how notions of objectivity and professionalism are 
either subverted or buttressed by news events. From Al Ahram in 
the period of Sadat, a lot can be learnt about Sadat, Sadat's 
methods of government and the Egyptian social heirarchy, since 
these are reflected in, the editorial and semantic/ linguistic 
structure of that newspaper. 
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CONCLUSION 
This project has aimed to illustrate the importance of communica- 
tion in and between societies, in particular between developed and 
less-developed ones. Its main tools have been historical 
contextualization and content analysis of a given sub-period of 
Camp David (a significant section of which was devoted to 
linguistic analysis). For detailed analysis and comparison, three 
newspapers are chosen - two from the US (The Washington Post and 
The New York Times) - the third from Egypt (Al-Ahram). We have to 
be wary when extrapolating from merely three newspapers to the 
wider media world, but since the newspapers were chosen for their 
standing and influence, I feel that some wider conclusions may be 
safely drawn. 
The result has been to show that media are not always (and cannot 
always be) neutral instruments, but may be at times implicated in 
national and international political processes and that availab- 
ility-of information of all sorts (via media) is stacked (by virtue 
of technical and social factors) in favour of developed nations. 
The debate over NIICO (covered in Chapter 1) highlighted for a 
period the importance of the media as national and international 
institutions rather than merely multinational businesses. The 
distancing of communication systems from those societies they 
ideally should serve has developed as a result of more than early 
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colonization (where information tended to be incoming facts about 
the home European country), or post-colonial reconstitution of the 
old dependency relationship (when technology, equipment, expertise 
and styles of reporting were imported directly from developed 
countries). Other factors were possibly' that societies have, as 
yet, not developed a high regard for the importance of independence 
in indigenous media, while maintaining too high a regard for the 
media of the developed world. This latter may well be due to a lack 
of resources to furnish societies with an information infrastruct- 
ure. Whatever the causes of such deficiency the result has been 
pressure for a degree of order to govern the ever-expanding medium 
of communication, and behind some of these demands have been 
nationalist fears of greater dependency or cultural absorption. 
Camp David acts as a symbol of these problems with. US papers 
attempting balance by inclusion of heterogenous input (different 
writers, some from the developing world), -linguistically attempting 
to remove bias, but in the end offering predictable support for the 
diplomatic status quo (excluding Palestinian and other Arab 
complaints). Before examining the shortcomings of the reporting of 
Camp David I deal with the wider issues of developmental 
journalism, the ethics involved in both written and broadcast 
journalism within the West and the Third World. A considerable 
amount of historical research and discussion is therefore included: 
the Mideast from 1947 to the present; the relationship of developed 
to developing nations; post-colonial media, all relate to the way 
Camp David was reported. But this thesis is not concerned with the 
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rights and wrongs of the journalistic debate or with the relative 
effectiveness of different types of journalism for the developed 
and developing world, though the debate itself (including the 
heated controversy of the 1970s regarding developmental ism, and 
culminating in the Brandt Report) is discussed. The centre of the 
thesis remains the way media, through all this debate, effectively 
worked on one set of issues. 
However, the thesis considers another flaw in media: the imbalance 
between the developed countries' view of themselves and their 
actions, and the view developed countries have of the rest of the 
world. The thesis allows that there is no single viewpoint within 
the plethora of developed media; that there is no "conspiracy" 
somehow politically to defraud underprivileged nations, or act 
directly for domestic interests. I do consider that the way 
developed media act, and specifically acted during the Camp David 
period of 1976-1979 in the US, shows a paucity of historical 
awareness, a lack of profound debate, a resistance to unorthodox 
views, a lack of knowledge of non-Western cultures and, finally, a 
desire not to upset whatever consensus the editors perceived to be 
acting most directly upon their papers. 
The inability of the developing world to counteract this imbalance 
is made quite clear in the way the Western (specifically US) 
version of the Camp David Summit and Accords, as well as the 
overall peace process, was generally biased against viewpoints 
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critical of the US/Israeli status quo. What emerged in the US 
newspapers was a Western consensus in support of the Israeli 
position. Essentially, this reflected an image of a small state 
defending itself against aggressive odds. 
As media expand, it seems, individual nations have less control 
over it. The weaker the nation (in terms of economic strength, 
social cohesion and cultural independence) the less control the 
nation (in the sense of a group wider than the governing party) can 
hope to exert over its media output, and the more prone that 
nation's media are to external news influences. Al Ahram (as 
fulsome in its praise of Camp David as The Washington Post or The 
New York Times) expressed the required amount of approval. 
Interestingly, the cynicism and alienation felt by a significant 
number of the Egyptian people seems to be reflected in the way 
editorials in Al Ahram vacillate from praise of Sadat and his 
policies, through distrust of Israel, to hints (especially in late 
September, 1978) that Camp David could not articulate Arab 
aspirations regarding Israeli expansionism and aggression. 
With media infrastructure internally and externally at the centre 
of my concern in this thesis, I have used reporting of Camp David 
as a model. The reporting of the process leading up to the signing 
of the Treaty amply illustrates the consequences of a political 
issue when inadequately treated by external media and when 
similarly covered internally. All except the second chapter discuss 
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the problems of enforcing journalistic standards of practice at 
both the national and international levels, whether, indeed, there 
can be a universal code of practice when interests and values 
differ so hugely. For example there seems at present to be a new 
influx of nationalism on the world agenda. This makes the media of 
some countries (such as India, Russia, the former eastern bloc, 
China or parts of Africa) more inward-looking than in the heyday of 
non-aligned internationalism, but in quite a different way to the 
Western media in which will be reflected its readers' /viewers" 
self-interest in terms of foreign trade and older alliances. 
It soon became apparent that there are constraints on the operation 
of media brought about by the nature "of the media industry. 
Although by no means monolithic in structure (having many owners, 
being multi-structured in terms of editorial and reporting input, 
affected by numerous external stresses and restraints, and 
differing substantially even within the West) there are still 
tendencies, of monopolization in terms of time, space and knowledge. 
It is an industry profoundly influenced by politics and which 
(because of the huge sums involved in publishing even the simplest 
national or regional broadsheet) rarely escapes the constraints of 
finance. 
Thus it has always been difficult to strike any kind of balance 
satisfactory to all interest groups. When it comes to the 
international level, monopolization is made more real by the 
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concentration of both technological and human resources in the 
hands of a very few affluent societies. In the case of Egypt and 
the US, the media in the former is monopolized by the government 
(the government being the main source of financial revenue if the 
paper is government-owned, and even if it is not, most depend 
heavily on government advertising hand-outs) while in the latter 
media is constrained by more complex and multifarious but 
nonetheless effective influences. While in Egypt there are various 
laws and codes governing the industry (such as the Law of Shame 
under Sadat); media may often be self-censoring, because the 
operators of the media are civil servants. Although in the US the 
constitution ensures the free operation of the media, a heavy 
reliance on advertising for revenue handcuffs it to big business. 
Even relatively liberal newspapers find there are well-defined 
limits to political expression. 
The continuation of the operation of international communication in 
this way will hamper the implementation of any idea which is 
different from accepted political practice. Camp David is a case in 
point. When tested, the media coverage followed an established 
path, reflecting the most powerful political views of the dominant 
groups (whether the Democratic right in the case of The New York 
_Times 
or the Democratic left in the case of The Washington Post). 
Alternatives were expressed by political outsiders in both papers 
from time to time (Edward Said, for example, wrote in The 
Washington Post) but because a minority view plainly theirs was not 
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one that the paper was reflecting seriously. 
Camp David mirrored what was desired by the governing classes in 
both Washington and Cairo. Opposition to this in the Middle East, 
under these circumstances, was muffled. The only form of 
expression was from the non-conformist fringes of the media, which 
in any case found it difficult to acquire a sustaining audience. 
The thesis highlights the difficulty of breaking out of this bind. 
Objectivity, and professionalism, under such conditions, only 
became viable when used internally. (A good example would be the 
Bazoft affair, when a British journalist was hanged as a spy by the 
Iraqi regime. This crystallized the double standards operating on 
the international media scene. It took an obvious human tragedy 
for journalists to dig deeper into the malpractice of the Iraqi 
government. Iraq allowed journalists free access before this, but 
very little was said about the political behaviour of Saddam's 
regime. ) Objectivity or professionalism are distorted constantly by 
the journalists' knowledge of their home market and its specific 
demands. In order to "anchor" a foreign news story the practice in 
all forms of media remains to offer obvious, tangible links to the 
domestic audience: the involvement of that country's nationals 
perhaps, or the threat to that country's interests. 
Camp David can be seen in this way. Only after the signing of the 
Treaty in 1979"with the concomitant intransigence of the Israelis, 
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and the assassination of Sadat, did awareness of the unsuitability 
of the Treaty for most parties (except, arguably, the Israelis) 
come to be discussed within the Mideast. 
The three newspapers were chosen for several reasons: the main one 
is their pre-eminence in the newspaper industry. These are 
established broadsheets that other media use for both source 
material and, indeed, a lead in how to treat important issues. 
Their importance allows them to be a measure of the extent of 
balance of news coverage internally and externally. 
Because of their leading positions within the industry, they can 
also act as measures of journalistic neutrality, objectivity and 
positioning within the political consensus. This is no less so 
with Al Ahram than the other two papers. An -establishment 
newspaper, its journalists rank among the best in the developing 
world (if not in the world as a whole). Its political message 
carries weight simply because of the availability of resources to 
the paper, the political connections it has developed over time, 
the heavyweight journalists in its ranks as well as the important 
lack of any major Arabic language competitor. This allows an 
insight into what extent journalistic professionalism and values 
are reflected in a Third World newspaper. The other important point 
is that, given the strength of these papers (not in terms of reader 
numbers, but of political and social clout) they manage to reflect 
a narrow political order which does not encompass the popular 
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diversity and present reality of modern international relations. 
The heavy media coverage of Camp David meant it was an ideal event 
to use to study methods of filtering information within newspapers. 
Also, since the event created as much interest in the Mideast as it 
did in the West, though for different reasons, it proved a more 
fruitful task comparing different reports on the same event, 
especially since that event was almost universally considered 
important. 
One further aim of this thesis has been to compare, as between 
developed and less developed world media, what are considered to be 
journalists' most valued qualities: objectivity and profess- 
ionalism. I identify a misunderstanding in the lay-person's view 
of the media profession: as The Washington Post and The New York 
Times show, searching curiosity comes very much second to following 
the editorial or owners' line, or the established views of that 
particular readership. This in turn illustrates that media, far 
from being truly investigative on the international scene compared 
to the domestic one) build reports on pre-conceived notions of 
right and wrong. 
When I conclude on the media coverage of Camp David the result is 
to show that media, in general, is much less a researching tool of 
curious journalists, and very much an anchor for established views. 
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John Twitchin (BBC Education) 
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allies, was basically a political complaint against Third World 
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specifically the US. The Pool itself was accused of politiciza- 
tion not commensurable with a news gathering agency. 
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propaganda centre. 
12. Most newspapers in French ex-colonies, and many of the 
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the Dutch and Belgium colonies where the primacy of trade kept 
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Vol 2 No 2 (1978), this is clear. 
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characteristically associated with most colonial press 
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system modelled on the BBC, but Tanzanian officials found it 
intolerable to have a broadcasting service exercising independ- 
ence. To bring it under control they decided that once govern- 
ment policies were settled-broadcasters and journalists could not 
discuss them further. Measures such as, this were taken in a 
number of Third World countries. Burma, after enjoying a 
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relatively free press based on the British model (a press 
recognized as being the least restricted in Asia), imposed 
restrictions to deal with opposition and fragmentation. See F. 
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ing in the interests of large successful groups. 
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our colonial heritage which were neither democratic nor 
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known as the United States Information services (U. S. I. S). In 
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37. During the 1960s and 1970s US policy towards UNESCO changed 
from supportive to condemnatory. One reason was that active 
campaigning for international cooperation on change in the areas 
of information and communication by the Non-Aligned Movement and 
UNESCO was biased in favour of the developing world. UNESCO is 
one of the few fora where the rules of play are dictated by the 
majority developing nations, so such a slant was inevitable. 
US criticisms of UNESCO came to a head in the wake of the 
Conference for the Study of Latin American Communication Policies 
(San Jose, Costa Rica, July 1976). The Press Association and the 
International Press Institute (both Western-orientated) made it 
their task to campaign against the proposals of the Conference. 
(See Rosemary Righter, Whose News?. ) 
38. A study of four island countries by Tony Nnaemeka, ["Foreign 
News Flow in Three Island Press Systems Pre- and Post-Independ- 
ence Flow Structure" in Communications and Development Review, 
Vol 2 No 2 (1978)] (the Cook Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and 
Western Samoa) concluded that there was little or no native news 
gathering or dissemination; that the main suppliers of news to 
these islands were foreign agencies, based in Australia, New 
Zealand or France (AFP), and that most of the coverage con- 
centrated on news about New Zealand or Australia. The general 
concern of the study expressed by an island editor was for "less 
reliance on former colonial countries for news and information". 
The report illustrated three important facts. The flow of news 
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between the Pacific islands and local "Western" countries is 
almost entirely one way - from ex-colonizers to their old 
colonies; there is little flow of news among Pacific islands in 
comparison to the flow from rim countries to the islands; 
finally, there is almost no intercommunication of news between 
the islands. 
39. The Constitution of UNESCO, Article #3 
40. It is estimated that AP has 2,500 journalists and photograph- 
ers stationed in 62 countries; Reuters 1,150 correspondents 
located in a 183 states, filing 700,000 words of general news, 
sports and economic reports each day. to the London head office 
from whence the reports are re-transmitted to a further 154 
countries; U. P. I. 238 bureaux in 62 countries, with about 10,000 
people working for it, and enjoying more than six thousand, five 
hundred subscribers in over 100 countries, circulating 5 million 
words daily. TASS had 325 subscribers in 1990 - though since the 
break up of the USSR and TASS's reformulation this has dropped. 
By reason of their equipment and capital, Western news agencies 
have acquired a position of strength enabling them to offer a 
better service but also leading them to convey information 
reflecting the developed point of view. (An interview by Jaroslav 
Veis of Rupert Murdoch in Lidove Noviny, Feb 1990 Prague, 
suggests that News International sees no reason to alter its 
philosophy of news to suit differing markets. ) 
41. The Sunday Times, London, November 15 1991, front page and 
pg 15. Abdel Shafi and Saeb Erekat pictured on page 15. 
42. Western governments began to realize the importance of 
financial support for a Third World media infrastructure, if only 
to lessen demands for NIICO and soften the militant stand of 
Third World states. The US ambassador to the United Nations, 
John E. Reinhardt, clarified his country's position regarding 
financial and technical assistance. At the 20th session of the 
general conference of UNESCO in Paris in 1978 (UNESCO Yearbook, 
1979, Paris) he confirmed the need for a more effective program 
of action. He stressed that this program should include American 
assistance to public and private communications sectors, 
identifying regional information problems within the Third World. 
Such assistance ought to include the establishment of learning 
centres for a program for advancing communication to the 
developing world through the introduction of technology (specif- 
ically satellite) to help meet the needs of Third World rural 
areas, he concluded. 
43. The most notable among the consequent hearings and reports 
was the Kroloff and Cohen Report. This in the short term 
encouraged the US to increase aid to Third World media, but 
latterly has been seen by developing countries as just another 
attempt to control their efforts to press ahead for changes in 
the current structure of information-flow, by maintaining the old 
structures of news gathering by offering financial incentives to 
ward off changes. Importantly Kroloff and Cohen acknowledged that 
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the US had more to lose than any nation from a change in the 
world media order in which they had no direct influence. (Kroloff 
and Cohen, US Senate Commission Papers, 1977) 
44. UNESCO Conference (1978) Resolution 
45. The sequence of events ran as follows: 
In 1976, UNESCO decided to set up a commission to study the 
communications problem specifically. 
In 1978, there was an interim report. 
In 1980, the Commission, head by Sean MacBride, published its 
report (later compressed into Many Voices One World, see biblio- 
graphy). There were 82 recommendations. 72 were accepted by all 
16 members of the commission. There was some disagreement on 10. 
The US objected to what they termed the commission's anti- 
commercial bias; the USSR (and its Warsaw Bloc satellites) wanted 
a measure of government controls; the Third World wanted a more 
balanced flow of information. 
As a result of this report is was decided to form the IPDC. 
46. Sean Macbride, ICSCP Presidential Address (December 14th 
1977) 
47. Macbride, ibid 
48. There remains a heavy reliance on foreign agencies for 
meeting Third World demands for news: European and American 
capitals are still the centres for the world news industry, a 
fact clearly demonstrated in an amusing incident where a 
communications cable between two neighbouring African states 
(Accra in Ghana and Lome in Togo) had to be connected through 
Paris and London. According to Pradeep Krishnatray, "the 150 
mile journey takes 48 hours which could be covered faster by a 
runner". (Pradeep Krishnatray, "Exploding the Traditional Myth", 
Media Asia, Vol 5, No 4, (1978) pg 193) 
49. Satellite communication can only make disbalance worse in the 
short term, until prices of individual satellite channels become 
low enough for poorer countries to purchase. At which time it is 
likely that some at least of a people's cultural independence 
will have been eroded or lost through the absorption of high- 
quality (ie well-produced) Western product. 
50. The first conference concerned with the setting-up of NANAP 
was held in New Delhi, from 8th to 13th July 1976. It was 
attended by fifty-nine countries led by their Ministers of 
Information. Amongst those who were most outspoken was Mrs 
Indira Gandhi who inaugurated the Conference, stressing the 
importance of a news pool which would help liberate developing 
nations from their colonial past. 
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Self-reliance in sources of information is as important as 
technological self-reliance. When the western media spread 
false stories about a country, it was difficult for others 
to discern the truth. Hence, the necessity to have more 
direct exchange among the Non-Aligned countries in the 
field of information. 
(Indira Gandhi at the First General Conference of the News 
Agencies of Non-Aligned Countries, New Delhi, July 1976, quoted 
in News Acgencies Pool of Non-Aligned Countries: A Perspective, 
NONAC, New Delhi) 
51. The hopes of the IPI foundation cannot compete with the 
increasing costs of news gathering. The most likely outcome to 
the story of NANAP is as an adjunct to a larger, Western or 
Western-style news agency, using cheap channels on' satellites, 
becoming an alternative news system, but having to compete, 
nevertheless, with the more expensive and slick Western and 
Westernized channels such as CNN. 
It is hard to see how such an organization as NANAP can compete. 
Without the resources to commit to new technology the Third World 
will be outstripped in the market place: the newer the technology 
the quicker Western viewpoints will come to be the only view- 
points. When satellite television becomes the largest media 
system in, say, the Pacific by the mid 1990s, it is unlikely that 
dishes will be receiving much if anything about local issues. 
52. The Economist (August 7th, 1976) also expressed reservations 
about both IPI and the conception of NANAP. 
By facilitating the faster and wider flow of government 
handouts, this non-aligned press pool and similar regional 
scheme for Latin America also proposed ... may not add much to the sum of Third World knowledge. But as the 
Non-Aligned plan now stands, it should pose no great threat 
to press freedom either. Member agencies will have the 
option of supplementing pool reports with news from other 
sources, including western ones. But the danger signs are 
there. These include an Indian proposal for a Third World 
news agency censor in each country to sift out undesirable 
items. The Latin Americans went even further (following 
guidelines offered by the Russians) in urging special laws. 
The arrest of foreign correspondents shows newspapers 
publish material offensive to the government. 
53. Roderick Beaton, quoted in International Herald Tribune, 
(July 20th, 1976) 
54. "Canadian sovereignty in the next generation will depend 
heavily on telecommunication. If we wish to have an independent 
culture, then we will have to continue to express it through 
radio and television. If we wish to control our economy then we 
will require a sophisticated telecommunications sector developed 
and owned in Canada to meet specific Canadian requirements. ... 
Telecommunications, ' as the foundation of the future society, 
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cannot always be left to the vagaries of the market. " Brian 
Murphy, The World Wired Up, (London, 1983) pg 51 
55. In the case of Kenya, a continuing acceptance of the 
superiority of foreign theatre, cinema and television programmes 
is linked to an education system which promotes the superiority 
and nourishes the growth of Western education and languages to 
a point where the population have begun to refrain from indigen- 
ous forms of cultural expression; even native languages have had 
to give way to English. See Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, "Kenyan Culture: 
the National Struggle for Survival", J. Becker, G. Hedebro, L. 
Paldan, (eds) Communication and Domination: Essays to Honor 
Herbert I. Schiller (Ablex, 1986) pg 114 
56. Due to a lack of wood pulp in Zimbabwe that nation's two 
daily papers can only manage a limited print run, and the 
editions are sold out by early morning. What passes for the 
indigenous media is then passed from hand to hand, reaching 
nothing like the majority of the ten million Zimbabweans. Most 
people interested in the news turn to radio and television, and 
increasingly to satellite-link services from the US, and now from 
Europe. Land broadcasting from South Africa is limited to 
southern Zimbabwe. Such natural economic limits on print media 
can be found in most African states except those on the west 
coast with a ready supply of timber. (News International 
investigated the possibility of an English language paper for 
African distribution, taking advantage of the tide of economic 
liberalization characterizing the 1990s. ) 
57. Indigenous media policies have been carried out quite 
effectively in Tanzania, in the realization that any major 
constructive change in that country's political and economic 
situation required a massive investment in the media and 
communication infrastructure. The route the media took in 
Tanzania is the independent one, to a point where that country 
has been described as one of the few in the Third World that come 
closest to fulfilling the aims of the NIICO. 
58. The number of Third World states purchasing media equipment 
from the West is increasing; the manufacture of the equipment for 
decoding satellite television signals is limited to hi-tech 
Western companies (though Sony and Hitachi both have plans [1994] 
to open components and assembly plants in Africa and Asia) . There 
is now a Third World media infrastructure built by European, 
Japanese and American companies. The spread of Western technol- 
ogy has resulted in a heavy reliance on Western technicians; use 
of advanced technology in societies where there is no real 
technological or industrial base increases dependency. Some Third 
World countries find it economically crippling to maintain media 
since their operation requires constant maintenance by engineers, 
technicians and specialists. 
59. While most Western social observers (journalists and 
broadcasters) are overwhelmingly concerned with domestic politics 
rather than issues are far , removed 
from the needs of a developing 
world which has not even yet satisfied the basic needs of 
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citizens for medicine, clean water, education and stable 
government. Training by the West means that individuals return 
with knowledge of Western media technologies, unknowingly agents 
in their promotion. 
60. A few Third World countries have managed to cut across these 
dependency barriers. India, Brazil and Eastern Asian countries 
are notable cases. In the case of India, although they import 
certain technological facilities, the government requires their 
assembly in India itself (though this began to change following 
trade agreements in 1992). India, aiming at consolidating 
technological capacity, has created a small technologically elite 
group with secure income. The effect of the establishment of a 
technological infrastructure within some Third World countries 
has left those societies with sub-classes of people, in much the 
same way as industrialization did in the England of the 18th and 
19th centuries. 
61. Murphy, ibid pg 104 
62. It is highly unlikely than any CNN executive (much less an 
executive for News International) spends her or his time 
contemplating abstract debate within the UN. Energy is spent 
instead enlarging and consolidating, making more money and more 
effective television, attracting a larger audience and, of 
course, sustainable high-paying advertisers. 
63. Al Ahram's sales in North Africa, the Sudan and Central 
Africa are estimated as 8% of its total weekly run (Al Ahram's 
own estimates, 1990) but it has to be remembered that in these 
countries a newspaper is a much more communal item. 
64. The region also suffers from a traditional dependence on 
Western news agencies (although the language to a certain extent 
limits the exploitation of this market by Western media organiza- 
tions). Over the years, especially in the case of some oil-rich 
Gulf states, there has been a tendency to open radio broadcasts 
and television channels for foreigners working there. These 
channels (in the case of Dubai for instance) are dumping grounds 
for Western media products. Some Arab countries are more vigilant 
about such inflow of foreign media material and there is a 
conscious effort to censor film and broadcast material as well 
as newspapers considered offensive and contradictory to the 
national ideology and religion. 
65. Western newspapers are not global (with the possible 
exception The Financial Times, compilations such as The Herald 
Tribune, or magazines such as Time or Newsweek) and cater to 
their constituency. However, news services such as CNN, the BBC 
or TASS/ITAR are increasingly global - at least in terms of 
coverage. 
66. The term "public opinion" has 
Eastern terms. Often the public 
(less-literate) and has much less 
opinion. And because of the lack of 
a different meaning in Middle 
there is less well-informed 
chance to express itself as 
inter-communication (no polls 
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of opinion, no media gauging the average citizen's ideas) there 
is no consensus of belief, no series of "pictures" of the society 
from the bottom up, only from the top down. If public opinion 
means anything, it refers to literate, male, middle-class (or 
political class) opinion. Where there is consensus it tends to 
be against common enemies (Israel, the US, Iraq) and for certain 
common standards (Islam, the Arabic language and culture). 
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CHAPTER 2 
1. The Sykes-Picot Treaty (1918) was a concordat between French 
and British Mideastern interests, dividing up the area following 
the collapse of ottoman rule. There was no mention of Jewish 
immigration. The Treaty was named after the two leading career 
diplomats who drew it up. 
2. The Jews were only one community; there were also the 
Palestinians, Hashemite Jordanians, Syrians, Egyptians and, most 
importantly, the French and English who had divided the Mideast 
into two areas of influence: below Turkey and North of the 
Tigris/ Euphrates rivers would be French as far as Iran; the rest, 
including Egypt, British. Even within the colonial establish- 
ments different interest groups held sway. In Britain there was 
a pro-Arab lobby within the Foreign Office but this lost to the 
ascendancy of the pro-Jewish lobby which followed almost exactly 
the rise of Herbert Samuel, who fought the Zionist corner 
vociferously from 1914. He was High Commissioner for Palestine 
and Home Secretary in the 1920s, but was passionate enough about 
what Balfour had described as "a national home for the Jews" to 
end any hope the Arab Lobby may have had with the British 
Establishment. 
3. See Balfour Declaration, appendix F. 
4. The West's and Israeli interests often match far enough for 
one to be of use to the other: without having to intervene 
militarily in the region (with the possible repetition of a 
politically unpopular loss of life) the US can use a dependent 
nation. (Though strategically not as potentially vital as Egypt, 
logically good relations between Egypt and Israel was a highly- 
desirable strategic solution. ) 
5. See Appendix F 
6. At that time, as Balfour's letter suggests, the British did 
not officially view "a national home" as full statehood, but 
rather as a part of a regional protectorate under their control. 
Whatever the semantics surrounding notions of a state and/or a 
home, the priorities of British Mideast policy were not Arab. 
(See Appendix F) 
7. Quoted in C. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, 1917-1948, pg 5 
8. Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel: A Political Life 
(Clarendon, oxford 1991) Chapter 2-3 
9. At the Wansee Conference in 1941 Eichmann, Himmler and 
Heidrich set in motion the "Final Solution for European Jews" 
which lead to the extermination of over 6 million people. 
10. Sami Hadawi, Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948, pg 79 
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11. In the eyes of many in the international community the 
Palestinians were willingly giving up their homeland, though no 
evidence of Arab radio broadcasts or newsprint exhortations to 
the Palestinians to flee has ever been offered. Palestinians left 
not because they were advised to do so by other Arab states but 
because of atrocities by and fear of Jewish settlers. (Cf 
Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, pg 94ff. ) The Israeli government 
carried out a clarification of land ownership, a process which 
made it less and less possible for Arab inhabitants to claim 
possession of land within Israel. (Following 1967 the same 
processes of expropriation began on the West Bank and in Gaza. ) 
The Israelis decreed any inhabitant absent from land for a 
nominal period lost their rights of ownership. This made it 
difficult for Palestinians to claim once they found themselves 
in Syria or Transjordan. 
12. Resolution No 186 (S/2) 14th May, 1948 (see Appendix D) 
13. H. Cattan, The Palestinian Question, pg 81: 
As regards the territorial question, Count Bernadotte 
states that the boundaries of the Jewish State must finally 
be fixed either by formal agreement between the parties 
concerned or, failing that, by the UN. ... He suggested 
that the disposition of the territory of Palestine not 
included within the boundaries of the Jewish State should 
be left to the governments of the Arab states with full 
consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine ... . 
As to the refugees, he recommended "the right of the Arab 
refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled 
territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed 
by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement 
and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of 
adequate compensation for the property of those choosing 
not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the 
United Nations conciliation commission ... it, 
14. Cattan ibid, pg 83 
15. Cf Cattan, ibid, pg 84 
16. The PLO took an even more dramatic move away from its 
previous stand by accepting a solution based on a UN resolution 
(37/86D - 10th December 1982) which reaffirmed previous resolut- 
ions of November 1947, December 1948, October 1974, November 1974 
and July 1980. The PLO made similar declarations through Yasser 
Arafat at the later stage of 25th July 1982, during the Beirut 
siege, at which time a US congressional delegation lead by Paul 
McCloskey obtained from Arafat a statement declaring he supported 
all relevant UN resolutions, a declaration repeated at the UN in 
1988, and restated in August/ September 1993 following Israeli 
overtures regarding Jerico and Gaza. (Cf Cattan, The Palestinian 
. Question, pg 279f) 
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17. Resolutions 242 and 388, (see Appendix E) 
18. McDowell, David, Palestine and Israel: the Uprising and 
Beyond, pg 60 
19. The phrase "just and lasting peace" (in Arabic <Salam adil 
wa-da'im>) became in the arab press almost synonymous with 
Palestinian rights (see Chapter 5.6). 
20. J. Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace, pg 306 
21. When one surveys the nature and depth of the problem within 
the area of Palestine/Eretz Israel, the performance of 
interested outside powers seems lamentably inadequate. 
Resolution 242, a fine statement for 1967, now seems a 
flawed key to peace. With the inter-communal dimension 
rapidly overshadowing other aspects of the conflict, a more 
profound process of reconciliation is needed, in which 242 
can be no more than an opening gambit. (McDowell, ibid, 
pg264) 
22. T. G. Fraser, The US and the Middle East Since World War 2, 
(Macmillan, London 1989) pg 84 
23. Reagan tried to assuage Israeli fears by saying the US would 
never countenance a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, 
while telling the Arab League that the US supported withdrawal 
of Israeli troops from the occupied territories. Although this, 
by itself, is not necessarily an incoherent policy (since support 
for Israeli withdrawal does not automatically mean countenancing 
a Palestinian state) Reagan must have known that the Arab League 
would see support for Israeli withdrawal at least partially in 
terms of some form of Palestinian "entity". 
24. N. Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, pg 66-67 
25. Cf Seymour Hirsch, The Price of Power 
26. See S. D. Bailey, Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace 
Process, (Macmillan, London 1990) pg 285ff 
27. Robert D. Shulzingher, Henry Kissinger Doctor of Diplomacy, 
pg 156-157 
28. G. Shoukri, Egypt. Portrait of a President, pg 74. These 
"nationalisations" tended to be of foreign-owned firms. 
29. Prices of basic foods increased rapidly and continuously, so 
that the middle classes - let alone the lower classes - could not 
afford to keep pace with them. ... Over two million people were 
unemployed and immigrants to Arab and Western capitals reached 
a total of five million. Debts to the IMF and Western banks 
exceeded 24 billion dollars by 1981, and the crime rate in Egypt 
was the third highest in the world with the percentage of crimes 
increasing even in the last five years, while deficits in the 
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balance of payments grew higher year by year. (Shoukri, ibid, 
page ii) 
30. M. B. Quandt, The Middle East ten Years After Camp David, 
pg 1 
31. See for example M. Heikal, Autumn of Fury, pg 7 
32. It is important to point out that prior to this change 
Egypt's economy was under strain from the hostilities with 
Israel, coupled with Nasser's policy of self-sufficiency through 
indigenous manufacturing infrastructure and the minimizing of 
imports, lowering the involvement of foreign economies. 
33. As Chapter 5's account of Al Ahram's reporting of Camp David 
shows, there was more rhetoric than reality in Sadat's repetit- 
ions of support for Palestinian rights: Palestine became a stamp 
of wider legitimacy for diplomatic efforts with Israel. 
34. See Naomi Chazan, "Domestic Developments in Israel", in 
William B. Quandt, (ed) The Middle East Ten Years After Camp 
David, (pg 150ff). 
35. Chazan, ibid, pg 176 
36. Newsweek, Oct 2,1978 pg 22 
37. William B. Quandt, "American Proposals for Arab-Israeli 
Peace" in Willard A. Beling, (ed) Middle East Peace Plans, (Croom 
Helm, London, 1986) pg 78 
38. Cattan, ibid, pg 144 
39. Cattan, ibid, pg 145 
40. The UN Security Council would not sanction the deployment of 
a peacekeeping force in northern Sinai because of the unacceptab- 
ility of the Camp David Treaty to most of its members. In lieu 
of this the US established a multinational force in which it was 
and is the main participant. 
41. Quandt in Beling, ibid, pg 80 
42. See Appendix B, The Camp David Treaty, "Preamble" and 
"Framework". 
43. Cf Yehoshua Raviv, "The Arab-Israeli Military Balance", in 
Centre for Strategic Studies Papers, 7, February 1980, pg 26 
(a) Significant increase in ground forces order of battle 
by the addition of three armoured mechanized divisions. 
(b) A marked quantitative and qualitative increase in 
combat material, tanks (mostly of high quality), armoured 
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personnel carriers and artillery - to compliment the 
increased order of battle; an increase of 1,300 tanks and 
600 artillery pieces (including mortars). 
(c) The establishment of an anti-tank missile network force 
of various models. The number of anti-tank missile 
launchers increased from 50 in 1973 to approximately 500 in 
1980. 
(d) Improvement in air defence by the addition of 5 
surface- to-air missile batteries (of hawk and improved 
hawk varieties). 
(e) Continuation of the build-up in air power (including 
latest model F-15 aircraft). 
44. Cf S. Green, Living by the Sword, (Faber, London 1988) pg 
103: 
Egypt whose arms imports had exceeded those of Israel by 
more than two to one in the four years prior to the war, 
suddenly decreased the level in 1974. From 1974 to 1979 
Egypt imported only $1.73 billion in arms, less than one 
third of the amount of Israeli arms imports in the same 
period ($5.2 billion). 
45. For example, in 1975, it was reported that Egypt wished to 
drill for oil in El Tur on the Gulf of Suez. For this they had 
the backing of the US after exchanging the contract for the work 
with Amoco. Israel was furious - they regarded that territory as 
legally theirs and Egypt's act as a violation of their territor- 
ial integrity. This resulted in the destruction of the drilling 
site by Israeli gunboat bombardment. Egypt stood helpless 
militarily, and other Arab states, for the first time since 
Egypt's independence, had to resort to the reality of standing 
politically and militarily separate. 
46. Only Sudan, Oman and Somalia failed to follow this diplomatic 
initiative. 
47. D. Hirst and I. Beeson, Sadat, (Faber, London 1981) pg 272-3 
48. Green, ibid, pg 109 
49. Daily Telegraph, London, 28 November, 1977 
50. Hirst and Beeson, ibid, pg 277. As Hirst and Beeson report 
Begin also understood the narrow limitations of the Treaty, but 
wanted to avoid Camp David being identified for what it was 
because "it would weaken and embarrass President Sadat". 
51. Hirst and Beeson, ibid, pg 277 
52. Hirst and Beeson, ibid, pg 356 
53. Quoted in October, 15 January, 1978 
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CHAPTER 3 
1. Andrew Neil replying to Peter Sissons on "Question Time", BBC 
1, October 22,1992. 
2. News professionalism controls the behaviour of journalists 
in two related ways: (1) it sets. standards and norms of 
behaviour, and (2) it determines the professional reward 
system. 
Since news professionalism establishes norms of conduct for 
journalists, it is unnecessary for individual news or- 
ganizations to arbitrarily establish elaborate rules and 
regulations for staff members. Also, there is no need for 
news organizations to establish expensive and time-consum- 
ing training programmes for new journalists since all 
journalists come to the organization with a certain amount 
of professional training. But unlike engineering or 
accountancy, there are a number of educational paths that 
lead to careers in journalism. Journalism then, cannot 
rely just on controlling professional training ... jour- 
nalists come to share the cognitive base of news profes- 
sionalism. The norms of behaviour that emanate from news 
professionalism constitute [an] ... organizational mechan- 
ism. Since the behaviour of journalists is rooted ... in 
shared professional norms, this minimizes the problems of 
how news organizations are able to maintain control over 
journalists. But shared professional norms do not elimin- 
ate completely the problem of organizational control 
because (1) professionalism provides journalists with an 
independent powerbase that can be used towards heavy-handed 
interference by management in professional activities of 
news staff, and (2) professionalism provides too much 
freedom for journalists, and thus news organizations must 
adopt procedures that further limit the professional 
behaviour of journalists. (John Soloski, "News Reporting 
and Professionalism", Media, Culture and Society, April 
1989, Vol 11 #2, pg 212) 
3. "News Reporting and Professionalism: Some Constraints on the 
Reporting of the News", John Soloski, in Media Culture and 
Society, 11.2, April 1989, pg 213-14 
4. Roger Fowler, Language in the News, (Routledge, London 1991), 
pgs 208-209 
5. I shall return to the question of editorials in Chapter 5, as 
well as the notion of "imbalance". At this point I recognize that 
both "balance" and "imbalance" are both unreal states, and are 
useful only in suggesting a mode of journalism rather than an 
absolute code. Despite the fact that The New York Times' 
editorials not always neutral as regards either the PLO or Arabs 
as a whole (see Chapter 5.6) a certain level of balance (however 
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minimal) was achieved by using contradictory articles by external 
writers. 
6. Regarding the bias of language Paul Chilton uses the example 
of the terms which he refers to as "nukespeak" (the language used 
to discuss the complex sub-scientific world of nuclear weaponry) . The terminologies consciously employed in this case helped, 
according to him, to legitimize the existence of these weapons 
despite the consequences of their use for the survival of the 
human race. (Paul Chilton, Orwellean Language, pg 43) 
7. Clifford G. Christians, "Reporting and the Oppressed", in 
Responsible Journalism, ed Deni Elliott, pg 111 
8. On the Channel 4 programme HARD NEWS, broadcast on June 1, 
1989, Clive Wolmann, who had worked for the Financial Times, 
stressed that journalists are restricted in their investigative 
role. Restrictions are incursions on the journalist's ideal role 
as independent reporter: they pervert his expression rather than 
just limit it. In the case of the Financial Times he realized 
that the reason behind the lack of in depth analysis in financial 
issues stemmed from- the association of that paper with big 
business. This involvement subverts analysis which might hurt 
important sources. He mentioned the example of the Al Fayed 
takeover story as being typical of the way in which the Financial 
Times, made timid by traditional sources, only dared to publish 
comment and analysis after the event. 
9. See F. W. Hodgson, Modern Newspaper Practice, (Heinemann, 
London 1989) pg 28ff. Hodgson, with references to Denis McQuail, 
suggests profit-motivation, like bias, is a difficult charge to 
substantiate. It may be only one of a number of influences, but 
considering the turnover of, say, CNN, it must be a major one. 
10. As an example see how, during the 1991 Gulf War, CNN (Cable 
News Network) considered its viewing figures to be the prime 
indicator of its effectiveness as a news medium. By the 1990s 
professionalism could easily be confused with technical profic- 
iency. This argument was not as widespread in the criticism of 
newsprint media - except at the upper end of the market (The 
independent s use of high-grade photography probably added to its 
appeal, but did not make inroads into the market share of, say, 
The Guardian). 
11. As Chapter 5 indicates, an Egyptian journalist on the staff 
of Al Ahram might accurately be labelled a civil servant. 
12. Cf Hodgson pg 69 on the role of proprietors in policy making, 
as well as Coleridge chapters 1,3,11,13,22 and 24. 
"It doesn't really matter much in the end who actually owns 
the various newspapers, " Lord Rothermere told me ... "When 
one proprietor gives up ... another one pretty soon comes 
along to take his place. ... I rather doubt the general 
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reader has much idea when one owner hands over to the next 
fellow. " 
But, as Lord Rothermere knew well', Lord Rothermere was 
simply being polite. ... Much more than his editors or 
general managers ... the proprietor sets not just the 
agenda but the whole mood and context and level of 
expectation. (Coleridge, Paper Tigers, pg 534) 
13. Cf Z. Mikhael, "Asian Journalism - Challenges, Problems and 
Solutions", in Media Asia, vol 13.3 1986, pg 166 
14. Hinnebusch R. A., Egyptian Politics Under Sadat, (Reinner, 
London 1988) pgs 180-182 
15. Cf. D. McQuail, Mass Communications Theory: an Introduction, 
pg 94 
16. McQuail, ibid, pg 95 
17. Unfortunately, societies contain too many interest groups to 
allow a cohesive, centrally-designed media policy to be fair or 
effective. 
18. M. Traber, The Myth of the Information Revolution, pg 74-5 
19. Traber, ibid, pg 76 
Traber also observes the problems'associated with media deining 
its role in concert with the social authority. 
While conceding that the purposeful use of communication 
for development calls for a certain measure of direction, 
the problem really lies in how to define the modalities for 
providing media with direction. A certain amount of 
cooperation with the government is needed in order to get 
to know its development thinking and priorities, if for no 
other reason than that the government is -an important 
catalyst in the development process, and thus an important 
source of information on development issues. 
20. Pradeep Krishnatray, "Management of Communications int eh 
Developing Countries: the Indian Case", pg 160, Media Asia, vol 
13.3,1986 
21. The restructuring of Egyptian society after the British and 
Farouk was dependent on the consolidation of a new system of 
power. Such consolidation needed a system of propaganda. A 
mechanism was already available, and well-developed (if not to 
Nasser's specific needs) in the Egyptian press. Sadat inherited 
a system which had few connections with Western culture. He 
wished to reverse this and set Egypt on an economic path matching 
that of the capitalist West. However "... since 1972 as a result 
of Sadat's press policies seventy or more journalists had gone 
into exile abroad. The largest proportion had come from the Al 
Abram". (Anthony McDermott, Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak, pg 249) 
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22. Typical would be The Egyptian Gazette, which for almost a 
year (1976-1977) carried front page a portrait of president Sadat 
with bold headlines of his policies and pronouncements. In both 
Al-Ahram and Al-Gumhuriyah during 1976-1978 Sadat's portrait - 
more than Nasser's before him - was displayed almost daily, with 
his comments concerning topical events (see Chapter 5). 
23. One example was the bread riots of early 1977, started as a 
result of an increase in prices of a commodity used daily by the 
bulk of the people. Unexplained in any major daily paper, the 
government actions came out of the blue and caused widespread 
dismay and anger. In fact, looking at papers for late 1976 
indicates that headlines about Egypt's internal condition were 
strongly positive. 
24. S. W. Head, [ed] Broadcasting in Africa, (Temple University 
Press, Philadelphia 1974) pg 18 
25. Head, ibid, pg 19 
26. The centralization of the state's major functions and 
concomitant domination of the people in order to further 
restructuring needed a mechanism to encourage and promote change. 
The extent of post-colonial change is easy to disregard. 
The dominant anti-imperialist trend after 1945 was Arab 
nationalism, imbedded most notably in Nasserism ... . It 
represented opposition both to control of the economy by 
imperialism, large landowners and the Arab bourgeoisie, and 
in a profound transformation of the Arab countries prepared 
to empower the masses and organize them in democratic 
control of the economy. This force found expression in the 
expansion of the state sector which provided employment 
(large armies, nationalized industries, expansive 
bureaucracies), in private landowning and carried out 
certain anti-imperialist measures. It was anti-bourgeois 
in so far as capital accumulation and the provision of 
employment could be better advanced under state control. 
But within this overall domination by the state, a new 
ruling class was able to consolidate and exercise a new 
form of class dictatorship. (Fred Halliday, Arabia Without 
Sultans, pg 21) 
27. Mahfouz, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, criticises 
Egyptian society in the guise of fictional characters (a 
tradition from Swift to Marquez) . John Rodenbeck points Mahfouz's 
intentions out in the forward to the . novel The Beggar (al 
Shahhadh, first published in 1965). 
The Children of Gebelawi ... created a scandal, not only 
because of its subject matter, but also because of its 
technique, which represented a complete abandonment of 
old-fashioned descriptive novel. Making allegorical use of 
religious history, it suggested that the new regime would 
ultimately not be much different from the old ones; and did 
so with a passionate, darting intelligence that seemed to 
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have turned political disappointment - even despair - into 
a new freedom of expression. (John Rodenbeck, forward to 
The Beggar by Naguib Mahfouz, University of Cairo Press, 
1984) 
A yearning for freedom from Nasser's rule is hardly disguised 
below some of the more descriptive passages of his novels The 
Beggar or The Thief and the Dogs; when read by a contemporary 
Egyptian the meaning would have been obvious. For an example of 
this see The Beggar, pg 114. 
28. R. A. Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat, (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, London, 1988) pg 151/pg 1 
29. Hinnebusch, ibid, pg 151: 
The journalists' syndicate ... was generally on bad terms 
with the regime. Since Sadat's succession, it fought to 
expand journalistic freedom against regime controls. 
Adding asperity to the conflict was the strong leftist 
ideological influence in the profession. In the mid-70s, 
a Sadat confidant, Yussuf Sabai, headed the union and tried 
to discipline it; but somewhat later a left wing 
journalist, Kamal Zuhayri, was elected. This press 
criticism of the government, and the opposition political 
activity of some journalists, led Sadat to attempt to 
abolish the syndicate. It deflected this threat, but could 
not prevent creation of a watchdog "higher council for the 
press", to make sure journalists adhered to Sadat's 
political [code of ethics]. 
30. McDermott, ibid, pg 248-250 
31. Heikel, Autumn of Fury, pg 217. 
32. Al-Ahram, July 31st, 1978 [editorial): translation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
1. Le Sud-Quest in the local paper of the regions of Medoc and 
Acquitaine in south-western France, and is printed in Bordeaux. 
2. A typical good news story is middle-brow tabloid news and 
current affairs. Good news has its strongest place on popular 
television news programs such as ITN in the UK and in papers such 
as The Daily Express, and The New York Post and Daily News in the 
US. Circulation or audience figures govern news handling. When 
the high-quality French news channel Le Cinq collapsed in 1992 
it sent a message of caution to many media producers and 
investors in Europe. Hard news may partially be restricted to 
"quality" papers, domestic or non-sensitive reporting, and 
specialist, low-audience current affairs programming which 
operate off-peak or on minority channels. 
3. Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, (Sage, London 1987) 
pg 285 
4. This process is something the Glasgow Media Group publicized 
in Bad News and More Bad News, (Glasgow University Media Group, 
Bad News and More Bad News) and was underlined by Westergaard 
(Mass communication and Society, pgs 104-110). Agenda-setting has 
been described in their study of the way industrial relations was 
covered in Britain, skewed against trades unions and towards the 
employers and status quo. But a process which works domestically, 
works equally (and for similar reasons) internationally, where 
constraints and biases work most effectively; where there are few 
interest groups, and where those which do exist are blessed with 
a credible series of attitudes probably well in tune with the 
attitudes of the nation as a whole. 
5. Westergaard, ibid, pg 110 
6. R. Collins, J. Curran et al [eds] Media Culture and Society, 
(Sage, London 1986) pg 275 
7. See Robert Fisk, The Independent, February 27th 1994, pg 17, 
"Israelis can be terrorists too" on linguistic agenda-setting in 
the context of Israel, the Israeli Armed Forces, the PLO and its 
associated groups, and Hamas, in the aftermath of the killing of 
48 Muslim worshippers by Baruch Goldstein on February 14th, 1994. 
8. To illustrate the selective concerns of the media the massacre 
in East Timor in 1991 of one hundred and forty demonstrators 
(Amnesty figures) in the capital Dili, the previous years' 
genocide of the East Timorese by Indonesia, and the statement by 
the governor of East Timor in November 1992 (in the week before 
the first anniversary of the killings) that it would have been 
better had one thousand demonstrators died rather than one 
hundred, was reported in all the major British papers. Only two, 
The Independent and The Guardian went to more than one paragraph, 
and in the US only The Washington Post went into detail. 
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9. Primarily the Western media has the filtering structure of 
news agency/service (such as AFP or Reuters), then selection of 
items by journalists from this agency, further selection by 
editorial staff - dividing material into various types of 
prominence - which in turn involve selection of graphics, 
followed by rewriting and cutting. This contributes to the type 
of response offered, and what falls within certain acceptable 
political limits (or what fails to). Response is further altered 
by previous days' reporting, other papers' attitudes, whether 
certain political attitudes would be covered at all. All these 
gate-keeping, restructuring tasks would take place within the 
general political atmosphere of the paper, and journalists would 
usually know where they stood on general-issues. 
10. US commercial interests might perceive Mideastern peace as 
a valuable prerequisite both for an avoidance of another oil 
embargo, as well as for better trading relations with the region 
as a whole. As reporting and editorials in both The Washington 
Post and The New York Times show (see Chapter 5), there was an 
ill-defined hope that the spirit of Camp David (reconciliation, 
arbitration and peace) would spill over into the other countries 
of the Mideast, and that interests could be better protected by 
the Accords. 
11. It is difficult to know just how much the media hype 
associated with Camp David fed back into the political process, 
simplifying it. What can be said is that many media judgements 
of Arab politics showed a profound lack of sympathy - especially 
in US media. 
12. Quandt, William B., Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 
(Brookings, Washington, 1986) pg 321 
13. The threat offered Israel by its neighbours cohered a 
defensive group into a lobbying party with the necessary 
credentials to be effective within the US system. The factor 
behind political and media support for Israel (and Camp David) 
is the relative economic strength of such a large lobby as well 
as its organizational strength and untiring professionalism. The 
only groups which come close to this kind of determination will 
be similar "minority" lobbies where past repression and present 
danger invigorate members into lobbying activities. 
14. Quandt ibid, pg 321-322 
15. Chomsky, ibid, pg 4 
16. It would be absurd to suggest that, with all its intelligence 
capacity, satellite surveillance techniques, and leaks to the 
media even before Mordecai Vanunu's spectacular revelations in 
The Times of London in 1981, the US had no inkling of the traffic 
of enriched Uranium to Israel from South Africa during the 1970s. 
17. Nowhere in the research of Chapter 5 did The New York Times, 
The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal or Newsweek offer 
criticism of US military aid to Israel. Extensive research on 
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subsidiary material (The San Francisco Chronicle, The Los Angeles 
Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Austin American Statesman) 
also offered no criticism. There was plenty of criticism about 
US military sales elsewhere in the Mideast, especially of 
Carter's arms package to Saudi Arabia (1977). The impression is 
that the fact of US military patronage was one of the immutables: 
questioning that might have lead to doubts about Israel's right 
to exist. 
18. Within The Washington Post and The New York Times over the 
Camp David period (September 1977 - April 1979) the three Arab 
countries most mentioned in international news sections (as a 
total percentage of Arab countries covered) were Egypt (28%) 
Lebanon (21%) Saudi Arabia (19.5%) and Jordan (8%). Similar 
percentages were found in other US papers, with Libya, Iraq and 
Syria scoring larger percentages during the 1980s when these 
countries were closely associated with the incidence of "terror- 
ism". From 1977 to 1994 there was a shift, and issues of Mideast 
peace were approximate-ly equal to issues of Arab-sponsored 
"terrorism". Percentage averages for those 10 years for the top 
issues from Arab countries were: Israel and associated peace 
moves - 18.5%; Arab-sponsored "terror" - 17% (including, most 
notably, the "Achile Lauro incident and the Lockerbie bombing); 
Palestinian issues - 11%; inter-Arab conflict (not counting the 
Iran-Iraq war which was a war between an Arab and a non-Arab 
country) - 6%; oil - 5.5%; Islam - 5%. 
19. In the US even liberal papers such as the Boston Globe 
narrowed reporting of Camp David to stringers who followed 
reports by Reuters or AP in much the same mould as the two main 
papers studied and, later, barred critics such as Noam Chomsky 
from its columns. (See Chomsky, Deterring Democracy) 
20. See Schwartz, William A., and Derber, Charles, The Nuclear 
Seduction, (University of California Press, London 1990) and 
Sagan, Carl and Turco, Richard, A Path Where No Man Thought, 
(Century, London 1990) pg 285f 
21. Dorman, William A., Farhang, Mansour, The U. S. Press and 
Iran, (University of California Press, London, 1987) pg 152-153 
22. Dorman and Farhang, ibid, pg 157 
23. Dorman and Farhang, ibid, pg 226 
24. Said, Edward W., Covering Islam, pg 31-32 
25. It is notable that not even liberal US papers like The 
Washington Post or The Boston Globe chose to go into great depth 
about Palestinian grievances. Interest remained specifically 
linked to the future of the Occupied Territories. 
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CHAPTER 5 
1. Used in an abbreviated and selected form in The International 
Herald Tribune these two papers have the widest circulation 
outside the US of any US newspaper. 
2. The New York Times named it eight times from 1977 to 1979 as 
a conservative, government source. 
3. High-profile media in developed countries do also come under 
covert government pressure: the BBC and ITV in Britain and both 
The Washington Post and The New York Times, and more recently, 
CBS in the US have faced criticism of news coverage which changed 
content. 
4. For September 1977 the following figures ignore agency 
reports, and first give a percentage of space used during that 
month for Mideast news of all kinds (out of a total news 
coverage, domestic and international) then as a percentage of 
only international news. 
The Washington Post 4% 9% 
The New York Times 5.5% 12% 
The Wall Street Journal 3.5% 8% 
Newsweek 6% 13.5% 
The Boston-Globe 4% 8.5% 
The Times (London) 6% 11.5% 
The Guardian (Manchester 
and London) 6.5% 12% 
Le Monde (Paris) - 6% 10.5% 
In each case, European newspapers gave more space to internation- 
al news of all kinds, and used agencies less than their US 
counterparts. 
5. The literate class in Egypt is narrower than in the US, and 
more or less limited to the educated middle and upper classes. 
Literacy in Egypt has been reckoned at 51.6% by 1990 (Article 
19: World Report 1991, Library Asociation Publishing, London). 
Al-Ahram itself, in its annual report for 1993 published in 
Cairo, estimates its readership at something between 2 and 2.5 
million. However sales do not equal readership, and the true 
readership total as papers are passed from hand to hand, may be 
nearer 10 million. 
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6. It should be noted that distribution patters differ. Al Ahram 
is in many ways more international than the three US newspapers. 
Although there is the vehicle of The International Herald Tribune 
to spread leading articles from The Washington Post and The New 
York Times abroad, at home The New York Times speaks mainly to 
middle and upper middle class New Yorkers, and those resident in 
the commuter area around New York (say within 200 kilometres). 
Al Ahram, on the other hand, is sold in virtually every Arabic- 
speaking country, as well as having its English language sister 
copy printed in London.. Even while a propaganda tool for Nasser 
and then Sadat, it spoke to a large audience. The style of its 
editorials as well as the contents of its first three pages 
suggest a combination of domestic propaganda as well as Egyptian 
policy statement for the Arabic-speaking world as a whole. 
7. There are of course major differences. There was never any 
"Party" in Egypt to compare with the role of the Communist Party 
in the USSR. However, there was within the Egyptian system a vast 
civil service guaranteeing jobs for those migrating from schools 
and colleges, a system only finally challenged under Mubarak. 
8. (247, Article 19 - World Report 1988: Information. Freedom and 
Censorship, Longman, London 1988) 
9. Al Ahram, February 18,1977, Editorial. 
10. Whether or not Sadat knew what intelligence Carter received 
about Egypt (and it is certain that during 1977 and 1978 he was 
kept informed about the parlous internal situation in Egypt, 
despite the poor intelligence on Arab affairs in general) Al 
Ahram's role as a semi-official, semi-independent register of the 
country's situation read throughout the region and beyond, made 
it an obvious candidate for strict control. 
11. New York Times, December 13,1976; February 3,1977; May 25, 
1977; February 12,1978. 
12. In spite of the organization of popular demonstrations to 
welcome the president on his return from Camp David, he had 
to take note that the opposition was ever-increasing ... 
[H]is entire regime was deprived of any basis, as it was 
suspended between external power and internal repressions. 
Sadat felt obliged to "go into the streets" according to 
his own expression, to "face the people directly". 
In parallel with this direct action by the president, the 
ruling regime started multiple actions to facilitate his 
task by preparing a cultural and informational background 
favorable to. his move. ... 
Ghali Shoukri, Egypt, Portrait of a President, pg 402 
13. Al Ahram, July 14,1977, pg 1 [Nb: when someone's name is 
used in a headline followed by a colon, the following words are 
considered to be a quotation, or a paraphrase of a quotation. 
There is a similar practice in some Western newspapers. ) 
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14. ibid, headline front page, September 19,1977. 
15. It is not unusual that, in national emergencies, free 
expression within media should be curtailed. What is interesting 
and paradoxical about the stifling of dissent in Egyptian 
newspapers from 1976 to 1981 was the inference (because of the 
level of censorship) that the country was passing through a grave 
national emergency, while the media were constantly suggesting 
how relatively normal and successful political life was. Sadat's 
repression gave the lie to his assertion of normalcy. 
16. Al Ahram, August 13,1977, pg 5 
17. Al Ahram, August 16,1977, Editorial. 
18. Al Ahram quoted Sadat on September 19,1977 in a headline on 
page 1 as saying to Carter "I can't imagine the holding of any 
talks without the PLO". 
19. This could have been an unofficial message from Sadat to the 
us expressing his disapproval, or one of the few times journalism 
could be seen peeking out from behind government control. Because 
of Sadat's general lack of political subtlety the latter is more 
likely. 
20. Al Ahram Editorials September 2,4,6,11,12,14,15,17, 
all stress Camp David as the-great key to peace. 
21. Al Ahram, September 3, Page 5 
22. Al Ahram, September 6, pg 5 
23. Al Ahram, September 19, pg 3 
24. Al Ahram, September 11,1978, page 1 
25. Al Ahram, September 11,1978, Editorial 
26. Al Ahram, September 17,1978, Editorial 
27. This clash indicates that Al Ahram should by no means be 
considered just a mouthpiece of the Egyptian government. That el 
Jamal could be less than enthused in print suggests that the 
lines of censorship which stretched between Sadat's cabinet 
office and Cairo's government newspapers were not always so 
tightly-drawn. 
28. Al Ahram, September 22,1978. This Editorial was more or less 
typical. A simplistic (and repetitive) Editorial line only 
underpinned by other, supportive, opinions. A basic duality can 
be observed between "responsibility" and lack of it. Egypt, in 
the person of Sadat, was portrayed as doing its moral duty. 
29. Al Ahram, September 20,1978, headline: "Complete Change in 
State structure" 
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30. Al Ahram, September 20,1978, pg 7; Dr* Mohammed All El-Oweni, 
director of the media section of the Cairo-based School of Media 
and Communications, wrote an article which, together with the 
main Editorial, applauded the results of Camp David in specific- 
ally Arab terms, stressing that dissent was irresponsible and 
counter-productive both for Egyptians and Palestinians. 
31. Al Ahram, September 20,1978, Editorial (pg 7) 
32. Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt, (Westview Press, London 1989) 
pg 193 
33. There is a curious gap between the US press and what was, 
undoubtedly, a better-informed government structure. The NSC, for 
example, was well-briefed by such as Quandt and Cordesman, while 
David Long worked in the State Department. 
34. Dorman and Farhang, ibid, pgs 160f 
35. J. P. Wallach, "Leakers, Terrorists, Policy makers and the 
Press", in The Media and Foreign Policy, (MacMillan, London 1990) 
pg 89, S. Serfaty (ed] 
36. Cf The Washington Post, September 29,1977, pg A17 "Sadat's 
Rule Has Seen Little Material Gain for Egyptians" 
37. Nicholas Coleridge, Paper Tigers (Heinemann, 1993) 
38. ibid, July 28,1977 
39. Ibid, September 14,1977 
40. Ibid, September 29,1977 
41. Ibid, September 14,1977: Frankel's editorial talks of the 
"hopes" of the Dayan plan, while calling Palestine an "entity". 
On September 26, Frankel wrote positively about Sadat's role in 
the peace process. Then on September 29 Frankel launched a 
stinging attack on the PLO and Palestine (even as an entity this 
concept now was unacceptable). 
42. ibid, October 14,1977, editorial 
43. ibid, the editorial of November 1,1977 was deeply antagon- 
istic towards Arab opinion, especially . 
in the context of the 
Occupied Territories. 
44. ibid, November 21, pg 22, col 5/6 
45. ibid, November 21,1977, editorial 
46. The choice of photograph (November 21,1977] is always 
important in major news items: it may be used to break up a page 
of type, or to balance serious issues with visual distraction, 
but a picture always says something. Page 5's happy, smiling 
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faces suggest that, where politics and policies matter - ie with 
ordinary people - there is less room for cynicism or criticism. 
47. ibid, December 6,1977, editorial 
48. ibid, December 9,1977, pg A3 (headline and photograph) 
"Egyptians Rally in Support of Sadat as he Calls his "Hard-Line" 
Arab Critics "Dwarfs"", by Christopher S. Wren in Cairo. 
49. This could be part of a definition of "sentimentality". 
50. ibid, January 19,1978 
51. ibid, December 15,1977; January 2,1978; February 2,1978. 
52. ibid, February 2,1978. 
53. ibid, March 16,1978, editorial. (See also opposite page, 
where William Safire supported recent Israeli military action: 
"Israel's Answer". ) 
54. ibid, March 17,1978 
55. ibid, June 22,1978, pg A23. 
56. The New York Times, June 20,1978. 
57. ibid, July 6,1978. 
58. ibid, July 25,1978. 
59. ibid, June 20,1978, pg B1; June 21,1978, editorial. 
60. ibid, July 6/7,1978. 
61. ibid, December 18,1978, pg A19. 
62. On average, during the period of my study The Washington Post 
offered more domestic material, and less international material 
than The New York Times (as a percentage of total copy): 
Percentage of international copy (rounded up to the nearest . 5%) 
in: 
THE NEW YORK TIMES 
1976 14.5% 
1977 15% 
1978 15% 
1979 14.5% 
THE WASHINGTON POST 
13% 
12.5% 
13.5% 
13% 
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See Table 5.4 for a further breakdown in these percentages to 
show how much of that copy was devoted to Mideast material. 
63. Bradlee himself enjoyed an enormous amount of prestige after 
The Washington Post published its famous account of Watergate. 
It might even be said that Watergate made him the most 
influential editor in the US (and the most famous US editor 
worldwide). Other papers, importantly, began to take the cue from 
The Washington Post and Bradlee: Halberstam mentions two of the 
most influential, the Milwaukee Journal, and the St Louis Post 
Dispatch. (The Powers That Be, page 528. ) That influence is 
likely to have been wider still. But Bradlee himself was no 
radical journalist. He was, according to Halberstam, "irreverent 
in style rather than substance, in language but not in deed" 
(page 531). He was most importantly Katherine Graham's favourite. 
One final observation bears directly on Bradlee's treatment of 
the middle East, and on Camp David in particular. 
"Did [The Washington Post] have a moral centre? Should a 
newspaper have a moral centre? What worried many of the 
reporters and some of the editors about Bradlee was that a 
story was an end in itself. Get the story, best the 
opposition, stick it to them before they stick it to us. 
The story without any sense of the large context or 
implication. " (Halberstam, page 563) 
See also Nicholas Coleridge, Paper Tigers (London, 1993) pg 91 
where Bradlee is described as "buccaneering". 
64. Kay Graham, the paper's owner, was, very much a hands-on 
personality, regularly, sitting in on editorial meetings. Her 
influence spread itself across the newspaper, and may have 
eclipsed Bradlee, or at least obliged him to take a lower 
profile. (See Halberstam, The Powers That Be, pg 560f) 
65. The Washington Post, July 28,1977, editorial. 
66. ibid, July 28,1977, pg A23. - 
67. The Washington Post, November 20,1977, editorial. 
68. ibid, April 1,1978, Clayton Fritchey, pg A13. 
69. Cf Washington Post editorials May 12, June 21, June 27, July 
5, July 6, July 17,1978, and that responding to the Brandt- 
Kreisky initiative, printed on August 9. All illustrate how 
Bradlee lost touch with what he previously had seen as vital 
areas of disagreement in the Mideast, for the sake of a summit. 
70. The Washington Post, June 2,1977, pg All. 
71. Ibid, July 1,1977. The "Poster" section (page B5) 
72. ibid, July 16,1977. 
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73. ibid, November 22,1977, pg A12. 
74. ibid, November 21,1978, front page and pg A14. 
75. ibid, November 21,1977, pg A14. 
76. ibid, November 22,1977, pg A22 
77. Even H. D. S. Greenway was a little more critical - if only in 
a tangential manner. Cf his articles of April 6,1978 (front page 
and pg A18) and May 12,1978, pg A12. 
78. ibid, January 16,1978, pg A18. Randal went on to state 
"(Palestinian) residents sense no control of events". 
79. K. Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its 
Methodology, (Sage, London, 1980) page 21. See also page 26-7: 
In any content analysis it must be clear which data are 
analysed ... the aim or target of the inferences must be 
clearly stated ... the task is to make inferences from data 
to certain aspects of their context and to justify these 
inferences ... (and) the kind of evidence needed to 
validate its results must be specified ... . 
Also O. R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and 
Humanities, (Addison-Wesley, New York 1969) page 14: 
Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified 
characteristics of messages. 
And B. Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, 
(Hafner, New York 1952) page 18: 
Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest 
content of communication. 
80. Cf C. J. Muskens, Frames of Meaning, Are they Measurable?, 
(Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociologie, Nijmegen 1980) page 251-2, 
and Krippendorff, page 106. 
81. Ibid Krippendorff, page 99: 
Context sensitivity is displayed (1) wherever the 
researcher feels that the processing of his data must not 
impair their symbolic qualities and (2) to assure that 
these qualities are retained the analytical procedures used 
represents [sic] significant features of the context within 
which the data are considered. As analytical construct 
operationalizes what the analyst knows about the 
interdependencies between data and context. 
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82. Notably the following: Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle; Cattan, 
The Palestinian question; Fraser, The US and the Middle East 
Since World War 2; Bailey, Four Arab-Israeli-Wars and the Peace 
Process; Beling (ed], Middle East Peace Plans. 
83. Washington Post, September 10th, 1977, pg All: "Begin is 
Sharply Criticised for Role in Banker's Pardon". 
84. The Washington Post and The New York Times have less 
monolithic structures. Consensus doesn't need to be enforced from 
the top down, it establishes itself via similar educational, 
religious and political structures. A large bourgeoisie, with 
identifiably similar interests, resources, articulacy and 
thereby, power, dominate. Other interest groups can be absorbed 
at different rates according to how easily they are to be fitted 
into the dominant social picture. The difference between Egypt 
and the US or UK is that in the former consensus must be imposed 
top-down, often despite a burgeoning bourgeoisie, while in the 
latter cases there is a trade off in power between the most 
significant social group and its representatives. Consensus might 
still need to be imposed at times (for example, The Boston Globe 
book-reviewing policy does not recognize South End Press, a left- 
wing co-operative company that publishes Noam Chomsky's work, 
presumably because the work published by South End is too far 
outside the consensus to be palatable). 
85. These were:, British Politics; British Economics; British 
Social Issues Cie unemployment and its effects); Banking 
Scandals; Royal Family; US Politics; European Politics; 
Russia/the CIS [references to the old USSR]; Christian Religion; 
Islam; the Mideast; African Conflict and Famine; South Africa; 
Racism; Feminism [comprising equal rights, women's issues &c]; 
Sexual Politics [comprising gay rights]; Sexuality; the Arts; 
Military Issues; Green Issues. 
86. The New York Times, page 3 far left column, bottom page, 250 
words. 
87. Krippendorff (page 107) does not attempt to tackle 
linguistic-based content analytical theory, but notes: 
Analytical constructs for linguistic representations and 
for communications are very complex ... [the former] always involve several components operationalizing different 
knowledge about language use. One component provides a 
syntactical description of the linguistic material being 
analysed, one component infers the possible linguistic 
functions and meanings of words in their linguistic 
context, and a third maps the semantical interpretations 
onto a "world model" or "territory" of the discourse, whose 
logic allows the analyst to draw inferences about what is 
referred to and implied. 
He goes on to note that the use of generalizations are almost 
inevitable. 
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88. The Irish Times, published in Belfast and Dublin, is 
perceived to have a majority Catholic readership, though this is 
now changing. 
89. An Phoblacht is the newspaper of Sinn Fein, the umbrella 
political organisation which speaks for the IRA. It is non- 
sectarian (though presumably the majority of its readers are 
Catholic). 
90. The Belfast Telegraph was the paper serving the Protestant 
community, though now it aims to be non-sectarian. 
91. The Oxford English Dictionary for the US newspapers, and The 
Oxford English-Arabic Dictionary for Al Ahram. 
92. See Fowler, ibid. 
93. I took a random selection of articles in the London-based 
newspaper Al Arab (first published 1970) -in their correspondent 
section <Mujarad Raiee> "Only An Opinion" for December 1993. The 
articles were mainly attacks on Western or Arab establishments 
from a Libyan/Arab socialist viewpoint. Most of the articles ran 
for no longer than 300 words. Linguistically there was a very 
similar semantic structure, with the same style of repetitions 
and re-use of stock word/word-group phrases, the only difference 
being that Israel was not the main target, but only one of a 
range of targets. (The, most. villified of which was the US. ) 
94. Roger Fowler, Language in the News, page 209 
95. This was not unusual for an Arabic newspaper. See also the 
"editorial" or "comment" <ra'il> sections of Al Gumhuryah, Al 
Wafd. Even stringers and ordinary columnists used rhetoric. 
The nearest equivalence in the West would be the tabloid style 
(using rhyme, assonance, symbol and exaggeration). 
96. I recognise how problematic it is to define humour, but 
for the purposes of this definition it should be (i) 
inappropriate reference ("West Bank by Any Other Name", New 
York Times editorial, September 14th; "Slouching Toward 
Geneva" editorial, September 29th) (ii) sarcasm (iii) word- 
play - ie punning (iv) exaggeration). 
97. The title concerned the Geneva Conference: "Slouching 
Towards Geneva" but echoed a well-known poem by W. B. Yeats, 
"The Second Coming", filled with occult foreboding, its 
critique of amoral politics re-applied to US politicians. 
"The Second Coming" appeared in Michael Robartes and the 
Dancer (Faber, London 1928) (a group of Yeats' most 
apocalyptic poems, published during the increasing violence 
prior to the Irish Civil War, 1921): 
Turning and Turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
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Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
Surely some revelation is at hand; 
Surely the Second Coming is at hand. 
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out 
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi 
Troubles my sight: somewhere in the sands of the desert 
A shape with lion body and the head of a man, 
A gaze bland and pitiless as the sun, 
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it 
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds. 
The darkness drops again; but now I know 
That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle, 
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, 
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born? 
The conclusion that "the best lack all conviction, while the 
worst/Are full of passionate intensity" Was a direct reference 
to the Carter Administration (then involved in the Lance 
scandal) could not easily be avoided. This editorial followed 
a significant dialogue on Capitol Hill concerning the role of 
the Palestinians in any peace conference. Each time a Mideast 
peace structure was put together obstacles were encountered, 
and the similarities between the Madrid Conference of October 
1991, and the mooted Geneva Conference of 1977 are plain. The 
editorial (whether or not it recognized the nature of Israeli 
opposition) did recognize that any moves by Carter towards a 
dialogue with the PLO could only be to Israel's disadvantage 
(and, for the editor, the discredit of the US administration). 
By implication, the editorial tried to squeeze Palestinian 
representation into an unimportant corner. "Israelis of every 
political stripe oppose a separate Palestinian state and fear, 
rightly, that a separate Palestinian delegation could set the 
stage for a separate state. " (Note the use of the verb-adverb 
structure "fear, rightly", associating fear and its 
appropriateness with the Palestinians. ) The "rough beast" of 
Yeats' poem is probably the PLO, and whereas the foreground of 
the editorial talks in terms of Israeli fears and political 
problems, the subtext remains the poem, and the image of the 
Palestinian delegation as bestial and even satanic. Using the 
word "right" (meaning correct) about the Israelis' anti- 
Palestinian stance three times in the piece, but keeping the 
reader's mind anchored in the Satanic image of Palestinian 
politics, projected an attitude more negative than distrust of 
or political disagreement with Palestinian elements in the 
suggested talks. This is the advantage of humorous rhetoric: 
it allows criticism to be far stronger (as it does frequently 
with satire). 
98. Cf Nicholas Coleridge, Paper Tigers, pgs 20 & 102. 
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99. The Washington Post, pg A16 Col 4, September 3,1977 
100. The-New-York Times, pg 3 Col 1 base, September 3,1977 
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APPENDIX A 
THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, SEPTEMBER 17,1978 
A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
AGREED AT CAMP DAVID 
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy 
Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David 
from September 5 to September 17,1978, and have agreed on the 
following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite 
other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it. 
PREAMBLE 
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the 
following: 
- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict 
between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 242, in all its parts. 
- After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human 
efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and 
the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the 
blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace 
so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can 
be turned to the pursuits of peace and -so that this area can 
become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations. 
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting 
Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, 
government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of 
Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by 
both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by 
the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented 
opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation 
and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war. 
- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now 
provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all 
states. 
- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 
2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between 
Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate-'pace and security 
with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the 
provisions and principles of resolutions 242 and 338. 
- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of every state in the area 
and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of . force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconcilia- 
tion in the Middle east marked by cooperation in promoting 
economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring 
security. 
- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by 
cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In 
addition, under the terms of the peace treaties, the parties can, 
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on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arran- 
gements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, 
early warning stations, the presence of international forces, 
liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements 
that they agree are useful. 
FRAMEWORK 
Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to 
reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle 
East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. 
Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. 
They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all 
those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They 
therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended 
by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt 
and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other 
neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on 
this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to 
proceed as follows: 
A: West Bank and Gaza' 
1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the 
Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the 
resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To 
achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank 
and Gaza should proceed in three stages: 
(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful 
and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the 
security concerns of all the parties, there should be transition- 
al arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not 
exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military 
government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as 
soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the 
inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military 
government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrange- 
ment, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the 
negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrange- 
ments should give due consideration both to the principle of 
self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to 
the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved. 
(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for 
establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West 
Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include 
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians 
as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which 
will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing 
authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal 
of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a 
redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified 
security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements 
for assuring internal and external security and public order. A 
292 
strong local police force will be established, which may include 
Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces 
will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control 
posts to assure the security of the borders. 
-(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) 
in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the 
transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as 
possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning 
of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to 
determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its 
relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty 
between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. 
These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West 
Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be 
convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the 
four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status 
of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its 
neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representat- 
ives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the 
elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, 
taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of 
the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all 
the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 
242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the 
location of the boundaries and the nature of the security 
arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also 
recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and 
their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will 
participate in the determination of their own future through: 
(1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the 
representatives of the inhabitants of the West bank and Gaza to 
agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other 
outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period. 
(2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected 
representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. 
(3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants 
of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern 
themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement. 
(4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee 
negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. 
2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to 
assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the 
transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such 
security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the 
self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of 
the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing 
liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, 
Jordanian, and Egyptian officers. 
3. During the transitional periods, - representatives of Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute 
a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities 
of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 
1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and 
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disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with 
by this committee. 
4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other 
interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, 
just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the 
refugee problem. 
B. Egypt-Israel 
1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the 
use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled 
by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 
33 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to 
negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three 
months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between 
them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed 
simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties 
with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The 
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and 
Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The 
parties will agree on the modalities and the time table for the 
implementation of their obligations under the treaty. 
C. Associated Principles 
1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions 
described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and 
each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. 
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships 
normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they 
should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include: 
(a) full recognition; 
(b) abolishing economic boycotts; 
(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of 
the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process 
of law. 
3. -Signatories should explore possibilities for economic 
development in the context of final peace treaties, with the 
objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation 
and friendship which is their common goal. 
4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual 
settlement of all financial claims. 
5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the 
talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation 
of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying 
out of the obligations of the parties. 
6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to 
endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall 
not be violated. The permanent members of the Security council 
shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure 
respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to 
conform their policies and actions with the undertakings 
contained in this Framework. 
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: 
A. Sadat 
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For the Government of Israel: 
M. Begin 
Witnessed by: 
Jimmy Carter 
Jimmy Carter, President of 
the United States of America 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE 
TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND-ISRAEL 
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree 
to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three 
months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between 
them. 
It is agreed that: 
The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations 
flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed. 
All of the principles of the UN Resolution 242 will apply in 
this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt. 
Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty 
will be implemented between two and three years after the peace 
treaty is signed. 
The following matters are agreed between the parties: 
(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the 
internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated 
Palestine; 
(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai: 
(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, 
Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes 
only, including possible commercial use by all nations; 
(d) the right of free passage by ships. of Israel through the 
Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantin- 
ople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be 
open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of 
navigation and overflight; 
(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan 
near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and 
Jordan; and 
(f) the stationing of military forces listed below. 
Stationing of Forces 
A. No more that one division (mechanized or infantry) of 
Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying 
approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the 
Suez Canal. 
B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped-with 
light weapons to perform normal police functions will be 
stationed within an area lying west of the international border 
and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km. 
C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border 
there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four 
infantry battalions and United Nations observers. 
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D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will 
supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not 
included above. 
The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided 
during the peace negotiations. 
Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the 
terms of the agreement. 
United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the 
area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean 
Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the 
Sharm ei sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the 
Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such 
removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations 
with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members. 
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdraw- 
al is complete, normal relations will be established between 
Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including 
diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of 
economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and 
people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of 
law. 
Interim Withdrawal 
Between three months and nine months after the signing of the 
peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line 
extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the 
exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement. 
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: 
A. Sadat 
For the Government of Israel: 
M. Begin 
Witnessed by: 
Jimmy Carter 
Jimmy Carter, President of 
the United States of America 
LETTER FROM ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM 
BEGIN TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, 
SEPTEMBER 17,1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after my 
return home I will submit a motion before Israel's Parliament 
(the Knesset) to decide on the following question: 
If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between 
Israel and egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you 
in favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern 
and southern Sinai areas or are you in favor of keeping the 
aforementioned settlers in those areas? " 
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The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free 
from the usual Parliamentary Party discipline to the effect that 
although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out 
of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both on the 
Government and Opposition benches will be enabled to vote in 
accordance with his own conscience. 
Sincerely yours, 
Menachem Begin 
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO 
EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT, 
SEPTEMBER 22,1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister 
Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the issue of the 
Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the latter's decision. 
In this connection, I understand from your letter that Knesset 
approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according 
to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation 
of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotiations on a 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. 
Sincerely, 
Jimmy Carter 
Enclosure: 
Letter from Prime Minister Begin 
LETTER FROM EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL 
SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, 
SEPTEMBER 17,1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to 
be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the settlements: 
1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according 
to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation 
of the peace treaty. 
2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional 
institutions to this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite 
to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty. 
3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "Framework" 
shall be void and invalid. 
Sincerely, 
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat 
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LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO 
ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, 
SEPTEMBER 22,1978 
Dear Mr Prime Minister: 
I have received your letter of September 17,1978, describing how 
you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli 
settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision. 
Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's letter to me on this 
subject. 
Sincerely, 
Jimmy Carter 
Enclosure: 
Letter from President Sadat 
LETTER FROM EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL 
SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, 
SEPTEMBER 17,1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic 
of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem: 
1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal 
and historical Arab rights in the City must be respected and 
restored. 
2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty. 
3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled 
to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the 
Palestinian People in the West Bank. 
4. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, particularly 
Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusal- 
em. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the 
City are null and void and should be rescinded. 
5. All peoples must have free access to. the City and enjoy the 
free exercise of worship and the right to visit and transit to 
the holy places without distinction or discrimination. 
6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the 
administration and control of their representatives. 
7. Essential functions in the City should be undivided and a 
joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and 
Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these funct- 
ions. In this way, the City shall be undivided. 
Sincerely, 
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat 
LETTER FROM ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM 
BEGIN TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, 
SEPTEMBER 17,1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
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I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 
1967 - Israel's Parliament (The Knesset) promulgated and adopted 
a law to the effect: "the Government is empowered by a decree to 
apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the State 
to any part of Eretz Israel (land of Israel-Palestine) , as stated in that decree. " 
On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed in 
July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capital of 
the State of Israel. 
Sincerely, 
Menachem Begin 
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO 
EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT, 
SEPTEMBER 22,1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
I have received your letter of September 17,1978, setting forth 
the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of 
that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information. 
The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as 
stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General 
Assembly on July 14,1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost 
in the United Nations security council on July 1,1969. 
Sincerely, 
Jimmy Carter 
LETTER FROM EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR EL 
SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, 
SEPTEMBER 17,1978 
Dear Mr. President: 
In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East, " 
I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the implementation of the 
comprehensive settlement. 
To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the 
West bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to 
assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following 
consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the 
Palestinian people. 
Sincerely, 
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat 
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LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO 
ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, 
SEPTEMBER 22,1978 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 
I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows: 
A) - In. each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the 
expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and 
will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs. " 
B) In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" 
appear, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government 
of Israel as Judea and Samaria. 
Sincerely, 
Jimmy Carter 
LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD 
BROWN TO ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER EZER 
WEISMAN, ACCOMPANYING THE DOCUMENTS 
AGREED TO AT CAMP DAVID, RELEASED 
SEPTEMBER 29,1978 
September 28,1978 
Dear Mr. Minister: 
The U. S. understands that, in connection with carrying out the 
agreements reached at Camp David, Israel intends to build two 
military airbases at appropriate sites in the Negev to replace 
the airbases at Eitara and Etzion which will be evacuated by 
Israel in accordance with the peace treaty to be concluded 
between Egypt and Israel. We also understand the special urgency 
and priority which Israel attaches to preparing the new bases in 
light of its conviction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai 
airbases until the new ones are operational. 
I suggest that out two governments consult on the scope and 
costs of the two new airbases as well as on related forms of 
assistance which the United States might appropriately provide 
in light of the special problems which may be presented by 
carrying out such a project on an urgent basis. The President is 
prepared to seek the necessary Congressional approvals for such 
assistance as may be agreed upon by the U. S. side as a result of 
such consultations. 
Harold Brown 
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APPENDIX B 
THE-EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY, MARCH 26,1979 
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND THE STATE 
OF ISRAEL 
The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government 
of the State of Israel: 
Preamble 
Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, 
comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance 
with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; 
Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the 
Middle East Agreed at Camp David, " dated September 17,1978; 
Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is 
intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt 
and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab 
neighbours which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this 
basis; 
Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and 
to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live 
in security; 
Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between 
Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for compreh- 
ensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects; 
Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the 
peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles 
of the aforementioned Framework; 
Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation 
between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter 
and the principles of international law governing international 
relations in times of peace; 
Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their 
sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the 
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel: " 
Article I 
1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and 
peace will be established between them upon the exchange of 
instruments of ratification of this Treaty. 
2. Israel will withdraw all is armed forces and civilians from 
the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and 
mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex 
I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty 
over the Sinai. 
3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in 
Annex I, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relat- 
ions, in-accordance with Article 111(3). 
Article II 
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The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized 
international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated 
territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without 
prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The 
parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect 
the territorial integrity of the other, including their territ- 
orial waters and airspace. 
Article III 
1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international 
law governing relations among states in times of peace. In 
particular: 
a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence; 
b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live 
in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries; 
c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly 
or indirectly, against each'other and will settle all disputes 
between them by peaceful means. 
2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of 
belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and 
are not committed from within its territory or by forces subject 
to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, 
against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. 
Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigat- 
ing, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of 
belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other 
Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of 
such acts are brought to justice. 
3. -The Parties agree that the normal relationship established 
between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic 
and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and 
discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, 
and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due 
process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve 
such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other 
provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol 
(Annex III). 
Article IV 
1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the 
basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be 
established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli 
territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in 
detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security 
arrangements the Parties may agree upon. 
2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations 
personnel in the areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree 
not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and 
that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is 
approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the 
affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the 
Parties otherwise agree. 
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3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the 
implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I. 
4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 
2 of the Article may at the request of either party be reviewed 
and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. 
Article V 
1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from 
Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez 
canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the 
Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention 
of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and 
cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or 
coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory 
treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal. 
2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of 
Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for 
unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and over- 
flight. The Parties will respect each other, ' s right to navigation 
and overflight for access to either country through the Strait 
of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. 
Article VI 
1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as 
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the PArties 
under the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their 
obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or 
inaction of any other party and. independently of any instrument 
external to this Treaty. 
3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures 
for the application in their relations of the provisions of the 
multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the 
submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General 
of the UNited NAtions and other depositaries of such conventions. 
4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligations in 
conflict with this Treaty. 
5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under 
the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the 
obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented. 
Article VII 
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation 
of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations. 
2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations 
shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration. 
Article VIII 
The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual 
settlement of all financial claims. 
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Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 
2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and 
Israel of September, 1975. 
3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty 
shall be regarded as an integral part hereof. 
4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Done at Washington, D. C. this 26th day of March, 1979, in 
triplicate in the English, Arabic, and Hebrew languages, each 
text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of 
interpretation, the English text shall prevail. 
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: 
A. Sadat 
For the Government of Israel: 
M. Begin 
Witnessed by: 
Jimmy Carter 
Jimmy Carter, President of 
the United States of America 
AGREED MINUTES TO ARTICLES 1, IV, V, VI AND ANNEXES I AND II OF 
THE TREATY OF PEACE 
Article 1 
Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the 
Sinai provided for in paragraph 2 of Article I shall occur with 
regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from that area. 
Article IV 
It is agreed between the Parties that the review provided for in 
Article IV(4) will be undertaken when requested by either Party, 
commencing within three months of such a request, but that any 
amendment can be made only with the mutual agreement of both 
Parties. 
Article V 
The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be 
construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The 
foregoing - is not to be construed as contravening the second 
sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows: 
"The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and 
overflight for access to either country through the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. " 
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Article VI(2) 
The Provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contra- 
diction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the 
Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be 
construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(2) of the 
treaty, which reads as follows: 
"The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligat- 
ions under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of 
any other Party and independently of any instrument external to 
this Treaty. " 
Article VI(5) 
It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this 
Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other 
Treaties or agreements prevail overt his Treaty. The foregoing 
is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article 
VI(5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows: 
"Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the 
events of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under 
the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the 
obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented. " 
Annex I 
Article VI, Paragraph-8, of Annex I provides as follows: "The 
Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations 
force and observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from 
nations other than those which are permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council. " The Parties have agreed as 
follows: 
"With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of 
Annex I, if no agreement is reached between the Parties they will 
accept or support a U. S. proposal concerning the composition of 
the United Nations force and observers. " 
Annex III 
The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establish- 
ing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance 
therewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal 
commercial sales of oil by Egypt to 'Israel, and that Israel shall 
be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed 
for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil 
concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel on the same 
basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil. 
Republic of Egypt: 
A. Sadat 
For the Government of Israel: 
Witnessed by: 
M. Begin 
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Jimmy. Carter 
Jimmy Carter, President 
of the United States of 
America 
APPENDIX C: 
LETTER FROM ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN AND EGYPTIAN 
PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, MARCH 26, 
1979 
Dear Mr. President: 
This letter confirms that Egypt and Israel have agreed as 
follows: 
The Governments of Egypt and Israel recall that they concluded 
at Camp David and signed at the White House on September 17, 
1978, the annexed documents entitled "A Framework for Peace in 
the Middle East Agreed at Camp David" and "Framework for the 
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. " 
For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement 
in accordance with the above-mentioned Frameworks, Egypt and 
Israel will proceed with the implementation of those provisions 
relating to the West Bank' and the Gaza Strip. They have agreed 
to start negotiations within a month after the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification of the Peace Treaty. In accordance 
with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East, " the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The purpose 
of the negotiation shall be to agree, prior to the elections, on 
the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing 
authority (administrative council), define its powers and 
responsibilities, and agreed upon other related issues. In the 
event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the 
negotiations will be held by Egypt and Israel. 
The two Governments agree to negotiate continuously and in good 
faith to conclude these negotiations at the earliest possible 
date. They also agree that the objective of the negotiations is 
the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West 
Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants. 
Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the 
negotiations within one year so that elections will be held as 
expeditiously as possible after agreement has been reached 
between the parties. The self-governing authority referred to 
in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" will be establ- 
ished and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, 
at which time the transitional period of five years will begin. 
The Israeli military government and its civilian administration 
will be withdrawn, to be replaced by the self-governing author- 
ity, as specified in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East. " A withdrawal of Israeli armed forced will then take place 
and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces 
into specified security locations. 
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This letter also confirms our understanding that the United 
States Government will participate fully in all stages of 
negotiations. 
sincerely yours, 
For the Government of Israel: 
M. Begin 
Menachem Begin 
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: 
A. Sadat 
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat 
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, 
MARCH 26,1979 
Dear Mr. President: 
In response to your request, I can confirm that, within one month 
after the completion of Israel's withdrawal to the interim line 
as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, 
Egypt will send an a resident ambassador to Israel and will 
receive a resident Israeli ambassador in Egypt. 
Sincerely, 
A. Sadat 
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat 
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER 
MENACHEM BEGIN, MARCH 26,1979 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 
I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one 
month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line 
in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt 
and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and 
will receive in Egypt a resident Israeli ambassador. 
I will be grateful if you will confirm that this procedure will 
be agreeable to the Government of Israel. 
Sincerely, 
Jimmy Carter 
Jimmy Carter 
LETTER FROM ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN TO PRESIDENT 
JIMMY CARTER, MARCH 26,1979 
Dear Mr. President: 
I am pleased to be able to confirm that the Government of Israel 
is agreeable to the procedure set out in your letter of March 26, 
1979 in which you state: 
"I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one 
month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line 
in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt 
and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and 
will receive in Egypt a resident Israel ambassador. " 
Sincerely, 
M. Begin 
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Menachem Begin 
LETTER FROM-PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR 
EL SADAT, AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, MARCH 26, 
19792 
Dear Mr. President1Prime Minister: 
I wish to confirm to you that subject to United States Constitut- 
ional processes: 
In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty 
of Peace between Egypt and Israel, the United States will, on 
request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties 
with respect thereto and will take such other actions as it may 
deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the 
Treaty. 
The United States will conduct aerial monitoring as requested 
by the Parties pursuant to Annex I of the Treaty. 
The United States believes the Treaty provision for permanent 
stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited 
force zone can and should be implemented by the United Nations 
Security Council. The United States will exert its utmost efforts 
to obtain the requisite action by the Security Council. If the 
Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements 
called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take 
those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance 
of an acceptable alternative multinational force. 
Sincerely, 
Jimmy Carter 
Jimmy Carter 
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APPENDIX D: 
Resolution No 186 (S/2) 14th May, 1948 
Appointing a UN mediator 
The General Assembly, 
Taking account of the present situation in regard to Palestin- 
ians, 
I 
Strongly affirms its support of the efforts of the Security 
Council to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon all 
Governments, organizations and persons to co-operate in making 
effective such a truce; 
II 
1. Empowers a United Nations mediator in Palestine, to be chosen 
by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representat- 
ives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America to exercise 
the following functions: 
(a) to use his good offices with the local and community 
authorities in Palestine to: 
(i) arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the 
safety and well-being of the population of Palestine; 
(ii) assure a protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings 
and sites in Palestine; 
(iii) promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of 
Palestine. 
(b) To co-operate with the truce commission for Palestine 
appointed by the Security council in its resolution of 23 April 
1948. 
(c) To invite, as seems to him advisable, with a view to 
promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of palestine, the 
assistance and co-operation of appropriate special agencies of 
the United Nations, such as the World Health Organization, of the 
International Red Cross, and of other governmental or non-govern- 
mental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political 
character; 
2. Instructs the United Nations mediator to render progress 
reports monthly, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the 
Security council and to the Secretary General for transmission 
to the members of the United Nations; 
3. Directs the United Nations mediator to confirm in his 
activities with the provisions of this resolution and with such 
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instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may 
issue; 
4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the United Nations 
mediator an emolument equal to that paid to the President of the 
International Court of 'Justice, and to provide the mediator with 
the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions 
assigned to the mediator by the General Assembly. 
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APPENDIX E 
Resolutions 242 and 388 
Resolution No. 242 (1967) of 22 November, 1967 
STATING THE PRINCIPLES OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 
The Security Council, 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation 
in the Middle East, 
Emphasizing the inadmissability of the acquisition of 
territory by war and the need to work for a just and 
lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in 
security, 
Emphasizing further that all member states in accept- 
ance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken 
a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the 
Charter, 
1. 'Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles 
requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace int 
he Middle east which should include the application of both 
the following principles: 
(i) withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories 
occupied in recent conflicts; 
(ii) termination of all claims or states of 
belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every state in the area and their 
right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
(a) for granting freedom of navigation through 
international waterways through the area; 
(b) for achieving a just settlement for the refugee 
problem; 
(c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and 
political independence of every state in the area, through 
measures including the establishment of demilitarized 
zones; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special 
representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish 
and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful 
and accepted settlement in accordance with the provision 
and principles in this resolution; 
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4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security 
Council on the progress of the efforts of the special 
representative as soon as possible. 
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting. 
Resolution No 338 (1973) of 22 October, 1973 
CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL OF ITS PARTS 
The Security Council, 
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease 
all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, 
no later than twelve hours after the moment of the adoption 
of this decision, in the positions they now occupy; 
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately 
after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the 
cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties con- 
cerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a 
just and durable peace in the Middle East. 
Adopted at the 1747th Meeting. 
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APPENDIX F: 
THE BALFOUR DECLATION 
Foreign Office, 
2 November, 1917 
Dear Lord Rothchild, 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His 
Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with 
Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and 
approved by the Cabinet: 
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment 
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will 
use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this 
object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done 
which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political 
status enjoyed by Jews in any country". 
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to 
the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. 
Yours sincerely, 
Arthur James Balfour 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. A note by Carter at-the foot of this document states: 
"I have been informed that the expression 'West Bank' 
is understood by the Government of Israel to mean 
'Judea and Samaria. "' 
2. Two letters were sent - one to Begin, the other to Sadat - 
which were identical in all respects 
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